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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation explores the prospects for Christian-Muslim dialogue regarding 
the ecological crisis. It compares the views of Sallie McFague and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 
leaders in ecological theology and ethics. In 1990, at the Spirit and Nature symposium at 
Middlebury College, they dialogued unsuccessfully. They could not understand each 
other across the ideological gulf of McFague’s postmodernism and Nasr’s traditionalism.  
However, beneath an outer shell of significant differences, McFague and Nasr 
share profound common ground. They both understand the ecological crisis as a result of 
the desacralization of nature in human perception. They believe that Western 
Christianity’s failure to cultivate a spiritual vision of nature set the stage for the 
development of a thoroughly mechanistic and desacralized worldview in the Renaissance 
and Enlightenment. They both articulate visions for the resacralization of nature. While 
unique, these visions both image the world as a body animated by the Spirit of God rather 
 viii 
 
than as a lifeless machine. Furthermore, both authors find insights to support human 
harmony with the natural world in the mystical wisdom of their traditions.  
The dissertation models a process of dialogue that unveils McFague’s and Nasr’s 
common ground. The first two chapters explore their stories and contexts, modeling the 
importance of getting to know one’s interlocutor. In chapters three and four, their overall 
ecological theologies are outlined. Only in chapter five, in a dialogical setting in which 
both authors’ ideas are viewed empathetically, are their differences engaged. Chapter six 
looks at their common ground, tracing how it grows out of their mutual ecological 
concerns. Finally, chapter seven creatively synthesizes their ideas, especially their 
proposals for the reintegration of nature into cities and their descriptions of the mystical 
understanding of the God-world and human-world relationships.  
The dissertation explores how the mystical consciousness of the unity of the 
human body with the body of the world needs to be cultivated more widely, and extended 
into the practice of interfaith dialogue. Christians, Muslims, and all others concerned 
about the ecological crisis need to become more aware of our unity and see through the 
illusion that we are separate. 
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PREFACE 
In the past several years Christian-Muslim dialogue has become a major 
intellectual, spiritual, and ethical concern of mine. I have had numerous opportunities to 
engage in dialogue, worship, and study with Muslim friends, neighbors, and colleagues. 
Another major intellectual, spiritual, and ethical concern of mine is the ecological crisis. 
This dissertation represents a coming together of these two important pieces of my life. I 
hope that this work will strengthen and enhance future efforts at dialogue between 
Muslims and Christians, especially pertaining to the themes of the appreciation of nature 
and the problem of the ecological crisis. Let us continue to celebrate our distinctions 
while removing the many veils of separateness. We are all one in God and on Earth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Purpose of Study 
The ecological crisis appears to be the most serious threat human beings have 
ever collectively encountered. It is a crisis of human origins, a result of our ruthless 
domination and exploitation of fellow human beings and nature in the quest for material 
wealth and power. On a deep level, we are relating to nature as if it were an inanimate 
machine rather than an animate body. We have lost our spiritual vision of nature which 
recognizes the world as sacred and intuits the interconnections of ourselves and all life in 
God. Because the ecological crisis is global in nature the solution to the crisis itself must 
be global. Human beings from different civilizations and cultures need to identify shared 
values and ways of viewing the world that can shape a new global paradigm of 
relationship between humanity and nature. Religions are called to radically shift their 
adherents’ worldviews, but how will they accomplish this daunting task? 
Within the context of this enormous problem that calls for a dramatic collective 
human response—a global shift in consciousness—this dissertation considers one piece 
of the solution to the ecological crisis: interfaith dialogue and cooperation. Religious 
communities cannot merely address this problem in their own spheres of influence but 
must dialogue and cooperate in order to fashion an effective global response. Within this 
effort, this dissertation looks at the possibility for such dialogue and cooperation between 
Islam and Christianity. These are the two largest and fastest growing religions in the 
world, and the dissertation does not attempt to explore the full breadth of their responses 
to the ecological crisis. Instead, it focuses on the potential for mutually supportive 
  
2 
dialogue in the area of ecological theology and ethics through a comparison and synthesis 
of the works of Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Sallie McFague.  McFague and Nasr, thought 
leaders in the Christian and Muslim communities respectively, identify both a spiritual 
crisis and a crisis of values as roots of the ecological crisis. They agree that nature has 
become desacralized in human perception, and that the religions of the world are called to 
lead humanity in a process of resacralization of nature. However, throughout their 
careers, they have not seen eye to eye. 
Nasr and McFague had the opportunity to dialogue in 1990 at the Spirit and 
Nature symposium at Middlebury College in Vermont. This was an intentional effort to 
bring together influential religious leaders from around the world to help fashion a global 
religious response to the ecological crisis. But the attempt at fostering dialogue was not 
very successful for McFague and Nasr; actually, they disagreed more sharply than any 
other two thinkers present. This dissertation is not about two thinkers who obviously 
agree or can easily find common ground, but rather about two thinkers from different life 
worlds who missed their opportunity for interfaith dialogue. McFague and Nasr represent 
the potential failure of an exchange of ideas and recognition of common ground between 
the Christian and Muslim religions in general. In seeking to discover their common 
ground, despite their failure to recognize it themselves, this dissertation seeks to present a 
way forward for Christian-Muslim dialogue regarding the ecological crisis. It seeks to 
negotiate the ideological barriers that stood between Nasr’s and McFague’s respective 
responses to the ecological crisis, and to identify the substantial common ground which 
these authors share in addressing the spiritual crisis at the root of the ecological crisis. In 
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doing so, it attempts to model a process for successful dialogue between Muslim and 
Christian interlocutors on this pressing issue of mutual concern. 
McFague and Nasr share the project of restoring awareness of the spiritual value 
of nature by connecting nature to the ultimate source of value, that is, God. However, 
they disagree sharply over such debatable issues as the place of science in theology and 
the use of traditional language for God versus inclusive language. This comparison is an 
exercise in Christian-Muslim dialogue that presents the possibility of ideologically 
disparate religionists finding common ground on the ecological crisis, working together 
to reawaken a sense of the sacred value of nature without letting persistent ideological 
conflicts block conversation.  It compares McFague’s strikingly innovative and Nasr’s 
solidly traditional proposals for addressing the ecological crisis in light of their common 
ground. The comparison yields new insights on how to creatively synthesize tradition and 
innovation in ways that strengthen Christian-Muslim discourse and religious discourse in 
general on the ecological crisis. 
Context—First Attempts at Dialogue 
 One of the relatively early attempts to foster global interfaith dialogue concerning 
the environmental crisis was the “Spirit and Nature” symposium at Middlebury College 
in 1990, at which both Sallie McFague and Seyyed Hossein Nasr were featured 
presenters, along with the Dalai Lama and other significant figures from major world 
religions. The symposium built upon earlier efforts such as the 1986 interfaith dialogue in 
Assisi, Italy, which also addressed environmental concerns. Since that time, numerous 
other interfaith dialogues on the environment have been organized—notable among them 
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are the eight “Religion, Science, and the Environment” symposia organized by Patriarch 
Bartholomew of Constantinople since 1995.
1
 The lead organizer of the symposium at 
Middlebury College, Steven C. Rockefeller, later chaired the commission which authored 
the Earth Charter (published in draft form in 1997 and 1999, and final form in 2000). 
The Earth Charter is a global document of spiritually-centered environmental values and 
ethics which built on the World Charter for Nature (1982), a UN document.  
In his major speech at the symposium, “Faith and Community in an Ecological 
Age,” Rockefeller defines the ecological crisis as a spiritual and ethical crisis and issues 
an impassioned call for religions to unite in guiding the global human community into a 
new, more ethical and sustainable way of relating to nature. Of course, this call for 
religions to unite is no simple one for religions to answer. As Rockefeller assesses it, 
“The challenge [for religions] is to preserve their religious and cultural uniqueness 
without letting it operate as a cause of narrow and divisive sectarianism that contradicts 
the vision of divine unity and peace.”2 For Rockefeller, religions that meet this challenge 
of eschewing “narrow and divisive sectarianism” and overcoming “social and ideological 
issues that underlie much of the conflict between religions” will be able to “help the 
human race at this critical moment in the evolution of its consciousness”…and “make us 
see beyond the limitations of our ignorance, pride, and fear and to awaken in us a new 
                                                        
1“The History of RSE Symposium,” Religion, Science, and the Environment, accessed July 17, 
2014, http://www.rsesymposia.org/more.php?theitemid=58&catid=27.  
 
2
 Steven C. Rockefeller, “Faith and Community in an Ecological Age” in Spirit and Nature: Why 
The Environment is a Religious Issue, ed. Steven C. Rockefeller and John C. Elder (Boston: Beacon 
Press,1992), 169. 
  
5 
ecological faith.”3 Rockefeller’s hope is for a new ecological faith, not uniform across 
religions but nevertheless universal, and supportive of global standards for environmental 
ethics. Although this new faith will be rooted in “ancient traditions” it will be new by 
virtue of its incorporation of “the new knowledge of the interdependence of the whole 
earth community.”4 This new knowledge, presumably, would be drawn primarily from 
contemporary biological sciences.  
One problematic aspect of Rockefeller’s rhetoric is that it presents the basic marks 
of the “new ecological faith” as if they can, should, and will be adopted by all religions. 
Those religions which do not get on board seem to be judged in advance as “narrow and 
divisive” and limited by “ignorance, pride, and fear.” The use of such pejorative language 
to describe those who do not embrace the “new ecological faith” could alienate 
traditionalists such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr who have much common ground with 
Rockefeller and other progressive Westerners who value nature, and yet have deep issues 
with the “new ecological faith”—not because of a narrow fundamentalism or divisive 
sectarianism, but rather because of a concern for preserving the integrity and sacredness 
of their living religious traditions and cultures.  
 Rockefeller’s description of the new ecological faith in “Faith and Community in 
an Ecological Age” has much in common with Sallie McFague’s proposals in the field of 
ecological theology. Rockefeller, like McFague, includes in his methodology a thorough 
deconstruction of major parts of Medieval and biblical Christian theology, which “can be 
                                                        
3Rockefeller, “Faith and Community,” 169. 
 
4
Ibid. 
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seen as generating anthropocentric, dualistic, hierarchical, and patriarchal ideas and 
attitudes that are problematic from an ecological as well as a democratic perspective.”5 
Significantly, Rockefeller rejects the Medieval picture of the hierarchy of existence (the 
Great Chain of Being) because of its dissonance with modern Western science and 
because this view of the universe is hierarchical and supports patriarchy, and is thus at 
odds with Rockefeller’s democratic and egalitarian vision.6 Rockefeller is supportive of 
an emergent Christian theology which is panentheistic and emphasizes the immanence of 
God while deemphasizing the transcendence of God.
7
 This new Christian theology 
deconstructs the monarchical image of God and, in the words of Rosemary Radford 
Ruether, “level[s] the heavens and exalt[s] the earth and create[s] a new world without 
masters and slaves, rulers and subjects.”8 Another significant aspect of Rockefeller’s 
approach, which he shares with McFague and Nasr, is that he problematizes the Cartesian 
ego and the Cartesian-Newtonian mechanistic worldview of the modern and industrial 
period.
9
 Like McFague, Rockefeller embraces “contemporary physics and ecology” as 
the basis for “an organic and holistic view of nature” which can displace the mechanism 
and dualism of the Cartesian-Newtonian model of the universe. He does not seriously 
consider recovering earlier models of the universe, such as the medieval model. 
                                                        
5
Ibid., 147. 
 
6
Ibid., 148. 
 
7
Ibid., 160. 
 
8
Rosemary R. Ruether, Sexism and God Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1983), 30. Quoted in Steven C. Rockefeller, “Faith and Community in an Ecological Age” in Spirit 
and Nature: Why The Environment is a Religious Issue, 6. 
 
9
 Rockefeller, “Faith and Community,” 150-154. 
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Rockefeller attempts to articulate the parameters of a new ecological faith in 
conversation with other great religions besides Christianity, such as Hinduism, Judaism, 
Taoism, Buddhism and Islam. However, his treatment of these traditions is markedly 
unequal. Buddhism (and to a lesser extent, Taoism) is highlighted because of its critique 
of the ego and correspondence with the view of the world as an evolving organism.
10
 For 
McFague, Buddhism is also the primary religious other in constructing her organic model 
of eco-theology and ethics. Unfortunately, Rockefeller gives very little attention to 
Hinduism, Judaism and Islam. He rightly argues that certain forms of Islamic theology 
are in agreement with panentheism and that the Quran “warns against the extremes of 
anthropocentrism,” but his treatment of the subject is very terse and quickly departs from 
the theme of Islam and the environment, going on a kind of apologetic tangent about the 
true meaning of jihad; in this case, Rockefeller’s rhetoric seems more designed to 
convince a Western, non-Muslim audience that this religion can be included in the global 
interfaith coalition, rather than seriously considering what Islam brings to the 
conversation both in support and critique of his vision. He does not deal with the deep 
tensions and contradictions between his “new ecological faith” and traditional Islam, such 
as surface in this dissertation through a comparison of the works of Sallie McFague and 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr. For example, he does not consider how his critique of the Judeo-
Christian tradition would be received by Muslims. However, by implication, his support 
of a deconstruction of the traditional Christian picture of God can also, to a certain extent, 
be applied to the traditional Islamic picture of God.  
                                                        
10
Ibid., 156-158, 161. 
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In the name of the ecological crisis and egalitarian democracy, Rockefeller 
supports major changes in the Christian tradition as necessary prerequisites to the growth 
of the new ecological faith he promotes. Because the ecological crisis developed in the 
West it is not unreasonable to implicate the Christian tradition as part of the problem. 
Yet, because the ecological crisis did not develop in the Islamic world, Muslim theology 
may serve as a kind of experimental control in terms of parsing out what exactly in the 
Christian tradition is problematic in terms of fostering negative views of nature. Nasr 
would agree not only with the critique of dualism in historic Christianity, with its 
bifurcation of the natural and supernatural, but also with the critique that Christianity 
historically misconstrued God’s transcendence as distance while neglecting God’s 
immanence so as to make God seem separate from rather than present to the world. 
Another major issue that Nasr raises is the absence of a sacred law in Christianity, which 
led to the sacred/secular dualism in terms of everyday life. However, Nasr and, 
presumably, other traditional Muslims, will not easily accept a program of deconstruction 
of Christian scripture or traditional images of God which Islam shares with Christianity. 
Traditional Islam supports an emphasis on God’s immanence, but not at the expense of 
God’s transcendence. Finally, traditional Islam joins Rockefeller, McFague, and other 
progressive Western environmentalists in rejecting the Cartesian-Newtonian worldview, 
but it is more interested in preserving a traditional Islamic hierarchical cosmology based 
on traditional Islamic sciences (including the Great Chain of Being) than in adopting the 
organic worldview of postmodern Western physics and biology with the Western values 
of egalitarianism and progress that come with it. 
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                On the one hand, it is important to affirm the value of the “Spirit and Nature” 
symposium, which brought Nasr and McFague into dialogue. On the other hand, it is an 
important conclusion of this dissertation that we should seek to foster interfaith dialogue 
that does not avoid the areas of tension and disagreement between traditions, but rather 
engages these conflicts constructively while lifting up and recognizing the substantial 
common ground that we nevertheless can find. In the dissertation, which is a model for 
dialogue, acknowledging differences fully and fairly allows for discovery of substantial 
common ground on a deeper level. Fair observations of difference allow the conversation 
to proceed through the outer membrane of ideology and value-conflicts into the mystical 
heart of religions, rather than finding vague common ground outside the membrane of 
religious and cultural identity. There is a way to get through this membrane, which is in 
fact permeable, without destroying it. Respecting the permeable membrane is important; 
it needs to remain intact during dialogue rather than being deconstructed or invalidated 
for deeper connections to be made.
11
  
Problem—Dialogical Stalemate 
 At the conclusion of the “Spirit and Nature” symposium the presenters engaged in 
a reflective dialogue on the exercise itself, and the prospect of religious cooperation in 
forging a universal environmental ethic. At one point, Steven Rockefeller, who 
moderated the dialogue, asked the presenters whether the major world religions would be 
willing to cooperate on environmental problems in the near future. Nasr, responding to 
                                                        
11
 The idea of the permeable membrane is adapted from the philosophy of Howard Thurman. See, 
for example: Howard Thurman, The Search for Common Ground: An Inquiry Into the Basis of Man’s 
Experience of Community (Richmond, Indiana: Friends United Press, 1986 [1973]), 34-39. 
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this question, frankly observed his profound discomfort with McFague’s method of 
theological deconstruction.  
We have been presented with a very eloquent discourse by Professor McFague 
concerning the deconstruction of certain images of the Christian tradition. For me, 
as one who happens to be a Muslim, who knows a little about Christianity, and 
has lived a long time with Christians—even for me, it is very difficult to 
understand how if Christ said, ‘Father, forgive them for they know not what they 
do,’ that now the image of Father will somehow have to be changed…I only give 
this as an example. This means that within Christianity there is, if not a crisis, 
then certainly a tension of views which is not at all the same as in other 
religions.
12
  
 
However, despite this major stumbling block for Nasr, his assessment of the prospect of 
interfaith dialogue regarding the environment was still cautiously optimistic. Nasr argued 
that those in every tradition who are attracted to ecological questions are also attracted to 
the inward or esoteric dimensions of their traditions. Because, in Nasr’s conception of 
interfaith dialogue, “only the hearts of religions really meet,” it is likely that those 
religionists who focus on nature as well as the “inward… mystical… contemplative 
dimension” of their traditions will also be able to engage in “a profound dialogue 
religiously.”13 Nasr concluded: “[D]espite all the troubles there is definitely the 
possibility of both discourse and accord among religions as far as the environment is 
concerned.”14 Nasr’s cautiously optimistic assessment of the hope for interfaith dialogue 
will be borne out by the simulated dialogue of this dissertation. 
                                                        
12
 Steven C. Rockefeller, “Keeping Faith with Life” in Spirit and Nature: Why The Environment is 
a Religious Issue, 180-181. 
 
13
 Ibid., 180. 
 
14
 Ibid. 
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 In the same dialogue, McFague responded to Rockefeller’s question about 
whether it is appropriate to attempt to develop a universal environmental ethic to be 
accepted by all religions and cultures. McFague problematized this vision as potentially 
being a new type of universalism, much like the so-called universalism of white male 
Euro-American supremacy which for so long suppressed women’s voices. “So when 
asked about a universal ethic, I in turn ask: is this some kind of watering-down of 
differences? Is it a refusal to entertain how the very different voices that are coming to us 
and that have not been allowed to be part of the discourse in the past? If it were that, then 
I think we would want to negate it.” However, despite this caution about instituting a new 
universalism, which would potentially silence new voices entering the discourse 
(previously limited to certain highly educated white male Euro-Americans), McFague 
nevertheless voiced support for the “world ethic of sustainability” at that time contained 
in the UN’s Caring for the World document.  
People are part of nature. Every life form warrants respect and preservation. All 
persons should take responsibility for their impacts on nature. People should treat 
all creatures decently. The needs of individuals in society should be met. Each 
generation should leave to the future a world that is at least as diverse and 
productive as the one it inherited and so forth. This to me is not a mask for a new 
kind of universalism. No do I think it waters down the differences among the 
various religions.
15
  
 
For McFague, that type of environmental ethic is so straightforward and undeniable that 
she believed it could be accepted by all the major world religions, on their own terms, 
without compromising their integrity and uniqueness. 
                                                        
15
 Rockefeller, “Keeping Faith,” 185. 
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 Nasr, responding directly to McFague, agreed, but with a proviso. Although he 
believed that all of the ethical principles of the Caring for the World report, as elaborated 
by McFague, would be accepted, by and large, by leadership in all quarters of the Muslim 
world, Nasr nevertheless argued that a global consensus on environmental ethics might 
not be necessary for an effective response to the ecological crisis. Nasr argued that while 
the ecological crisis is global, action is local. “Human beings have to pay attention to 
what they’re doing locally—to their house, to their local environment, their office, to 
their farm, whatever they’re doing.”16 McFague was somewhat uncomfortable with 
Rockefeller’s idea of “a universal ethic of sustainability that will be accepted by all the 
different religious traditions and by the many different cultures in the world,” because she 
was concerned that marginalized voices might be excluded by this ethic just as Western 
women were once excluded from white male Euro-American discourse. McFague values 
diversity and does not want to see the world’s religions homogenized. Nasr, apparently, 
was even more uncomfortable with the prospect of this ethic’s universal adoption. For 
Nasr agreement on this ethic was a possibility but not a necessity. One reason for Nasr’s 
apparent uneasiness with the ethic and its relatively low-priority status for him could be 
that his own voice and perspective, that of traditional Islam, was not authentically 
included in the process of formulating this ethic. Although McFague’s description of the 
ethic cites certain environmental principles that are difficult to disagree with, as 
Rockefeller’s essay on “Faith and Community in an Ecological Age” demonstrates, this 
ethic is not, as it were, religion neutral. Rather, it grows out of a certain religious or 
                                                        
16
 Ibid. 
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spiritual orientation which Rockefeller calls the “new ecological faith,” a faith that mixes 
fairly well with postmodern Christianity and certain forms of Buddhism, but is at odds in 
several ways with traditional Islam.  
Later on in the dialogue, McFague again addresses the problem of attempting to 
combine all religious voices into one in support of a universal ethic. She responds, in 
particular, to Rabbi Schorsch’s hopeful comment that the ecological crisis, if recognized 
as a common danger, could “help religions and traditions transcend their particularity and 
begin to raise their sights to the welfare of mankind in general.”17 For McFague, the 
problem itself, if given the attention it deserves by religious leaders, could of its own 
accord lead to solutions and concerted action by people of various faiths despite religious 
differences.  
Perhaps one of the most important things that the religious leaders can do, 
because the religions are in many ways the guardians of the values and 
worldviews of culture, is to make this common danger speak—be seen for what it 
is in its immensity. Those of us gathered here, although we see things in different 
ways, can at least agree that we are faced with an enormous danger, and that part 
of what we mean by salvation is the well-being of our planet and its creatures. 
Whatever else one wants to say about salvation, surely, one is talking about 
health, the health of our planet and all its creatures.
18
 
 
McFague’s comment is sensitive to the fact that “[t]hose of us gathered here…see things 
in different ways.” The most obvious differences, out of all the presenters of different 
faiths, were actually between Nasr and McFague—Nasr quite directly expressed his 
discomfort with McFague’s method of theological deconstruction (which is not merely 
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her personal approach but represents a major trend in Christian theology and Protestant 
theology in particular). McFague’s perceptive comment also anticipates other differences 
between herself and Nasr, for example, their different interpretations of the meaning of 
salvation. For McFague, salvation is decidedly “earthy” and not concerned with a life 
beyond this world—post-resurrection—as understood in traditional Christian and Muslim 
theology. Far from being unique to McFague, this turn towards a focus on this-worldly 
salvation is part and parcel of postmodern theology in general. In deference to the more 
traditional view, McFague pleads for agreement that “part of what we mean by salvation 
is the well-being of our planet and its creatures…[w]hatever else one wants to say about 
salvation, surely, one is talking about health, the health of our planet and all its 
creatures.”19 McFague is of course aware that Nasr and the Muslim tradition in general, 
as well as the Christian tradition and many contemporary Christians, interpret salvation 
as being primarily related to a future, transcendent state that is fundamentally other-
worldly. For McFague, at least at this time in 1991, what is a major part of salvation, that 
is, the present and future health of people and planet, is for many other religionists in the 
Muslim and Christian traditions the minor part of salvation. Therefore, in 
acknowledgement of these and other significant differences, McFague proposes that we 
“make this common danger speak.” McFague does not expect religions, which she 
acknowledges as “the guardians of the values and worldviews of culture,” to let down 
their guards, so to speak, in the formulation of a universal ecological religion which 
would of necessity betray the values and worldviews of certain cultures, globally 
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speaking. Instead, she proposes that the problem itself be taken as the locus of common 
ground rather than some unattainable religious synthesis. She is apparently well aware 
that a synthesis of the religions of the postmodern and highly industrialized Western 
world and the religions of more traditional civilizations such as certain parts of the 
Muslim world, which Nasr represents, will not be readily possible. To understand more 
deeply the contradictions of values and worldviews that Nasr and McFague in particular 
represent, a sociological coda will be useful. Robert Bellah, in “Religious Evolution,” 
provides an insightful description of the religious paradigm that McFague and other 
postmodern Protestants are operating in compared to the paradigm of traditional Islam, 
Christianity, and the other great religions of the axial age.
20
 
Reflections on Method—A Sociological Coda 
In “Religious Evolution” Bellah presents a typography of religious evolution or 
development in five major periods: primitive, archaic, historic, early modern, and 
modern. This terminology is different than the terms used throughout this dissertation, 
which are primarily and intentionally those of McFague and Nasr. Roughly, McFague 
uses “postmodern” for Bellah’s “modern”; Nasr mostly uses the term “modern man” 
pejoratively to speak of a “Promethean man” in rebellion against God, but could possibly 
translate Bellah’s “modern man” as “modern religious man” to get roughly at the same 
meaning. Also, Bellah’s presentation of various historic periods of religious evolution is 
at odds with Nasr’s worldview in general (in that it relies upon the application of 
evolutionary theory, which he generally rejects). Furthermore, Bellah’s typology of the 
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historical religions, which includes both traditional Christianity and Islam, more 
adequately describes Christianity than it does Islam; in particular, the characteristics of 
dualism between the natural and supernatural worlds
21
, as well as a dualism between 
religious and political life
22
, do not apply to Islam as they apply to Western Christianity. 
Bellah’s analysis misses the central theme of unity or tawhid in Islam, which leads to an 
integration of the natural and the supernatural, as well as the religious and political, not 
found in Christianity. Despite these problems and others, aspects of Bellah’s schema are 
helpful in understanding the fundamental tensions manifested in the dialogue between 
Nasr and McFague, insofar as Nasr operates in what Bellah calls the “historical” 
paradigm and McFague operates in what he calls the “modern” paradigm. 
Bellah argues that the historical religions, including traditional Christianity and 
Islam, contain a strong element of world denial based on “[t]he discovery of an entirely 
different realm of religious reality” beyond the material world. Again, his interpretation 
of the implications of this discovery apply more to Christianity than to Islam, insofar as 
he argues that the focus on this reality leads to “a derogation of the value of the given 
empirical cosmos.”23 Certainly, in Christianity this has most often been the case, despite 
the notable exceptions of mystics such as Hildegard of Bingen, Francis of Assisi, Julian 
of Norwich, Meister Eckhart, etc., who transcended the world at the same time that they 
loved the world and recognized the Spirit permeating it. In Islam, however, because it is 
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not dualistic in the way mainstream historical Christianity is—in terms of separating the 
natural and the supernatural—the focus on the next life has often served to intensify this-
worldly ethical obligations, including “environmental” ethical obligations to animals and 
trees, and with regard to water conservation, frugality, etc. Nevertheless, Bellah aptly 
recognizes the hierarchical location of the supernatural realm in historic religions, insofar 
as it is “‘above’ this world in terms of both value and control” and insofar as this implies 
that “both the supernatural and earthly worlds are themselves organized in terms of a 
religiously legitimated hierarchy.”24 Hierarchy and transcendence are primary aspects of 
Nasr’s metaphysical cosmology, which affirms the hierarchical structure of the universe 
as understood, in Western medieval symbolism, by the Great Chain of Being.  
Also, Bellah describes how, in the historic religions, otherworldly salvation is the 
primary goal of religious activity: 
Religious concern, focused on this life in primitive and archaic religions, now 
tends to focus on life in the other realm, which may be either infinitely superior 
or, under certain circumstances, with the emergence of various conceptions of 
hell, infinitely worse. Under these circumstances the religious goal of salvation 
(or enlightenment, release and so forth) is for the first time the central religious 
preoccupation…Religious action in the historic religions is thus above all action 
necessary for salvation.
25
 
 
Again here, it is important to nuance how this general typology applies to Islam in 
general and Nasr in particular. On the one hand, Nasr’s alignment with the historic 
paradigm of salvation as Bellah describes it manifests in his insistence on a spirituality 
that seeks to know God transcendently, beyond this world, in a foreshadowing of 
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humanity’s ultimate destiny with God beyond this world. For Nasr knowing God beyond 
the world is also the precondition for understanding the symbolic meaning of nature 
insofar as it reflects higher orders of reality, ultimately pointing to God. On the other 
hand, because of its emphasis on the theme of unity, religious action in Islam, even in 
what Bellah might call its historical phase, is arguably “identical with the whole of life” 
insofar as the Shariah applies not only to ritualistic acts but to business, family life, 
architecture, eating, sexuality, and all other aspects of everyday life. Bellah reserves this 
kind of “whole of life” religious action to the early modern period; again, this more aptly 
fits the historical development of Christianity. Another nuance is that Nasr’s particular 
“religious action” as a Sufi Muslim includes a search for union with God that is, in a 
sense, present-focused. Sufi Muslims, who represent the sapiential or contemplative 
dimension of Islam, have typically subordinated the goal of future salvation to the higher 
goal of divine union, the former being motivated by the lower self’s fear of punishment 
or desire for reward, and the latter being motivated by the higher self’s love of Truth.  
Still, despite several important qualifications of Bellah’s theory as it applies to 
Islam, much of the profound tension between McFague and Nasr can be seen as a result 
of Nasr’s allegiance, as a traditionalist Muslim, to the key themes of world denial, cosmic 
hierarchy and otherworldy salvation so central to traditional Christianity and Islam, 
whereas McFague operates in what Bellah calls the “modern” paradigm (again, roughly, 
Bellah’s “modern” corresponds best with what McFague calls “postmodern”). 
Furthermore, another source of tension is the fact that some of the key negative elements, 
environmentally speaking, that McFague and other Christian eco-theologians 
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intentionally leave behind by transitioning from the historic to modern paradigms of 
Christianity—e.g. natural/supernatural dualism and denial of the world in a derogatory 
sense—are actually not characteristics of Islam in its “historical” or traditional form. 
Christianity and Islam indeed have unique histories, contexts, and characteristics, such 
that the implications of maintaining tradition or embracing postmodernity are not simply 
equivalent from a Christian and a Muslim point of view, respectively; in fact, the 
implications are complexly different. Much of the failure in interfaith dialogue between 
Christians and Muslims stems from a failure on either end to appreciate this complexly 
different set of implications. In this regard, a theory like Bellah’s that attempts to yoke 
the historical development of Christianity and Islam to the same typology, without 
carefully parsing out the profound differences, is probably more harmful than helpful; it 
becomes an occasion for Christians to project their situation on Muslims and wrongly 
expect them to pass through equivalent stages of development.
26
 The process of 
theological deconstruction and reconstruction, for McFague and other contemporary 
Protestants, appears to be the only way to obtain a vital ecological theology, and appears 
to be more creative than it is destructive (insofar as the recovery option, medieval 
Christian theology, is no longer a living option and carries with it profound problems). 
Yet, for Muslims such as Nasr, for whom traditional Islam is a living tradition with a 
functional ecological theology and ethic, rather than a memory from a bygone era, such a 
process would appear to be much more destructive than creative and, moreover, 
theologically and politically infeasible. The most useful aspect of Bellah’s typology, for 
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the purposes of this work, is his description of the profound shifts from historical, to early 
modern, to the modern phases of religion which, like his whole schema, applies most 
directly to the historical development or evolution of Western Christianity. 
Bellah argues that the Protestant Reformation ushered in what he calls the “early 
modern” period of religious evolution, which is defined primarily by “the collapse of the 
hierarchical structuring of both this and the other world.”27 Significantly, Bellah notes 
that, during the early modern period, “A great deal of the cosmological baggage of 
medieval Christianity is dropped as superstition.” This observation holds true for 
McFague. This early modern stage leads into the modern stage, which Bellah claims is 
“characterized by a deepening analysis of the very nature of symbolization itself.” 
McFague, in her extensive and self-conscious discussions of metaphors and models, 
clearly exemplifies this characteristic. Bellah highlights Kant as a representative of 
modern religion insofar as he “ground[s] religions in the structure of the ethical life rather 
than in a metaphysics claiming cognitive adequacy.”28 McFague, in her theology, clearly 
follows this pattern of ethical rather than metaphysical grounding of religion, especially 
as her theology matures around the ethical theme of limiting our egos and consumption 
through the practice of kenosis. Another key figure Bellah discusses is Karl Barth, whom 
he describes as attempting a rearticulation of traditional dualistic symbolism; but, Bellah 
argues, because of his ambiguity regarding dogma, Barth actually produces a “regressive 
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reassertion of the adequacy of the early modern theological formulation.”29 McFague, 
who began her theological career as a Barthian, had the occasion, through rejecting Barth, 
to consciously reject the traditional Christian symbolism of a hierarchically conceived 
God beyond this world as irrelevant to the needs and problems of the modern or, in her 
language, postmodern era. Her critique was emboldened by the fact that Barth’s brand of 
highly dualistic world denial could not speak to the ecological crisis and the need for a 
resacralization of nature. McFague is quite aptly described by Bellah’s characterization of 
modern religion, which, breaking from the historical phase of world-denial, affirms the 
world and seeks to discover “an entirely new mode of religious symbolization.”30 
McFague is a fairly good image of what Bellah calls “modern man,” a “self capable, 
within limits, of continual self-transformation and capable, again within limits, of 
remaking the world including the very symbolic forms with which he deals with it, even 
the forms that state the unalterable conditions of his own existence.” As Bellah predicts 
of “modern man,” McFague has, throughout her career, documented her “continual self-
transformation”; furthermore, she has “developed [traditional religious symbolism] in 
new directions, but with growing awareness that it is symbolism and that man in the last 
analysis is responsible for the choice of his symbolism.” Besides the fact that McFague 
departs from Bellah’s symbolism of “man” and male language in terms of understanding 
herself, humanity in general, and God, and prefers “postmodern” to “modern,” another 
important distinction between her theological method and Bellah’s prediction is that 
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instead of “maintain[ing] and develop[ing] [traditional religious symbolism] in new 
directions,” McFague is more aptly described as deconstructing and reconstructing this 
symbolism. This is the mode of religious action that is most strikingly at odds with Nasr’s 
religious sensibility; which, in this regard, is thoroughly traditional in its focus on 
remembrance, contemplation, and preservation of traditional texts and doctrines. Like the 
modern self of Bellah’s predictions, McFague is clearly engaged in “remaking the world 
to conform to value demands,” rather than engaging in world rejection and deferring the 
satisfaction of value demands until the Day of Judgment in a world beyond this world.  
While Bellah’s typology needs to be interpreted carefully and qualified 
extensively in making comparisons between McFague and Nasr, the most basic tensions 
between what Bellah calls the historic and modern phases of religion are represented by 
Nasr, a traditional Muslim, and McFague, a postmodern Protestant. Part of the challenge 
of this work has been to move beyond the apparent stalemate experienced between Nasr 
and McFague when they both made presentations and engaged in dialogue at the “Spirit 
and Nature” symposium. In fact, as their careers continued from that point, their initial 
ideological stalemate persisted to block a deep exchange of ideas (or even an attempt 
thereof) despite the fact that both authors, in McFague’s words, continued to “make this 
common danger speak.”31  
In this dissertation, we have explored, for the first time, the profound common 
ground in terms of theological mission and vision that is discernable in the works of both 
authors as they have plumbed the depths of the ecological crisis as spiritual crisis. As 
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Nasr suggested at the “Spirit and Nature” symposium, there appears to be a place at the 
heart of their respective ecological theologies where McFague and Nasr meet in a kind of 
transcendent unity of mystical spiritual vision and purpose which leaves their major 
ideological and religious differences—what might be called their outer doctrinal 
membranes—essentially intact.  
This present work has simulated a conversation that is fruitful in its exchange of 
religious insights and ideas despite profound unresolvable tensions in metaphysics, 
cosmology, and theological method. While the paradigm differences between the authors 
are not resolvable, dialogue between the authors and others from their respective 
paradigms and traditions could nevertheless lead to collaboration, not in terms of 
reaching an agreement or compromise on the terms of traditionalism and postmodernity, 
but rather in terms of mutually enriching each other’s ecological theologies and finding 
actionable common ground. 
A Humanist Evolutionary Perspective 
In the Social Conquest of Earth, E. O. Wilson presents an evolutionary 
perspective on religion that is also helpful to reflect upon in terms of the purpose and 
methodology of this dissertation. Wilson, a secular humanist, argues that religion and 
morality have developed in human culture as a result of the process of natural selection. 
For Wilson, religions are evolutionarily adaptive insofar as they are used to reinforce a 
sense of a particular tribe’s superiority, help tribe members bond, encourage altruism 
among members of the same tribe, and strengthen the tribe through proselytization.
32
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Wilson, who is quite skeptical about the existence of a God or gods, and about the 
authenticity of religious experience, sees all religions, ancient and modern, as “no more 
than a tribe united by a creation myth.” In dissatisfaction with the tribalism and 
counterfactual creation myths of organized religions, Wilson asserts that “[h]umankind 
deserves better.”33 While apparently valuing religion insofar as it supports “the search for 
truth”34 and helps humans achieve “spiritual fulfillment,”35 Wilson argues forcefully 
against devotion to organized religions. He argues that the advance of science and the 
process of globalization is already eroding the validity of creation myths and other 
religious dogmas, but he also calls for efforts to publicly discredit such religious truth 
claims and the leaders who make them.
36
 Wilson’s hope is that people could put their 
religious differences aside and agree on a simple ethic of protecting our planet, “the only 
home humanity will ever have.”37 By liberating ourselves from tribalism and myth, and 
embracing a simple ethic of common decency and respect for scientific truth, Wilson 
hopes that Earth can be turned into “a permanent paradise for human beings” in the next 
one hundred years.
38
 
My critique of Wilson’s analysis of religion is that within all major religions there 
are significant currents of ethical and spiritual values that transcend group particularity. 
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These values help connect human beings across cultural and religious boundaries, and 
connect human beings empathetically to other forms of life as well. Wilson's experience 
of the Southern Baptist Convention, a largely fundamentalist denomination which is more 
dogmatic and sectarian than mainline Protestant denominations, colors his understanding 
of religion in general.
39
 However, the dominant expressions of Christianity and other 
world religions, historically speaking, do in large part corroborate the evolutionary 
framework that Wilson presents insofar as religion has been used as a tool for the 
cohesion and success of tribal, national, and ethnic groups in competition with others. 
Religions are often used as barriers that delineate and divide these groups, blocking 
cooperation and dialogue. 
Interestingly, the type of interreligious dialogue I am hoping to foster in this 
dissertation, and the nature spirituality and ethic that this dialogue supports, do not fit 
within Wilson’s characterization of religion as a cultural adaptation for group survival. 
Instead, this dialogue and the form of spirituality it points to can be characterized as 
serving a planetary evolutionary purpose in terms of promoting a supra-human end of 
planetary flourishing. We are at an interesting place where evolution and consciousness 
collide. It is possible for us to choose to embrace a cosmic function serving the survival 
needs of all life, which also coincide with the long-term survival needs of human beings.  
Wilson does not provide or speculate about this kind of evolutionary framework 
in this text, but it might be possible to speak about the transition in terms of interreligious 
relations (from competition to harmony) that I imagine could and needs to become the 
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dominant trend in global religious life in terms of the evolutionary language of 
adaptation. Insofar as religions continue to fuel hostility and misunderstanding between 
tribes, nations, and ethnicities, they are becoming increasingly maladaptive; to serve an 
adaptive purpose in the twenty first century and beyond religions must contribute to the 
task of uniting diverse human cultures around the planetary ethical concerns that Wilson 
highlights, such as prevention of global warming and the preservation of biodiversity. In 
Wilson’s understanding of human evolution, there is a give and take between genetic and 
cultural evolution; culture helps define the way we interact with the various hard-wired, 
epigenetic features of our human condition, and continually adapts by natural selection to 
increase our chances for survival. Brain size, for example, a genetic difference, made 
homo sapiens more successful than homo erectus. Neanderthals, who were also displaced 
by homo sapiens, had slightly larger brains than homo sapiens, but a less advanced 
culture. The development of modern science and technology can be seen as a major step 
in the cultural evolution of human beings, one which is rapidly reshaping the ways we 
relate to each other and the rest of the natural world. This rapid increase in technological 
ability and scientific knowledge can be likened to an artificial growth of the human brain, 
increasing our capacities for memory, data collection and analysis, abstract conceptual 
modeling, etc. However, without a corresponding evolution of the heart—that helps us to 
acknowledge human-nature interdependence and embrace empathy for all life—we risk 
using our technologically enhanced brains as tools for our own destruction. The rapid 
evolution of our culture in terms of science and technology calls for a corresponding 
religious and ethical evolution.  
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In this dissertation we will look at the ecological crisis which has been brought 
about through humanity’s misuse of its modern technological prowess. Through a process 
of dialogue, we hope to highlight common features of the worldview, ethics, and 
spirituality of Christianity and Islam which might help to unite human beings from these 
two religions in the common cause of caring for Earth. As Wilson’s critique of religion 
indicates, dogmatism and sectarianism do present obstacles to the success of this 
dialogue, yet these obstacles are not insurmountable. Religions are highly malleable 
cultural forms; while they can be used for narrow tribal purposes, they can also be turned 
towards universal human ends and, even more widely, towards the end of promoting the 
flourishing of life in general, human and non-human. Religions help to harness the innate 
human capabilities for empathic connection that are essential for cooperation. Certain 
forms of exclusive dogmatism effectively set the bounds of this empathy to a ritually 
delineated in-group, simultaneously fostering feelings of hatred and therefore 
disconnection with persons outside the dogmatic perimeter. In their centuries-long history 
of conflict and hostility, Christianity and Islam have developed dogmas that define each 
other in ways that discourage empathic connection, thus stymying dialogue and 
cooperation between Christians and Muslims. In the process of the dialogue that unfolds 
in this dissertation, we will work through the ideological obstacles between Sallie 
McFague and Seyyed Hossein Nasr to glean a common vision for a worldview and 
mysticism that highlights the unity and interconnectedness of humans and the world, and 
fosters a sense of cosmic environmental responsibility for those who embrace this vision. 
This dissertation is limited in scope to a dialogue between two particular thinkers, and 
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does not seek to deal with the barriers to dialogue between Christianity and Islam as such. 
However, it will certainly contribute to such a larger effort. 
Content—Chapter Outline 
The first two chapters of the dissertation lay out the life and times of Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr and Sallie McFague. These chapters are different stylistically insofar as 
they represent the different ways in which each author chooses to tell their life stories. 
Both stories focus heavily on the author’s intellectual and spiritual journeys. 
Understanding the life-world out of which the thought of each author emerges is an 
essential first step in dialogue or comparative analysis. Knowing their stories helps us to 
take an empathetic and informed approach to the content of their theologies and modes of 
expression. One remarkable detail is that both Nasr and McFague were born in the same 
year, 1933.  
In chapters three and four we introduce each thinker’s ecological theology. This 
phase of introduction represents another essential step in the dialogical and comparative 
process, before we begin in earnest to compare the thought of the two thinkers. In chapter 
three we explore Nasr’s ecological theology, which is primarily focused on restoring 
traditional anthropology and cosmology, both in the Muslim world and in the West. Nasr 
presents a constructive proposal for what he calls a sacred science and the rediscovery of 
the human being as pontifex or bridge between heaven and earth. In chapter four we 
explore the heart of McFague’s ecological theology, which is her constructive work on 
the doctrine of God. She believes this doctrine needs to be deconstructed and 
reconstructed as a first step for an adequate Christian ecological theology. Chapter four 
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introduces ideas mainly from the first phase of McFague’s theology; that is, her writings 
up until Super, Natural Christians (1997). Later in the dissertation more ideas from 
McFague’s second phase, from Life Abundant (2000) on, especially her new ideas 
regarding the God-world relationship, kenosis, and ecological economics will come into 
play. As we shall see in chapters 1 and 2, Nasr and McFague have very different 
intellectual and spiritual journeys. Nasr reports a discovery of traditionalist intellectual 
certitude in his early twenties before his publishing career begins, and all of his writings 
are more or less anchored in this experience. McFague, however, experiences two major 
spiritual awakenings or conversions during her publishing career, one which sparked her 
interest in intellectual ecological activism, and another, half-way through that activism, 
which awakened her to God’s presence as reality and love. Much of her thinking shifts 
after this awakening.  
Nasr and McFague each cover the three areas of cosmology, anthropology, and 
theology, and yet their priorities in terms of which loci of ecological theology they 
engage are quite different and shift over time. Whereas McFague emphasizes work on the 
doctrine of God, Nasr pretty strongly resists the call to either deconstruct or reconstruct 
traditional God language. The purpose of chapters three and four is to bring us up to a 
point where we can understand the differences between McFague and Nasr that prevented 
them from finding common ground in the early 1990’s when they had the opportunity to 
do so.  
In chapter 5 we begin to compare the ecological theologies of Nasr and McFague, 
focusing on their differences. These differences are significant and did effectively block 
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Nasr and McFague from having any kind of useful dialogue. The chapter explores the 
differences primarily through the lens of Nasr’s critique of McFague in Religion and the 
Order of Nature (1996), which responds to McFague’s thought up until The Body of God 
(1993). As McFague’s theology progresses beyond that point, some of Nasr’s critiques 
become less applicable, while others remain just as applicable. McFague never responds 
directly to Nasr, although her theology does address most of the problems he raises. What 
emerges in this chapter is a picture of sharp ideological differences concerning religion 
and science, patriarchy, the doctrine of divine transcendence, theological method, etc. 
This bundle of differences can be explained, beyond differences between Islam and 
Christianity, by the authors’ respective identities as a traditionalist and a postmodernist. 
The differences are, at root, ideological, and cannot easily be resolved. The challenge that 
presents itself is how to move forward with discovering common ground without being 
able to resolve these differences. 
Chapter 6 begins to explore the common ground between McFague and Nasr, a 
common ground that begins with the problem of the ecological crisis. The most obvious 
common ground between Nasr and McFague is that they see the problem similarly, as 
rooted in the desacralization of nature. Furthermore, their general proposals for the 
resacralization of nature are closely aligned. For example, there are profound similarities 
in the concepts of God and the world which they present as correctives and in the figures 
from the Christian tradition whom they consider to be exemplars or primary resources for 
a Christian theology that might help restore the West’s lost spiritual vision of nature. 
Notwithstanding their major differences, they have a cluster of even more compelling 
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commonalities relative to their opposition to desacralization and support of 
resacralization.  
Chapter 7, “Common Ground Embodied,” continues to explore the common 
ground of Nasr and McFague through their common interest in the resacralization of 
cities and the mystical importance of the body. The theme of the body is essential to the 
ecological theology of both Nasr and McFague, who argue that the shift from 
desacralization of nature to resacralization of nature corresponds with a shift from a 
mechanistic view of nature as machine to an organic view of nature as a body. They 
propose complementary ways of reforming the urban industrial city to support the shift in 
consciousness they are seeking, and both reference the body as their major theme. 
Furthermore, on a deeper level, both McFague and Nasr describe the importance of the 
mystical recognition of the human body as a source of connection with all bodies, with 
the world as body; for McFague this is the characteristic experience of the “universal 
self,” and for Nasr it is the characteristic experience of the “universal man.” There is a 
mystical unity to the thinking of McFague and Nasr as they plumb the depths of their 
traditions and propose drastic shifts in human consciousness which they believe are 
necessary for delivering humanity from the ecological crisis. It is in the context of 
understanding and claiming this common ground that Nasr and McFague and 
interlocutors with similarly oppositional ideological profiles will be able to successfully 
engage in dialogue that leads their respective communities to find common ground and 
make common cause in addressing the ecological crisis. 
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 The concluding chapter of the dissertation looks at the big picture and reflects 
more in a theoretical mode about what prevented the authors from finding common 
ground and how other interlocutors like them can communicate with each other more 
successfully in the future. How can we adjust our modes of interfaith engagement to 
unlock the potential for cross-pollination and mutual enrichment between thinkers such 
as McFague and Nasr? Actually, McFague and Nasr provide compelling answers to these 
questions. Ultimately, one finds a willingness for this dialogue to happen, but there is a 
need for greater understanding of the other and dialogical intentionality in order for there 
to be success in the future. The dissertation represents an attempt to lay some 
groundwork in terms of substance and process for future dialogue between Christian and 
Muslim interlocutors. Insights acquired may also be applicable in other dialogical efforts 
to address the ecological crisis, and suggest avenues for future research in this regard. 
Because of the increasing severity and sense of urgency regarding the ecological crisis, it 
is quite possible that ideological differences such as McFague and Nasr present might 
appear to be less formidable obstacles to dialogue and cooperation as the problem itself 
speaks in increasingly loud and frightening terms to the global human community. The 
groundwork of this dissertation, we hope, will come in handy as interfaith interlocutors 
renew efforts with greater urgency to articulate a way forward out of the spiritual crisis at 
the root of the problem. In the light of their common ground, there is much work to be 
done in terms of critically analyzing and creatively synthesizing their ideas, balancing 
Nasr’s call to return to tradition with McFague’s call to deconstruct old theological 
models and construct new ones.  Both tradition and innovation will be required to 
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articulate a compelling and intellectually viable ecological theology and ethics in the 21
st
 
century.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
NASR’S LIFE AND TIMES 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter introduces Seyyed Hossein Nasr to readers not familiar with the 
basic contours of his life. For an author who rarely writes in the first person, or reveals 
personal experiences to his readers, such a treatment is especially helpful insofar as it 
orients the reader to certain significant experiences and contextual factors which have 
shaped Nasr’s ideas, opinions, and convictions. One of the major themes in Nasr’s 
writing is the tension between traditional Muslim thought and modern Western thought. 
In his life, this tension is reflected in Nasr’s alternate periods of residency in Iran and the 
United States. Nasr grew up in Iran, from 1933 to 1945; then he lived in the United States 
as an adolescent and young adult, until 1958;  he returned to Iran after completing his 
PhD studies; in 1979, just before the fall of the Shah, he returned to the United States as 
an exile and has resided here since.  
Nasr’s passion for engagement with East-West dialogue—in a way that 
acknowledges significant cultural, religious, and ideological tensions—is informed by his 
experiences living in both worlds, and his own internal struggle to reconcile his 
experiences in these very different contexts. It is also important to note that this chapter 
models an essential first step in interfaith dialogue—learning the story of the person with 
whom one is in dialogue. When this step is skipped, false assumptions, generalizations, 
and stereotypes often take the place of an informed and objective understanding of one’s 
partner in dialogue, one’s “other.” 
  
35 
 
Traditional Upbringing in Iran 
 Seyyed Hossein Nasr (1933- ) was born into a cultured, religious, highly educated 
and well-connected family in Tehran, Iran. As a young child in Tehran he was steeped in 
Islamic mystical poetry and philosophical discourse spanning ideas from West to East, 
from Enlightenment modernism to traditional Muslim thought. His father, Seyyed 
Valīallāh, a physician and influential educator, encouraged his son to memorize poetry, 
study the Qur’an, and engage challenging philosophical questions (often in direct 
conversations with various poets, philosophers, and spiritual leaders who visited the 
home for discussion). His mother, Ashraf, whose lineage included many prominent 
religious scholars, was also highly educated (a rarity in her time). She engaged in 
activism for women’s rights. She also brought Nasr on pilgrimages and instilled in him a 
love for Persian literature and culture. “By the age of ten”, Nasr writes, “I not only had 
met the greatest Persian scholars of the day, but heard debates, often on a highly 
philosophical level, about certitude and doubt, tradition and modernism, the scientific 
worldview and religious cosmology and many other serious subjects.”1 Apparently, many 
of the most important themes of Nasr’s intellectual career came to the fore at this early 
age.  He writes further,  
The age of ten marked the beginning of my philosophical awakening and my 
mind became engaged in thinking about such issues as causality, the finitude or 
infinitude of the body, and so on. My faith in God remained firm while my mind 
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continued to be engaged in philosophical issues as well as in the cultural tension 
between East and West, which at that tender age I perceived in contrast between 
following traditional norms in both action and art, and becoming attracted to alien 
norms which incited the mind more to rebellion.
2
  
Nasr’s identity as philosopher and theologian is foreshadowed very early on in his life. 
By the age of ten Nasr is aware, not merely of an interest in this type of vocation, but also 
of the profound tension between Eastern traditionalism and Western modernism that 
becomes a major theme in his scholarly career. However, despite this early philosophical 
budding, there is more than a decade gap in his outward expression of this identity. 
Education in the U.S. 
 With his father on his deathbed in 1945 Nasr, at the age of 12, was sent to study in 
the United States, so as to avoid having to witness the tragedy of his father’s demise.  
Nasr’s academic proficiency propelled him to the top of his class at the Peddie School in 
Highstown, New Jersey, despite the fact that he had only a few months to learn English. 
At Peddie, which was a Baptist affiliated school, Nasr was exposed to Christianity 
through mandatory weekly chapel services. Nasr writes, “Those years of attending 
Protestant service helped to acquaint me directly with Christian practices including rites, 
preaching, singing of hymns as well as ethics, not to speak of my experience of the 
palpable presence of Christic grace. My long engagement in dialogue with Christianity 
has one of its sources in the years of contact with Protestantism at Peddie.”3 At Peddie, 
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Nasr excelled in all subjects but most especially in mathematics, which led his teachers to 
suggest that he study either mathematics or physics in college. Nasr decided to study 
physics at MIT. 
Disillusionment with Modern Science 
At MIT, Nasr underwent a “spiritual and intellectual crisis” when his lofty 
intention to study physics in order to gain insight into the nature of physical reality was 
undercut by the positivistic orientation to physics which dominated MIT’s intellectual 
milieu. Nasr’s intellectual crisis came to a head in a pivotal encounter with the famous 
British philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell, who was visiting MIT to give a 
public lecture, which Nasr attended. Afterwards, one of Nasr’s professors at MIT, the 
Italian philosopher Georgio De Santillana, invited him and a few other outstanding 
students to speak with Russell. For Nasr, this conversation would mark a major turning 
point in terms of his understanding of his scholarly vocation.  
I recall clearly that in a small discussion with Bertrand Russell following one of 
his lectures, we posed a question to him concerning the nature of physics and he 
replied that physics did not concern itself with the nature of physical reality per se 
but with mathematical structures related to pointer readings.
4
   
 
This response was at once troubling and illuminating. Nasr’s primary motivation to study 
physics was to discover the nature of physical reality. His studies were part of his search 
for truth in the transcendent sense. However, Russell’s blithe response to the question 
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posed by Nasr and his peers upended that idea. He no longer knew why he was studying 
physics—if it is not concerned with discovering the nature of things. 5 
This incident with Bertrand Russell prompted an epiphany for Nasr that had been 
mounting for some time. Nasr had already been somewhat aware of a deep discordance 
between where physics and mathematics fit into his world view—which is rooted in the 
traditional Islamic culture of Iran—and where these subjects were situated in the 
intellectual and cultural space of MIT and the North American academic world in 
general.  His encounter with Russell sparked a disturbing intellectual crisis. 
Consequently, I faced a major intellectual crisis. I never lost my religious faith.  
My faith in God continued. But intellectually my “worldview” was turned inside 
out. Sometimes I would stay awake all night. There was in me an existential angst 
which was not just academic and concerned merely with books; it was anxiety 
about my understanding of the nature of reality, which touched me existentially… 
As a result, I went through several months of very painful soul-searching. What 
was I to do? Is there Truth in the absolute sense? Who am I and what am I doing 
here? These questions came up over and over again in my mind and exhausted my 
mental energy and tormented my soul.
6
 
 
Nasr’s encounter with Bertrand Russell exposed the fact that the dominant worldview of 
modern physics and his own were quite out of step with each other. Yet despite this 
revelation that Russell and the discipline of modern science and mathematics, generally 
speaking, did not confirm Nasr’s conviction in absolute truth, he soon found an 
intellectual home in the perennial philosophy of Rene Guenon, Frithjof Schuon, and other 
thinkers of the traditionalist school of thought. It was this discovery of an intellectual 
home that permanently resolved Nasr’s crisis of identity and worldview. 
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Introduction to Perennial Philosophy 
  Shortly after inviting Nasr to the most destabilizing intellectual experience of his 
life—his short conversation with Bertrand Russell— De Santillana introduced Nasr and a 
select group of MIT undergraduate “philosopher-physicists” to study Eastern philosophy, 
specifically Hinduism.
7
 In a seminar held at the instructor’s home in the evening, they 
read together two works by Rene Guenon, Introduction to the Study of the Hindu 
Doctrines (1921) and Man and His Becoming According to the Vedanta (1925). These 
works were shunned in academic circles in France where they were originally published, 
and at the time were unknown in America.
8
 Nasr’s response to these works, which 
confirmed a traditional Hindu worldview and sharply criticized Western modernism, was 
just as sudden and striking as his earlier encounter with Russell. 
As soon as I read these works, the whole world shook under my feet, and very 
soon I realized that these teachings were what I was looking for. To me what 
Guenon was saying was the truth, and his criticisms of modern philosophy and of 
the modern world were absolutely true.
9
 
Guenon’s stance—his criticism of modernity and embrace of tradition as an intellectual 
home—was one that Nasr readily adopted. Guenon gave language to Nasr which began to 
assuage his anxiety and give him the intellectual tools and strategies to cope with the 
extreme tension he felt between his traditional Islamic worldview and the then-dominant 
worldview at MIT—which was based in modern reductionist science. 
                                                        
7
 Nasr and Ramin, In Search of the Sacred, 41. 
 
8
 Ibid., 42. 
 
9
 Ibid. 
  
40 
Studies in Traditional Thought 
Soon after his intellectual encounter with Rene Guenon, Nasr was introduced to 
Dona Luisa Coomaraswamy. She was the wife of a recently deceased Harvard professor, 
Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, who had been the leading proponent of the philosophia 
perennis in the United States, and had died a few years before Nasr began studying at 
MIT. It was in Dona Luisa Coomaraswamy’s personal library, furnished in traditional 
Eastern style, that Nasr found refuge from the aseptic and overly scientific environs of 
MIT’s laboratories.   
Her apartment contained Coomaraswamy’s library whose richness in the realm of 
traditional philosophy and art can hardly be described. Here one could find almost 
everything essential that one could seek in Indian (both Hindu and Buddhist), 
Islamic, Chinese, Platonic, and medieval European traditional thought as well as 
art and symbolism…Once within the library, one felt physically in a traditional 
milieu removed from the tensions and dispersions of the modern world.”10  
 
In this library, a place of affinity with the environment of his upbringing, over many long 
hours of reading, Nasr found solid intellectual ground. There he fully imbibed the 
writings of Rene Guenon, Frithjof Shuon, and other leading figures in the traditionalist or 
perennialist school.  
Nasr soon became a committed member of this intellectual and spiritual school; 
this commitment has continued to play a defining role in Nasr’s scholarly career. 
Members of the traditionalist school maintain that the philosophia perennis, the eternal 
truth about human nature, the Divine, and the universe, has been revealed repeatedly 
throughout history by various prophets or sages and subsequently transmitted in diverse 
religious forms; this truth is also discernable through the intellect, the higher aspect of 
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human intelligence associated with intuition and creativity. It should also be noted that 
the traditionalist school, while being anti-Western, emerges out of a Western context. Its 
two major pillars, Rene Guenon and Frithjof Schuon, are both Westerners who draw on 
non-Western religion and spirituality to critique modern Western cultural forms and 
ideas. Bertrand Russell’s curt dismissal of the telos of Nasr’s intellectual quest removed 
the ground from under him, but the philosophia perennis affirmed Nasr’s fundamental 
attraction to absolute truth.   
The discovery of traditional metaphysics and the philosophia perennis through the 
works of these figures settled the crisis that had caused such a deep upheaval in 
my inner life. I gained an intellectual certitude which has never left me since then 
and which has only grown stronger…Henceforth I knew with certitude that there 
was such a thing as the Truth and that it could be attained through knowledge 
gained by means of the heart-intellect and also through revelation. My childhood 
love for the attainment of knowledge now returned on a new plane related to the 
very meaning of existence and the soteriological function of knowledge as 
traditionally understood.
 11
  
 
Nasr’s discovery of the perennial philosophy profoundly shaped the course of his 
spiritual and intellectual development. Regarding the spiritual impact of this encounter, 
Nasr writes, “The traditional writings, especially those of Schuon which emphasized the 
need for the practice of a spiritual discipline as well as theoretical knowledge, were 
crucial in determining the course of my life from that time when I was nineteen years old 
onward.” Nasr began to become as serious about prayer and contemplation as he was 
about his schoolwork. Intellectually, the encounter strengthened his nascent opposition to 
the modern Western scientific worldview. It also sparked his interest in world religions. 
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Through the perennial philosophy, Nasr studied and appreciated not only his home 
tradition, Islam, but numerous other world religions. 
My studies were to take me from the Indian, Platonic and medieval European 
intellectual worlds to Lao-Tze and Chuang-Tzu and from there to Islam and 
Sufism. The circle was therefore in a sense completed and I returned to my 
intellectual and spiritual homeland but only after having traversed both the 
modern Western world and the other major traditions outside of both the Western 
and Islamic worlds.
12
 
 
Nasr’s breadth of knowledge, and his exploration of various ancient and contemporary 
life-worlds and worldviews, is part of what makes him so fascinating and relevant as a 
global philosopher and theologian. Nasr’s formative educational experiences in a 
Western intellectual milieu presented him with dramatic existential challenges. This 
existential experience of the tension between Western thought and Islamic thought 
infuses Nasr’s writings on the subject with a keen sense of urgency. 
Throughout his intellectual career, Nasr’s thought has continued to demonstrate 
profound loyalty and affinity with writers of the perennialist persuasion. In the 
philosophia perennis Nasr finds his basic rationale and method for comparative 
philosophical and religious studies; of especial influence in regard to his method of 
comparative religious study is Frithjof Schuon’s The Trancendent Unity of Religions 
(1953). Schuon employs a typology that views religions as both exoteric and esoteric; 
there is an esoteric or, in other words, transcendent unity to all religious traditions, 
despite the fact that their exoteric forms may appear to be mutually exclusive. An 
exoteric religious point of view, which does not consider the essence or esoteric 
dimension of its tradition, “claims, by definition, to be the only true and legitimate 
                                                        
12
 Ibid., 19. 
  
43 
one…being concerned only with an individual interest, namely salvation, [it] has no 
advantage to gain from knowledge of the truth of other traditional forms.”13 For Schuon, 
religions are formally different but essentially the same. Only a spiritual elite, through 
“direct evidence…intellectual evidence that implies absolute certainty,” can grasp this 
essential, transcendent unity of religions.
14
  
Religious traditions, in this perspective, are not social constructions but spiritual 
organisms. It will be useful for the reader to see Schuon’s full definition here: 
A Tradition is an integral whole comparable to a living organism which develops 
according to necessary and exact laws; one might therefore call it a spiritual 
organism, or a social one in its most outward aspect. In any case it is an organism 
and not a construction of arbitrary conventions; one cannot therefore legitimately 
consider the constituent elements of a Tradition independently of their inward 
unity, as if one were concerned with a mere collection of facts.
15
 
 
Unlike Rene Guenon, whose critique of the West implicated Christianity,
16
 Schuon 
repeatedly addresses the tensions between Christianity and Islam as exoteric; he affirms 
the essentially equal validity and value of Christianity and Islam, considered esoterically.  
This positive reception not only of all religions in general, but of Christianity in 
particular—which is often a very difficult religion to embrace from a Muslim 
perspective—made a profound impact on Nasr. His consistent attempts to dialogue with 
Western Christians is undergirded by Schuon’s confidence in the essential value of the 
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Western Christian tradition as such, despite his profound problems with modern Western 
science, religion, art, architecture, culture, etc.  Nasr’s embrace of Schuon’s perspective 
leads him to embrace all Traditions, including Christianity. But this embrace also causes 
him to reject the scientific study of religions and the modern theological methods 
growing out of this study, insofar as this methodology defines religious traditions 
exoterically as social constructions, rather than recognizing their esoteric dimensions 
which unite them as living organisms animated by the Spirit.
17
  
Furthermore, the perennial philosophy also informs Nasr’s strategy for navigating 
the relationship between religion and science. In this regard, he is more dependent on 
Guenon than Schuon. Guenon critiqued the Western idea of progress. Using a Hindu 
eschatological framework, Guenon framed the so-called scientific, technical, and 
economic “progress” of the West as in fact a sign of regress, the disintegration of societal 
integrity and loss of spiritual vision which precedes the end of a cosmic cycle or age. 
Nasr’s initial encounter with Guenon’s works, while a graduate student at MIT, 
encouraged Nasr to shift his focus to the philosophy and history of science, which would 
eventually be the subject of his Ph.D. from Harvard. Guenon’s criticism of modern 
Western science and arguments in favor of traditional forms of science helped to inspire 
and direct Nasr’s dissertation, which documents the tradition of Islamic science.  
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In many cases, throughout Nasr’s works, he repeats paradigmatic arguments of 
figures of the traditionalist school, especially Schuon and Guenon. This is not a sign of 
unoriginality but rather of a duty intrinsic to the claim of the philosophia perennis to 
universal and absolute truths that never change. For example, Nasr’s concept of scientia 
sacra (sacred science) which he espoused in fullest form in his work titled, The Need for 
a Sacred Science (1993), is clearly inspired by Guenon, who published Symboles de la 
Science Sacrée (Symbols of Sacred Science) in 1962. The telos of Nasr’s career, unlike 
most contemporary Western scholars, has not been to produce new knowledge, but to 
revive timeless knowledge. The perennialist or traditionalist perspective constitutes the 
world view and intellectual milieu from which Nasr launches not only his critique of 
modernity but also his constructive vision of a way of thinking and being in the world 
that is at once contemporary and integrated with traditional ways of knowing and 
perceiving. Many other themes in Guenon and Schuon’s works are reiterated by Nasr, 
although in creative ways, especially in terms of his adaptation of the perennialist 
perspective to the problem of the ecological crisis. In regard to this particular application 
of the philosophia perennis and Islamic thought to the problems posed by the 
environmental crisis, Nasr is clearly a leader of other traditionalists and, beyond that 
inner circle, of Muslim scholarship in general. 
Nasr’s Academic Conversion 
After graduating from MIT with an undergraduate degree in physics, Nasr went 
on to further study at Harvard, first for a master’s degree in geology and geophysics.  
When Nasr first enrolled in this program he was still unsure of his path, though he had 
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begun to think about how he might end up more as a critic, rather than a practitioner of, 
the modern physical sciences. Nasr chose to study geology and geophysics to round out 
his science background with knowledge of descriptive natural sciences. He even 
considered becoming a professional geologist because this subject “was more ‘neutral’ 
than physics, intellectually speaking…”18 However, Nasr was quite frustrated with the 
way this subject was taught, because there was no room for him to ask his deepest 
questions regarding modern Western science. 
The way these subjects were taught aggravated me because whenever one asked 
deeper questions about the lack of evidence in the paleontological record for 
evolution and matters like that, the teacher would say, “We do not discuss these 
matters any more.” The teachers were not at all interested in the philosophical 
discussions of the subject they were treating. Nevertheless, I said to myself that it 
was better to complete at least the master’s program. Meanwhile, I decided 
definitely to leave the pure sciences and go into the field of the history of science 
and philosophy, and, therefore, even then while I was in the geology department, I 
began to take courses in the history of science and continued my study of 
philosophy, taking courses on Aristotle and Plato. Then finally in 1956, upon 
receiving my master’s degree in geology and geophysics, I shifted officially to the 
history of science department. I did not want to enter the philosophy department 
at that time because it had become totally positivistic.
19
 
 
Nasr is open and honest about the difficulties he faced ideologically and politically at 
MIT and Harvard. Nasr carefully and tactfully negotiated the tensions between his inner 
thoughts and the institutional pressures against them, handling feelings of intellectual 
frustration and oppression in constructive ways that enabled him to remain true to his 
developing perspective as a traditionalist. At the same time, he excelled academically and 
completed his formal studies in a timely and respectable manner. This part of his story as 
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a student exhibits Nasr’s independence of thought as well as his skill in negotiating 
profound intellectual differences in constructive ways. A person with less self-control and 
patience would probably have dropped out of MIT or Harvard rather than sit with the 
tension of disagreeing so profoundly with the dominant worldview of these institutions. 
Of course, Nasr’s discovery of traditionalist writings was indispensable in affirming his 
“deviant” intellectual position throughout his studies in the West.   
Nasr’s doctoral work at Harvard covered the fields of the history of science, 
Islamic philosophy and theology, and general Islamic civilization and history.  
My interest in the history of science and philosophy was not simply to join in 
praise of the glories of present day science by going over the history of the errors 
of the ages gone by. It was to understand other types of sciences of nature and 
also to seek the reason as to why modern science had developed as it had. I had 
learned something about modern science but had escaped completely the clutches 
of scientism and scientific positivism. Rather, as already mentioned, my 
philosophical perspective had become already crystallized by the discovery of the 
perennial philosophy and traditional metaphysics.
20
    
 
Nasr’s studies at Harvard were extensive and intensive, which is typical of Nasr’s thirst 
for knowledge and encyclopedic mind. He also had several significant meetings during 
this time with leading traditionalist philosophers, including Frithjof Schuon and Titus 
Burckhardt. These authors and their worldview of religious and philosophical 
traditionalism would continue to serve as the primary source of ideological stability and 
certitude throughout Nasr’s academic career. 
These intellectual and existential experiences not only rooted my mind and soul 
for the rest of my life in the world of tradition, intellectual certitude, and faith, but 
also led to the discovery of inner illumination, the harmonious wedding of “logic 
and transcendence,” to use the title of one of the works of Schuon, and intellectual 
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lucidity and rigor combined with love for truth and beauty. These years also set 
my gaze more fully on the horizon of universal and global truth in the traditional 
sense of the word, embracing not only the Islamic tradition which was my own, 
but also the Western, both Graeco-Alexandrian and Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, 
Far Eastern and primal, and also including esoteric Judaism associated with the 
Kabbala, and Zoroastrianism and other Iranian religions.
21
 
 
The first book Nasr published, based on his doctoral dissertation, demonstrates 
the fact that his intellectual position in terms of perennialism was, as he states, 
“crystallized.” Nasr’s criticism of evolution and Teilhard de Chardin, and his insistence 
on the traditional doctrine of transcendence, apparently adapted from Frithjof Schuon, 
already present in his doctoral dissertation, are themes that will continue, unchanging, 
throughout his career.  
[T]he fundamental difference between the interpretations of Muslim natural 
historians and of modern biologists with regard to fossils and older forms of life 
arises from the fact that, for the former, the world of physical nature is dominated 
by a higher level of reality, which transcends it, while for the nineteenth-century 
natural historians and their modern followers such a conception does not exist. As 
a result, the same “data” and “observations” have been interpreted in different 
lights, and the “spatial” and “vertical” gradation of the medieval scientists 
converted into a purely temporal and “horizontal” evolution which now, in such 
theories as those of Teilhard de Chardin, even seeks to make the higher states of 
being a kind of sublimation of the physical domain which has resulted from the 
very process of “horizontal” evolution. However, the idea of evolution, as usually 
interpreted, is metaphysically and theologically unacceptable and Teilhard de 
Chardin did no more than try the impossible, namely to correlate the theological 
teachings of the Church with the concept of evolution understood in its purely 
“horizontal” sense. The rise of this conception of evolution—truly a parody of the 
medieval conception of gradation and of the hierarchy of the states of being—
shows clearly how significant the cosmological background is to the cultivation of 
the sciences of Nature, which cannot escape having a world-view, or a general 
view about the cosmos, derived from sources other than the natural sciences 
themselves.
22
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Nasr’s engagement with perennialism while studying at Harvard was largely 
unofficial. De Santillana, who was probably Nasr’s most influential academic teacher 
from his years of higher education at MIT and Harvard, apparently did not support his 
worldview and explicitly critiqued Nasr in the foreword to his dissertation publication. 
Although De Santillana appreciated the intellectual depth of Nasr’s treatment of the 
subject of Islamic science, he was inclined to “disagree totally” with Nasr’s defense of 
“the essential wholeness and integrity of his culture down to modern times.”23 For De 
Santillana, the Islamic world’s suppression of science in the name of religion or 
metaphysics constituted a troubling “split between sapientia and integrity.” Integrity, for 
De Santillana, is defined primarily as a trait of the individual scientist who upturns 
established religious cosmologies when contradicted by the data at hand; for Nasr, 
integrity is a trait of the Muslim tradition of science insofar as it insists on the integration 
of science and metaphysics. De Santillana sees Islam’s suppression of science, as in al-
Ghazzali’s censorship of Averroes (who would have introduced a heliocentric worldview 
displacing the geocentric worldview), as a practice that led to the decline of Muslim 
civilization. For Nasr, however, Ghazzali’s approach strikes an appropriate balance and 
integration of science and sapientia, one that preserves the sacred symbolic meaning of 
the geocentric world from potentially desacralizing knowledge. While he does not press 
this case in his first publication, later in his career both in theory and action Nasr would 
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attempt to revive the traditional Muslim sciences and restore the integrated, hierarchical 
relationship between sapientia or metaphysics and science.
24
  
Environmental Interest Sparked 
Also at Harvard, besides defining his basic philosophical and religious 
orientation, Nasr developed an intellectually robust interest in the environmental crisis. 
Nasr calls this interest the “other major philosophical occupation of my life.”25 For Nasr 
the environmental crisis is the result of a spiritual and intellectual crisis; that is, the 
desacralization of knowledge and the loss of a spiritual vision of the natural world in the 
West as a result of the rise of modern science during the Renaissance and Enlightenment. 
Nasr’s budding awareness of the environmental crisis in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s 
coincided with a general rise in awareness in the United States, signaled and inspired by 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), which Nasr credits as a source of personal as well 
as societal consciousness-raising. As he recalls, however, the single event which most 
piqued his attention regarding the environmental crisis was the construction of Route 128 
in the mid-1950’s, which cut off his neighborhood in Arlington Heights from Walden 
Pond and the forests of Concord, where he often visited to commune with nature.   
I began to ponder the rapidity with which man was destroying the natural 
environment on the basis of a science rooted in power and domination over 
nature, as well as on a conception of man based on greed and of human society 
evaluated solely in terms of what is called economic progress.  For me it was 
obvious that not only was an environmental crisis of major proportions around the 
corner, but that also the cause of this crisis was spiritual and religious and not 
simply the result of bad engineering and faulty economic planning.
26
 
                                                        
24
 Ibid., xi-xii. 
 
25
 Nasr, “Intellectual Autobiography,” 27. 
 
26
 Ibid., 29. 
  
51 
 
Nasr’s awakening to the ecological crisis coincided with the general increase in 
awareness in the United States, but Nasr was exceptional in his perception of the crisis as 
rooted in a deep dysfunction and loss of spiritual and religious values in the West.   
Nasr’s traditionalist worldview, already “crystallized” at this period, predisposed 
him to view the ecological crisis as related to the decline of traditional Christianity in the 
West, and the rise to prominence of a reductionist, scientistic worldview. The writings of 
Guenon, Schuon, and others in the traditionalist school carry with them substantial 
skepticism regarding the conventional modern concept of progress, in its technological, 
economic, intellectual and moral aspects. For Guenon and the traditionalist school, the 
development of modernity is more aptly characterized by regression. In East and West 
(1924), one among many texts that engages this theme, Guenon writes, 
The civilization of the modern West appears in history as a veritable anomaly: 
among all those which are known to us more or less completely, this civilization 
is the only one that has developed along purely material lines, and this monstrous 
development, whose beginning coincides with the so-called Renaissance, has 
been accompanied, as indeed it was fated to be, by a corresponding intellectual 
regress; we say corresponding and not equivalent, because here are two orders of 
things between which there can be no common measure.
27
 
 
For Guenon, the intellectual and spiritual regress of the modern West due to the rise of 
scientific materialism completely outweighs any apparent technological or economic 
progress. In The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times (1945), Guenon tells a 
counter-narrative to the modern Western progress story, arguing that this so-called 
scientific and technological progress, which is truly a descent into the sub-human, will 
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lead to the collapse of Western civilization, after which a “rectification” of spiritual 
knowledge will take place and a new cosmic cycle or epoch will begin.
28
 Living within 
this traditionalist narrative, which views modern science and technology as the root of an 
unprecedented spiritual and intellectual decline or regress in the West, Nasr identified 
scientific reductionism as the root cause of the ecological crisis, and the revival of 
traditional knowledge and spirituality as the solution. Nasr was immune, so to speak, 
from the simplistic reaction of many Western thinkers that there could be a technological 
fix to the ecological crisis. For Nasr, who has remained a traditionalist throughout his 
career, the ecological crisis is the fruit of scientific reductionism which has stripped the 
natural world of its connection to the sacred and left it as a meaningless assemblage of 
things that may be exploited for human gain using modern technology.  
Public Environmental Theology 
Throughout his career, Nasr would have opportunities to articulate his 
environmental philosophy and theology to a Western audience. In 1966, when he 
delivered the Rockefeller lectures at the University of Chicago, later published in 1968 as 
The Encounter of Man and Nature, his thinking about the philosophical and religious 
issues at play in the environmental crisis was already well-formed. His thesis is that the 
West needs to recover a traditional Christian cosmology of nature in order to recover its 
lost spiritual vision of nature which recognizes its sacred quality as created by God and 
symbolic of God. A key element of this cosmology is that it must acknowledge higher 
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levels of reality beyond the physical world—and it must integrate the physical sciences 
with metaphysical knowledge in such a way that the physical sciences are made sacred, 
and the integrity of traditional metaphysical knowledge is preserved. Because of his 
traditionalist orientation of openness to other faiths, Nasr’s thinking in The Encounter of 
Man and Nature relates not only to the Islamic tradition, but identifies valuable ideas in 
every major world religion in regards to appreciating the sacredness of nature and 
recognizing its metaphysical context. The tradition besides Islam which Nasr spends the 
most time discussing is Christianity. His lectures directly address a Western Christian 
audience and present the argument that dialogue with Islam and other major world 
religions—including Daoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, and indigenous 
spiritualties—could help Western Christians revive their lost spiritual vision of nature; 
this vision, while not dominant in the mainstream of the Christian tradition, can 
nevertheless be seen in the Bible and in the life and work of several Christian mystics 
including Hildegard of Bingen and Francis of Assisi. Nasr’s thinking in 1966 was in 
many ways ahead of the nascent field of Christian environmental theology. In terms of 
the discourse of environmental theology among Muslim scholars, his work was even 
more groundbreaking. Since the mid-1960’s Nasr’s writing, teaching, and lecturing have 
played a crucial role in raising awareness and stimulating interest concerning the 
environmental crisis throughout the Muslim world. With The Encounter of Man and 
Nature Nasr laid the groundwork for the development of a distinctly Muslim perspective 
and discourse on this subject which is still gaining momentum today. Furthermore, 
although Muslim-Christian dialogue regarding the ecological crisis has not yet begun in 
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earnest, his work represents the first attempt to initiate a significant and meaningful 
exchange of ideas in this arena.  
Intellectual and Cultural Activism in Iran 
 After obtaining his Ph.D. from Harvard University, Nasr returned to Iran and 
began his career as a professor of philosophy and history of science at Tehran University.  
Nasr would continue in this position from 1958 until the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The 
philosophy department at Tehran University was, at that time, largely positivist; most 
courses focused on Descartes, Kant, and Hegel, and the department chair’s philosophy 
was a positivism based on Comte. Of course, this ideological situation was distressing for 
Nasr, who felt the need “to carry out a major intellectual and spiritual jihad” against the 
modernism of Tehran University.
29
 
Had I not been a graduate of M.I.T. and Harvard, had I not had mastery not only 
of English, but also French, and known some other European languages as well as 
Arabic, and had my scholarship not been at a level where it could not be easily 
criticized, I would have been crushed, because the Faculty of Letters of Tehran 
University at that time, which was the heart of Persian culture and thought, was 
dominated by modern, Western ideas.
30
 
 
Besides his prestigious educational background and scholarly rigor, Nasr was accepted by 
the scholarly community at Tehran University, despite his traditionalism, because his late 
father had been a mentor to many of the faculty members. Although Nasr disagreed 
ideologically with the dominant scholars, on a personal level he “had the best human 
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rapport with these people.”31 Nasr was friendly on a personal level with his colleagues, 
but that did not prevent him from fighting for the ideas in which he believed. 
You cannot imagine the battle I had on my hands to try to turn things around in 
my own field of philosophy and in the philosophy department, which was the 
heart of the field of human sciences and humanities and exercised influence 
everywhere. This was a department that was dominated by French positivism to 
which I was strongly opposed, and I was trying to turn matters around in several 
ways.
32
 
 
In 1963, at the age of 30, Nasr became a full professor and was firmly entrenched in his 
academic position. He then began to more boldly pursue the intellectual agenda which he 
had begun with his dissertation at Harvard. 
When Nasr began teaching at Tehran University there was already one Islamic 
philosophy course being taught, but Nasr insisted on adding a required course on Islamic 
philosophy and culture, which he taught, as well as a doctoral seminar on Islamic 
thought, which he co-taught with Henry Corbin.  “First of all I wanted to strengthen the 
teaching of Islamic philosophy as a foundation on whose basis other philosophies, 
especially those of the West, should be studied rather than studying Western philosophy 
as if Persians belonged to the European tradition.”33 After building up the study of 
Islamic philosophy, Nasr also made efforts to expand course offerings in Western 
philosophy as well as Eastern philosophy, especially the philosophy of India. 
My attempt to have Persian students study other schools and traditions of 
philosophy from the point of view of their own tradition rather than studying their 
tradition from the perspective of Western thought was in fact to have an enduring 
and ever increasing influence which continues to this day, propagated by a large 
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number of earlier students, many my own, who are now professors and scholars 
of philosophy in Iran.
34
 
 
It is important to emphasize the fact that although Nasr’s philosophical vision regarding 
the integration of science and metaphysics has become more popular in the Islamic 
world, especially in Iran, when he began to implement this vision he had no ideological 
partners to speak of among his colleagues. Nasr writes, “I tried to expand the horizon for 
the study of philosophy and had a real jihad on my hands, made more difficult by the fact 
that I was a completely lonely voice…”35 However, through hard work, and by virtue of 
his father’s legacy, Nasr’s academic “jihad” progressed steadily. 
 Nasr was well-connected in Iran, and his influence extended beyond the reach of 
Tehran University. He lectured widely in philosophy at other schools as well as on the 
radio and television. Furthermore, he was appointed to influential government and 
academic councils, including “the Supreme Cultural Council which determined most of 
the cultural policies of the country on the national level.”36 
Membership in this Council for some sixteen years provided many opportunities 
for me to help organize national conferences and seminars on various traditional 
philosophers as well as issues of philosophical interest arising from the 
confrontation between tradition and modernism. I helped to propagate what is 
now known as civilizational dialogue long before it became fashionable and 
carried out many discussions with the French philosopher Roger Garaudy who 
was trying to establish a network of centers “for the dialogue of civilizations” 
throughout the world in the ‘70’s.37 
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Nasr’s criticism of “scientism” had not been welcome at MIT and Harvard, where 
it had begun to grow through his own insights and readings in traditionalist thought; nor 
was it easy to introduce this perspective into the Westernized academic context of Tehran 
University. However, Nasr’s critique of the Western tradition of positivism eventually 
found a receptive audience in Iran. His critique of Western thought and insistence on the 
integrity of Persian thought had a certain popular nationalistic appeal, which was 
eventually recognized by the Shah.   
My constant criticism of the blind emulation of Western scientism and the desire 
for wholesale adoption of Western technology prevalent in Iran at that time, led in 
1972 to my being chosen as the president of Aryamehr University, which was 
Iran’s leading scientific and technical university at that time. Its patron, the Shah, 
asked me to mold the University into an institution similar to MIT, but with 
strong roots in Persian culture. During the three years of my tenure (cut short by 
an illness in 1975 which led to my resignation), I sought to create a strong 
humanities program, not in the same way as President Killian had sought to 
achieve one at MIT during my own student days there, but by establishing a 
program in Islamic thought and culture with an emphasis upon a philosophy of 
science drawn from the Islamic philosophical tradition rather than positivism in 
one form or another. This program was to continue after my departure and has led 
during the last decade [1990’s] to the creation of one of the first graduate 
programs in the Islamic world in the philosophy of science based upon the Islamic 
philosophy of science.
38
 
 
Nasr’s thoughts regarding science, however out of context or inappropriate they might 
seem in MIT or Harvard, or North American academia in general, are very much resonant 
with his native intellectual culture of Iran. It is apparent that the criticism of Western 
philosophy and science that Nasr developed through his study of the philosophia perennis 
has struck an enduring chord with the Iranian intellectual community, and that of the 
wider Muslim world.  
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 Nasr enjoyed a close relationship with the Shah and Queen of Iran, a relationship 
defined by his loyal service and their generous patronage. In the context of this 
relationship, Nasr apparently had frequent opportunity to dialogue with them both. Nasr 
used these opportunities, in part, to pursue his unique blend of traditional and 
environmental activism. The Shah was more in favor of technology and modernization, 
but the Queen placed more value on Persian traditional culture. During his tenure as 
president of Aryamehr University Nasr repeatedly tried but failed to persuade the Shah 
“to concentrate on solar energy and not to build the Bushehr nuclear plant.” The Shah 
refused to accept Nasr’s suggestion, arguing that nuclear power might be needed if Iran 
ran out of oil. Unfortunately, the university continued to supervise the development of the 
Bushehr nuclear plant, despite the protests of student activists and Nasr’s internal efforts. 
Although Nasr was disappointed with the Shah’s decision on this matter, he notes that the 
revolutionaries, who initially protested against the plant, nevertheless began pursuing an 
even more extensive nuclear program than the Shah had envisaged soon after the regime 
change.
39
 Although Nasr disagreed with the Shah on certain issues, he did not disagree 
with monarchy itself or believe that the revolution improved the situation in Iran.  
However, despite Nasr’s failed lobbying effort in regards to nuclear energy, there 
were environmental successes under Nasr’s leadership; he writes, “Aryamehr University 
began to do some wonderful things in ameliorating the impact of modern technology on 
our culture and environment and trying to revive as much as possible traditional forms of 
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technology.”40 For example, he was successful in dramatically altering the shape of a 
major expansion of Aryamehr University’s campus into Isfahan. The original plan, which 
was approved by the Shah, included a thirty-story tower in the center of campus. Nasr 
pleaded with the Shah that it be replaced with what he called a “horizontal tower,” which 
would be more in harmony with Persian tradition and the environment. 
I said, “Can we build a horizontal tower?” He laughed and he said, “What in the 
world are you talking about?” 
I said, “We have 24 million meters of land, and why should we have all this 
energy wasted for elevators going up and down, for air conditioning, et cetera. We 
could have the same concentration horizontally and save much energy and be 
more in harmony with the surrounding environment.” He laughed and said, “I 
never heard of a horizontal tower. All right, go change the plan and bring it to 
me.” That was a very important matter that he conceded, and it gave us the 
opportunity to create a Persian design for the buildings. We started to build with 
bricks; I got the best bricklayers in Yazd, Qom, and Isfahan, made our own kilns, 
and tried to revive old technologies.
41
 
 
In Iran, Nasr was an insider to academic and political institutions because of his family’s 
prominent status, especially his father’s legacy. This advantageous social position 
enabled him to pursue an ambitious intellectual agenda, and to express his ideas 
theoretically, culturally, and institutionally. Furthermore, Nasr’s insider status in Iran also 
applied in a spiritual sense, insofar as he was welcomed with open arms into the inner 
circles of traditional philosophy in Iran. 
Studies of Traditional Islamic Philosophy 
 During Nasr’s twenty-one years in Iran, from 1958-1979, he began to pursue 
additional studies in traditional Islamic philosophy and mysticism. These studies continue 
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upon a trajectory of intimate, informal education that began with the living room 
discussions of his father’s friends that Nasr was party to as a child, and continued in 
Cambridge in the evening class in De Santillani’s home, his reading in the 
Coomaraswamy home library, and in meetings with traditionalist thinkers such as Schuon 
and Buckhardt. Nasr’s strongest intellectual and spiritual convictions were all formed 
outside of formal educational settings, and it is no surprise that Nasr continued to seek 
Truth in Iran, not through conventional institutional means, but rather in a more 
traditional manner. 
Years of study of Islamic and European medieval philosophy in the West, my 
direct encounter with the great expositors of traditional doctrines such as Schuon 
and Burckhardt, and my childhood experiences had all added up to convince me 
that there was an oral tradition of wisdom (hikmah) that could only be learned at 
the feet of traditional masters…Therefore, I set out soon after returning home to 
discover the still living traditional masters of hikmah in order to benefit directly 
from their oral teachings. Strangely enough, this quest was facilitated and doors 
opened by my late father, for one of his closest friends, Sayyid Muhammad 
Kazim Assar, who was one of the greatest teachers of traditional philosophy at 
that time, was still alive.
42
 
 
Nasr studied with Assar from 1958 until his death in 1974.  
For years Nasr attended classes three days a week, where Assar lectured to a 
small group of seekers of traditional wisdom. It took several years to finish reading just 
the introduction to a work of the 15
th
 century Sufi metaphysician, ‘Abd al-Rahman Jami. 
“‘Assar, who was then in his eighties, would teach for nearly two hours with incredible 
joy and spontaneity requiring of us only our attention, not expecting nor willing to accept 
remuneration of any kind. He followed the traditional Islamic ideal that hikmah or 
                                                        
42
 Nasr, “An Intellectual Autobiography,” 41. 
  
61 
philosophy should be taught freely.”43 For Nasr, true knowledge is not to be found in a 
setting such as MIT, where laboratories and tools of measurement abound, but rather in 
gardens where esteemed sages, who spend their days in prayer and meditation, teach 
eager seekers free of charge. It bears repeating, for example, that Nasr’s discovery of 
absolute certitude during his student days occurred not in an institutional setting (though 
he was frequently in class, libraries, and lab settings in MIT and Harvard) but instead 
began in the home seminar taught in the evenings by De Santillani and continued in the 
home library of Dona Coomaraswamy, with its traditional, Eastern ambience. The 
traditional settings and conditions which most open Nasr to intellectual discovery and 
learning mirror his value, as a traditionalist, on the sacredness of knowledge itself; such 
knowledge that Nasr values is best discovered in an environment that is intimate, 
beautiful, and peaceful rather than in formal, impersonal settings, created with emphasis 
on rationalism and efficiency. This difference in setting corresponds, on a deeper level, to 
the type of intelligence more emphasized and engaged in the different types of learning 
these settings typically host. Nasr distinguishes between the intellect, which is the divine 
spark or inner light of the human being, and the ratio, the lower faculty of rational 
intelligence of human beings. The former is more focused on quality, the latter on 
quantity. Through the intellect, one can intuitively grasp metaphysical truths which 
cannot be known in any other way. Nasr’s realization of absolute certitude in college, and 
later studies of Sufism which confirmed this certitude, were all achieved through 
intellectual experiences of this higher mind or intellect. 
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Besides Assar, Nasr studied in depth with two other traditional masters, ‘Allamah 
Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i (from 1958 to 1978) and Sayyid Abu’l-Hasan 
Qazwini (from the early 60’s to the mid 70’s).44 While it is not necessary to explore in 
great detail Nasr’s studies with traditional masters in Iran, it is important to note that 
these studies were pursued earnestly, for hours a week, over a long period. They inform 
Nasr’s overall perspective on the requirements for genuine philosophical and theological 
reflection. Nasr’s memorable experiences as a student of Tabataba’i help to demonstrate 
the profound influence of his studies in traditional philosophy. 
This venerable teacher was a person of great saintly presence who exuded a sense 
of silence and an air of inwardness in his immediate surroundings. He had not 
only studied philosophy and gnosis in his youth, but also spent years in spiritual 
practice which included long periods during which he observed silence. True to 
the Platonic ideal of the philosopher, he had for long practiced dying and was in 
fact already a dead person walking, dead to all the passions of the soul. He spoke 
little and rarely raised his head. And yet he was one of the greatest philosophers 
and religious scholars of his day.
45
 
 
Nasr’s studies with Tabataba’i and his other traditional teachers helped him to form an 
experiential understanding of the sacredness of the Islamic tradition. For example, Nasr 
considers it very important to have prayer and mystical experience informing and 
infusing one’s work with sacred symbols; the Western academic notion that theology or 
religious studies can be pursued as secular intellectual activities is quite foreign to Nasr. 
Without an understanding of the spiritual essence of a tradition, experienced existentially 
on a spiritual level rather than merely understood through an abstract conceptual analysis, 
one cannot properly engage in the study of that tradition.  
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One of my remarkable experiences, which was really unique, occurred during one 
of those summers when he [Tabataba’i] would come to Darekah, a village north 
of Tehran, which at that time was much less crowded than now. He lived amidst a 
beautiful garden with a stream in the middle of it. There alone, just myself and 
him, I studied with him for the whole summer the Diwan of Hafiz. You just 
cannot imagine the depth of meaning that he would expound, meanings compared 
to which ordinary interpretations were like gravel. It was as if the walls were 
speaking with him. He was not only a philosopher and commentator on the 
Quran, but also a gnostic and mystic of a very high order, as was Aqa-yi Assar.
46
 
 
It is impossible to understand Nasr’s embrace of tradition on an intellectual level without 
understanding his embrace of tradition in terms of his personal spiritual and religious 
practice. In fact, all of the major figures in the traditionalist school were practitioners of 
Islam and members of Sufi orders. Without grasping that Sufi mysticism and traditional 
Islamic science are living traditions in Iran, it is difficult to comprehend Nasr’s goal of 
reestablishing a sacred science. While in a Western context this might seem like an 
impossible task of regressive recovery (symbolized in the U.S. by the absurdity of the 
Creation Science Museum in Petersburg, Kentucky, or the Creation Evidence Museum in 
Texas), in Iran and other Muslim nations it is a much more feasible and acceptable 
project. It is also noteworthy to mention the thematic relationship between sacred 
knowledge and nature that runs through Nasr’s experiences. Nasr’s peak learning 
experience with Tabataba’i occurred “amidst a beautiful garden with a stream in the 
middle of it.” This experience speaks to Nasr’s conviction, repeatedly expressed in his 
theology, that remembrance and awareness of the sacredness of knowledge and the 
sacredness of nature are necessary to the remembrance and awareness of God.  
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It was through his studies with ‘Allamah Tabataba’i that Nasr became acquainted 
with Henry Corbin, a French scholar who taught at the Sorbonne and wrote extensively 
about mystical religion in Iran. Over many years, Nasr served as a translator between 
Tabataba’i and Corbin, who dialogued extensively on the questions Corbin brought from 
Western philosophical circles. Though Corbin was not a perennialist like Nasr, they 
shared a basic outlook on philosophy. 
[L]ike myself, Corbin always saw the real philosopher as the person who 
combines theoretical and experiential knowledge, the perfection of mental and 
intellectual faculties and purification of one’s being, the philosopher whom one of 
Corbin’s and my own intellectual mentors, Shaykh al-ishraq Shihab al-Din 
Suhrawardi, was to describe so luminously in his many writings to which we both 
devoted so many years of our lives.
47
 
 
Nasr’s conception of the “real philosopher” is decidedly traditionalist, and deeply 
removed from the modern Western notion of philosopher and theologian. This tension 
will emerge quite clearly later on in this dissertation, as our comparison of Nasr and 
McFague unfolds. On first glance, McFague does not fit Nasr’s archetype of the “real 
philosopher” simply because she is a woman—not that Nasr is misogynistic, but it cannot 
be denied that all of his mentors and teachers, all of his models of real live philosophers, 
are men. During the first part of her career, McFague, drawing on Gordon Kaufman, 
develops her theological method of deconstruction and reconstruction using metaphors 
and models to reimage God; this method itself breaks substantially with Nasr’s 
understanding of the theologian, insofar as its deconstruction of traditional Christian 
symbolism appears to him to desacralize the Christian tradition and violate its integrity as 
a living body. It should be noted, however, that this first phase precedes her development 
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of a spiritual practice and subsequent experiential spiritual awakening to the reality of 
God as Love. McFague’s theology post-awakening shifts not only in content and 
substance but also, more decidedly, in manner and quality of expression; her work begins 
to give off more of the perfume of the sacred, that subtle aesthetic beauty and spiritual 
quality of prayer that Nasr so values, especially in philosophy and theology. It may be 
that if Nasr had attempted to dialogue with McFague after this spiritual awakening, rather 
than before it, the conversation would have been more productive because he would have 
been more able to appreciate the authenticity of her theology.  
The third of Nasr’s major traditional teachers, Sayyid Abu’l-Hasan Qazwini, was 
a grand ayatollah who was once a teacher of Ayatollah Khomeini. Nasr studied off and 
on with him for years. In addition to being his student, Nasr also served as a scribe to 
transmit his thought to the larger public. 
Sayyid Abu’l Hasan Qazwini wrote little and spent nearly all of his time teaching 
as well as addressing the religious needs of the community. He had an aura of 
majesty and exuded a sense of great intellectual power which reminded me often 
of what I had read about Nasir al-Din Tusi, who was also an outstanding 
mathematician as well as philosopher. The master from Qazwin, who usually bore 
a severe countenance, took a liking to me and agreed to write a few short treatises 
for me on specific questions of philosophy that I would pose to him. During each 
journey to Qazwin I would pose a specific question and then he would write the 
answer in a notebook which he then gave to me during our next visit. In this 
manner a number of short treatises were collected, all written in exquisite Persian 
and dealing in simple language with some of the most complicated issues of 
traditional philosophy.
48
 
 
This final vignette of Nasr’s third traditional teacher reinforces the importance of the 
sacred “aura” and “ambience” surrounding these teachers. Also, the story of Nasr’s 
collection of Qazwini’s answers to his questions in short treatises illuminates how Nasr 
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sees his role relative to this traditional wisdom. For Nasr, this is sacred wisdom taught by 
sacred people in sacred settings; as such, he does not encounter it in a critical fashion as a 
modern Western scholar might, but instead seeks to preserve and transmit it. Thus, Nasr’s 
role in relation to Qazwini is to ask questions and record the answers for posterity. He is 
loyal to his traditional teachers and trusted by them to carry on their teachings. 
Nasr’s Spirituality 
Nasr believes in living a spiritual life, and that informs his intellectual projects, 
though this is not always obvious to his readers. In fact, Nasr’s spirituality and other 
aspects of his personal identity are normally veiled in his writings, which are expressed 
from the perspective of the objective “we” rather than the subjective “I.” In his interview 
with Ramin Jahanbegloo, Nasr is asked to respond to Thomas Merton’s saying that 
“Spiritual life is not to be known or studied. It is to be lived.” Nasr remarks: 
I have been concerned with living the spiritual life since my twenties…Of course 
that is a private aspect of my life about which I do not usually speak. That is why 
for those who have only read my books, it appears that I am more interested in the 
study of Sufism rather than its practice…Yes, the spiritual life is not something 
you only study or write about; it is something that should be lived. The goal of all 
authentic spiritual writings is to lead people to the practice of the spiritual life. All 
these books that are written on this subject by authentic teachers have for their 
aim to lead a person to the point where he or she will begin to practice the 
spiritual life.
49
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Given that the telos of Nasr’s writings is to inspire readers to practice spirituality, to 
understand Nasr’s written works it is essential to be aware of his definition of spirituality: 
Spirituality in itself is what the word itself reveals, that is, to be in contact with 
the world of the Spirit, and that transcends all particularities of the human state 
and of the material world…What is primary in spirituality is inwardness, the 
inward dimension which connects the human being inwardly to the Divine Truth 
and all of those external consequences, including love for others, or creation of 
poetry, or feeding the poor, flow from that inner realization.
50
 
 
When encountering Nasr’s thought, it is important to be conscious of the spiritual 
rootedness and spiritual goal of his writing life. In this sense, Nasr’s academic career is 
not merely an occupation, but a vocation; his pursuit of truth is a jihad, a spiritual quest.  
One question that emerges in this connection is the question of the relative 
significance, in Nasr’s overall intellectual jihad, of the natural environment. In the 
comparison of Nasr and McFague that unfolds in the present work in the form of a 
dialogue, a tension presents itself between Nasr’s jihad against modernism and his related 
effort to help restore Western Christianity’s lost spiritual vision of nature. Nasr attempts 
to dialogue with McFague, a theologian who on the one hand presents what he perceives 
to be an unacceptably modern theological method, but on the other hand is one of the 
most insightful and notable Christian theologians to address the problems related to the 
ecological crisis. The fact that he writes about McFague shows his willingness to 
cooperate with a Christian theologian who understands the gravity of the crisis, but the 
harshness of his critique of McFague at the same time shows his unwillingness to 
cooperate with what he perceives to be a modernist view (Nasr makes little distinction 
between modernism and postmodernism in the West). In this case, at least, Nasr’s 
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concern regarding modernism appears to outweigh his concern regarding the ecological 
crisis. However, his concerns are in fact intertwined and inseparable, insofar as he defines 
the ecological crisis as a symptom of modernism; his criticism of modernism, being a 
total criticism from the inside out, inevitably implicates McFague’s theological method. 
While this essay will be concerned with understanding this and other ideological conflicts 
that emerge in the conversation between Nasr and McFague, it will also explore the 
profound common ground that the authors have beyond their ideological differences. 
International Philosophical Activity 
In 1973 Nasr was inducted into the Institut International de Philosophie (the 
International Institute of Philosophy). In response to this international recognition, and at 
the prompting of the institute’s president, Raymond Klibansky, the Shahbanou provided 
Nasr with generous funding to establish an Academy of Philosophy which would restore 
Iran as a center of philosophical learning.
51
 For Nasr this gift from the Shahbanou was an 
opportunity to establish a philosophical school that would be both traditional and global, 
in accordance with the interfaith inclusivity of the philosophia perennis. One significant 
aspect of this project was Nasr’s decision not to build a new building to house the center, 
but rather to renovate an old mansion in the middle of Tehran. As in the extension of the 
campus for Aryamehr University, Nasr employed traditional craftsmen for the project, 
“to create a completely traditional interior replete with blue tiles and traditionally 
designed furniture.”52 For Nasr, the creation of a traditional environment for this center of 
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philosophy symbolized the philosophical rootedness of the center in traditional Persian 
and Islamic thought. Embodied in these architectural decisions are Nasr’s critique of the 
architecture of modern Western university’s such as MIT as well as his positive feelings 
about settings such as the traditionally furnished Coomaraswamy library. One also finds 
in this architectural decision a connection with Nasr’s environmentalism, insofar as Nasr 
cares deeply about preserving the sacred quality not only of the natural environment but 
also of the built environment nested within it. For Nasr, conservation of traditional 
architecture has always been directly related to conservation of nature.  
 For Nasr, the establishment of the Academy of Philosophy, and his related 
activities in international philosophical institutions, gave him the opportunity to assert the 
relevance of the philosophia perennis to the global philosophical community. The Institut 
International de Philosophie met at the Academy in 1975, which was its first time 
meeting in the Islamic world; there, a rich discourse between Eastern and Western 
intellectuals took place. Nasr credits this conference and the overall activities of the 
Academy with “a turning point in the globalization of the concerns, goals and methods of 
philosophy as understood in the West until recently.” For Nasr, the globalization of 
philosophy means its release from modern Western hegemony, and an appreciation of the 
value of philosophical traditions of non-Western origin. In all of Nasr’s international 
philosophical activity organizing conferences, serving on committees, and the like, he 
pursued “the goal of enlarging the horizons of philosophy and seeking to return it to its 
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original sense of love of wisdom or Sophia as this reality has manifested itself in diverse 
traditional climes.”53  
Along with this global agenda of asserting the value of traditional philosophies, 
Nasr was also an intellectual activist within the Islamic world. Among his 
accomplishments in this arena, the most significant was his role in organizing the World 
Congress of Islamic Education in 1977. Nasr cites his role in this conference, which was 
instrumental in promoting the project of the “Islamization of knowledge,” as evidence of 
his intellectual leadership role in advancing the cause of “the integration of all knowledge 
into the Islamic worldview.” Although Nasr “never liked the usage of this term”—“the 
Islamization of knowledge”—he argues that he began to write of the need for such 
integration in his doctoral thesis in 1957, ten or fifteen years before Isma‘il al-Faruqi and 
Naquib al-Attas, who often are credited as its main proponents, began to address the 
topic.
54
  
Iranian Revolution and Exile to U.S. 
 In 1979, the Iranian revolution caused a traumatic upheaval in Nasr’s life. As 
discussed earlier, Nasr’s role as a public intellectual in Iran also involved him in political 
matters. Although Nasr attempted to remain aloof from politics, and refused several 
offers of political positions, the positions he accepted in the educational and cultural 
realms also included a political dimension. Nasr argues that he “could not have remained 
in Iran and succeeded in achieving what I did achieve without accepting such posts which 
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in fact never distracted me from either my teaching or scholarly and philosophical 
writings.” Nasr’s close relationship with the Shah and Shahbanou, who were his major 
patrons, would not have been possible if he had withheld his services to the government. 
In 1978, just before the Revolution broke out, Nasr had hoped that he might play a key 
role in negotiating a new balance of power between the court and the religious 
authorities, “creating a new harmony and avoiding chaos,” because he was trusted by 
both sides. It was with this intention in mind that Nasr accepted the Shahbanou’s 
invitation to become head of her special bureau. This position became more political than 
he expected, given that the Shah became ill and the Shahbanou’s special bureau needed 
to handle his affairs. Although Nasr does not discuss this role in detail, he does state that 
he was in nearly constant contact with the Shahbanou and Shah during the hectic run up 
to the revolution, and that he dealt with “many issues of a political and social nature.” In 
early January of 1979 Nasr left Iran for London on his way to a Persian art opening in 
Japan with the Japanese royal family. The exhibition was delayed, and while waiting in 
London the Shahbanou let Nasr know that she and the Shah were going “for a vacation to 
Cairo” and that it would not be safe for him to return to Iran for some time. In this way, 
in London with his wife, two children, and a few suitcases, Nasr’s exile began. He has 
not been able to return to Iran since then.
55
 
 As a result of the Revolution, Nasr and his family lost all of their property and 
possessions. Nasr lost his extensive personal library, manuscripts, lecture notes and, as a 
result, experienced major setbacks in terms of his various academic projects. Over the 
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next several years, he struggled to rebuild his external financial and family life in the U.S. 
While the details of Nasr’s political involvement in Iran are opaque, some general 
observations are quite possible. The Iranian Revolution was a very negative experience 
for Nasr. Although Nasr had close connections with the religious scholars who supported 
the Revolution, he was certainly a member of the ruling class and the trusted inner circle 
of the royal family. Throughout Nasr’s autobiography, one observes a reverence for 
royalty and aristocracy in various nations, with whom he is often personally associated. 
On the other hand, everywhere in Nasr’s writings, the idea of “rebellion” is a highly 
negative one, associated with rebellion against God and traditional values. In this 
connection it is interesting to note, by way of foreshadowing, how vehemently Nasr 
opposes McFague’s call to dismantle the monarchical model for God, and her support of 
egalitarianism. While in the U.S. the idea of kingship is ripe for deconstruction, insofar as 
the political mythology of the United States includes the triumph of democracy over 
monarchy, such a theological move does not sit well for Nasr, given his bitter experience 
of the Iranian Revolution, which he associates negatively with chaos, upheaval, and the 
losses associated with his forced exile. For Nasr, the Iranian Revolution was not actually 
successful in making the nation more Islamic; instead he has seen increasing 
accommodation to modern Western models of architecture, decline in patronage of 
traditional Persian art, and a rapid increase in the development of nuclear energy in Iran. 
Nasr is therefore quite suspicious of rhetoric that assumes the superiority of democracy 
and egalitarianism to monarchy and hierarchy; in fact, politically, socially, intellectually, 
and culturally, Nasr prefers the latter. 
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In 1979, being unable to find a position in England, Nasr began a teaching career 
in the United States, first at the University of Utah in 1979, then to Temple University for 
five years, and finally to The George Washington University where he currently teaches. 
During his career in the United States, Nasr in many ways resumed his earlier scholarly 
and philosophical activity including extensive international travel for conferences and 
dialogues with various thinkers. However, his public role in the United States was very 
different, insofar as he stood out in this Western context as an Islamic intellectual and 
representative of the philosophia perennis. In this capacity, Nasr took a leadership role in 
terms of addressing major spiritual and religious issues to the Western world at large, and 
also the Western Muslim community.
56
  
By 1980 Nasr resumed writing prolifically. Among his most notable works are his 
1981 Gifford Lectures, Knowledge and the Sacred. The notes for these lectures were lost 
in the Revolution, yet Nasr wrote the complete, foot-noted lectures in two and a half 
months in the winter of 1981. For Nasr, this text was “a gift from Heaven.” He writes, 
“The text would in a sense ‘descend’ upon me and crystallize clearly in my mind and I 
was able to write each chapter in a continuous flow like a running river with no need for 
long pauses or hesitation.”57 Nasr considers this text his most important work. In it he 
encounters the problem of the desacralization of knowledge in the West which, in his 
analysis, is a fundamental problem underlying the ecological crisis.
58
 Nasr’s most 
significant treatment of the ecological crisis, which follows up on his earlier work in The 
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Encounter of Man and Nature, is Religion and the Order of Nature, based on his 1994 
Cadbury Lectures. In these works, which are all based on public lectures, Nasr engages a 
Western audience in dialogue around the fundamental problem of desacralization in the 
West, of both knowledge and the environment. He represents an Islamic and traditionalist 
perspective on these problems which draws quite heavily on the thought of Frithjof 
Schuon, Rene Guenon, and other traditionalist authors.  
Nasr’s status as a Western educated academic, and his awareness of the ecological 
crisis, has helped him to relate the relevance of the philosophia perennis to a Western 
audience quite effectively. While in Iran, Nasr worked actively to establish and promote a 
philosophical worldview centered in traditional Persian thought and, more generally, 
sought to advance the cause of Islamic philosophy, art, and architecture in the Islamic 
world as opposed to the Westernization of these domains. In the United States his role 
shifted and he became more focused on representing a traditionalist worldview in the 
West, in hopes of sparking a return to tradition in the West, especially among 
Christians—not a conversion to Islam, but a reawakening of Western traditions of 
philosophy and religion through dialogue with other traditions, including Islam. 
The Theme of Ecology in Nasr’s Works 
Nasr assesses the defining theme of his intellectual life as “that quest after a 
knowledge which liberates and delivers us from the fetters and limitations of earthly 
existence.” For Nasr, his discovery of intellectual certitude in his early twenties stayed 
with him his entire career, during which he steadfastly promoted traditionalism over and 
against modernism, scientism, and the like, especially in Iran and the Muslim world. This 
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quest for knowledge in the traditional sense, both as a seeker, teacher, scholar, and 
polemicist, was Nasr’s primary intellectual jihad. In Knowledge and the Sacred, Nasr 
states his mission with regards to the West, which applies not only to that work in 
particular but to his overall relationship with the West: “to aid in the resuscitation of the 
sacred quality of knowledge and the revival of the veritable intellectual tradition of the 
West with the aid of the still living traditions of the Orient where knowledge has never 
become divorced from the sacred.”59 It is within the framework of this traditionalist 
intellectual agenda that Nasr encounters the ecological crisis.  
In The Encounter of Man and Nature, Religion and the Order of Nature, and other 
texts, lectures, and conversations that touch on this problem, Nasr applies a methodology 
which is strikingly similar to his approach to the problem of desacralized knowledge in 
the West. His approach is so similar that the above quotation from Knowledge and the 
Sacred works as a mission statement for Nasr’s ecological theology simply if one 
substitutes the word “nature” for “knowledge”: “to aid in the resuscitation of the sacred 
quality of nature and the revival of the veritable intellectual tradition of the West with the 
aid of the still living traditions of the Orient where nature has never become divorced 
from the sacred” [“nature” substituted for “knowledge”].  
Nasr, as a perennialist, also brings a value for interfaith dialogue to the problem of 
the ecological crisis. Beginning with Man and Nature, and continuing in Religion and the 
Order of Nature, Nasr has brought together insights from various world religions and 
spiritualties. He has encouraged cooperative dialogue among practitioners of these 
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religions in the overall mission of “the revival of a sacred view of nature…requir[ing] a 
drawing together of various religions in providing a religious response on both the ethical 
and intellectual level.”60 
Nasr’s love of nature nests alongside his love of tradition in complementary 
fashion. The complementary nature of these two loves manifests itself quite clearly not 
only intellectually in Nasr’s philosophy and theology, but also practically, as in the 
numerous building projects he oversaw with intertwined concerns for traditionalism and 
environmentalism in all aspects of planning and building. Beginning with his Rockefeller 
lectures, Seyyed Hossein Nasr discovered the ecological crisis as a point of shared 
concern and connection with a modern Western audience, as a subject where his 
traditionalist concern for the desacralization of knowledge became relevant to a modern 
Western audience who had, by and large, not regarded the desacralization of knowledge 
as a problem as such. By establishing a direct connection between the desacralization of 
knowledge in the West and the desacralization of nature which has precipitated the 
ecological crisis, Nasr demonstrates the relevancy of the philosophia perennis to the 
modern Western world. True to form as a traditionalist, Nasr believes that the solution to 
the ecological crisis in the West is “the revival of the sapiential perspective in the 
West,”61 just as he believes that reviving this perspective in Iran and the Muslim world 
would return the Muslim world to harmony and balance with nature. His 1961 work, The 
Encounter of Man and Nature, has become a classic. It is one of the earliest works to 
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describe the environmental crisis from an explicitly religious point of view, and to 
indicate philosophical and spiritual rather than merely technological or political responses 
to the problems posed. Although the ecological crisis has not been Seyyed Hossein 
Nasr’s primary or ultimate concern, it is nevertheless an area of passionate engagement 
integral to his overall intellectual jihad. Many of his most original intellectual 
contributions and much of his intellectual and political activism have centered on 
understanding and addressing the ecological crisis.   
In closing, it should be mentioned that, in the course of his career as a religious 
environmentalist, Nasr has had the occasion to participate in interfaith dialogues with 
Sallie McFague. In a transcript of one dialogue, from the Spirit and Nature symposium at 
Middlebury College in the early 1990’s, where both Nasr and McFague were present, 
Nasr remarks on McFague’s theology. Furthermore, in Religion and the Order of Nature, 
Nasr comments quite extensively about McFague’s eco-theology. Nasr’s perspective on 
both occasions is frankly critical; and, on both occasions, McFague does not reply 
directly to Nasr. Apparently, these two profound theologians never saw eye to eye despite 
their shared concern for the ecological crisis. This work will explore the ideological 
differences that prevented these thinkers from finding common ground, as well as 
consider the profound common ground that they never discovered or appreciated because 
of these differences. But before venturing into that discussion, the next chapter will 
introduce Sallie McFague to the reader in much the same way that this chapter introduces 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr. These introductions represent an essential first step in a 
methodology of interfaith dialogue suggested by this dissertation, which is to gain first a 
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clear understanding of whom one is dialoguing with, where they come from, and what 
matters to them. It is essential, in this first step, to refrain from a judging attitude that 
problematizes differences but instead to accept with openness and empathy the identity 
and story of one’s dialogical partner. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MCFAGUE’S LIFE AND TIMES 
Introduction: Religious Autobiography as Kenosis 
After maintaining relative authorial anonymity in the first phase of her career, 
McFague provides her readers with a concise description of her religious autobiography 
in Life Abundant in 2001. In this account, McFague intentionally omits the details of her 
life—relationships, career moves, activism, etc.—and instead sketches out the 
experiences and ideas that have most directly impacted her theology. This is an 
intentional decision for McFague. Throughout her teaching career she has had a focus on 
religious autobiography, teaching the lives of the saints to students as a way for them to 
reflect upon their own religious autobiographies and to aid them in the construction of 
theologies that they can commit to and live out in meaningful ways. In her latest book, 
Blessed Are the Consumers (2013), McFague examines three of the primary subjects of 
the course on religious autobiographies she has taught over the years: John Woolman, 
Dorothy Day, and Simone Weil.  She finds in their stories resources for a theology and 
ethic of kenosis or self-emptying that she finds relevant to the ecological and economic 
crises facing middle-class North American Christians in the 21
st
 century.  
For McFague, religious autobiography can be seen in contrast to the type of self-
absorbed and self-indulgent autobiography saturating American media today, whether on 
Facebook, reality TV, or the superabundance of memoirs about addiction and recovery. 
The growth in recent years of these latter types of autobiography corresponds to the 
unsustainable growth of the egos and consumption of middle class North Americans. But 
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the theme of McFague’s religious autobiography is not self-aggrandizement but rather 
kenosis or self-emptying, that is, the death of the ego and the growth of the “universal 
self” which lives beyond the borders of one’s individual body. McFague tells her 
religious autobiography in a way that intentionally eschews narcissism. She instead 
humbly presents her life insofar as it can serve as a model for her readers as they seek to 
examine their own lives and construct their own theologies which they can commit to and 
live out today. Therefore, in this chapter, as we lay out McFague’s religious 
autobiography, we will do so in keeping with the way in which she intentionally presents 
it, focusing on the aspects of her story which she herself has chosen to highlight for 
specific pedagogical purposes. 
 In Life Abundant (2001), Sallie McFague introduces her religious autobiography 
into the stream of her public theological reflection.  The purpose of this self-disclosure is 
to model for her readers how they might engage in a process of constructing a meaningful 
theology that they could deeply internalize and live out in the world.  Here is a summary 
of her rationale: 
Each Christian is asked to examine his or her life with the goal of discerning the 
action of God in it and then express God’s power and love in everything. Each of 
us is expected to have a working theology, one that makes a difference in how we 
conduct our personal lives and how we act at professional and public levels. 
Becoming a mature Christian means internalizing one’s beliefs so that they are 
evident in whatever one says or does.
1
 
 
Rather than present her autobiographical theological reflection as exceptional, McFague 
describes herself as doing what each Christian is asked to do. It is instructive to recall that 
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this discourse, for McFague, emerges out of her teaching context. Her framing of it in this 
way would intentionally invite her students to follow suit and engage in the task of 
identifying major events in their spiritual journeys, and piecing these together to form a 
personally meaningful theology. McFague is a professional theologian, but for her 
religious autobiography is a personal task for all Christians rather than something left to 
professionals. One might assume that her expectation of her seminary students would be 
for them to extend her invitation to their congregants later on. This expectation of 
personal theological construction resonates with the Protestant principle of the priesthood 
of all believers. 
 To drive home her point that religious autobiography in the service of personal 
theological formation is not an affair for professional theologians only, McFague remarks 
that the goal of such personal reflection need not be a formal, systematic theology. 
I want to see how a few beliefs which I now hold undeniably can function as a 
working theology for the ecological and justice crises facing our planet in the 
twenty-first century. A bare bones theology, a few beliefs carefully thought 
through and actually functioning at personal and public levels, may be more 
significant than a comprehensive, systematic, but loosely embraced theology.
2
 
McFague contrasts her “bare bones theology” of “a few beliefs” which are deeply held 
and personally meaningful with a professional systematic theology that might be “loosely 
embraced”.  McFague believes that the former, mundane theology, which is actually 
                                                        
2
 Sallie McFague, Life Abundant, 4. 
  
82 
lived, is more effective and significant than the type of theology which pertains to the 
academic specialist alone, that is, systematic theology. 
I want to use my own history as a case study for other Christians who are also 
trying to integrate their beliefs and their actions at the deepest level, who are 
trying to be whole, mature Christians functioning effectively in the twenty-first 
century on planet Earth. The story I share will be brief, narrow, and focused. It is 
meant as a pedagogical tool for others and hence will ignore all kinds of personal 
data (family, schooling, relationships, etc.), which undoubtedly in a full 
autobiography would be relevant but will be passed over here.
 3
  
 
In this quotation McFague does not specify what theological content the process of 
reflecting theologically on one’s major spiritual experiences might produce, but rather 
articulates her value of the process itself as a way of fostering integration between belief 
and practice, of helping Christians be “whole”, “mature”, and “functioning”. Implicitly, 
this process will have different outcomes personal to each reflector. McFague embraces 
this fact, and encourages her readers to learn from her process in order to discover their 
own truths, rather than presenting her truths as necessary conclusions.  
The Structure of Her Story: McFague’s Four Conversions 
In McFague’s religious autobiography in Life Abundant she frames her narrative 
as a series of four conversions or moments of awakening. In a later essay, “Falling in 
Love with God and the Earth” (Ecumenical Review, 2013), McFague again returns to her 
autobiography, retelling a few of her major conversions but also adding a few more 
significant details to the story; she comments more extensively, for example, on the 
influence of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin on her theology and self-understanding. This 
chapter will give extensive attention to the major conversions in McFague’s life as she 
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describes them in Life Abundant and “Falling in Love with God and the Earth”.  Along 
the way, via a general review of McFague’s publications, this chapter will attempt to fill 
in lacunae in between McFague’s self-described “conversions” so as to give a fuller 
picture of the development and expression of her thought throughout her academic 
career. In closing we will also consider her general but still personal reflections on the 
integration of belief and practice in religious life in Blessed Are the Consumers (2013). 
McFague’s theology over the years demonstrates her passionate engagement in the 
process of constructive theology, her integration of new insights and sources of 
knowledge into her work, her response to specific ethical challenges, and her overall 
concern for wholeness, integrity, and lived religion. Her theological reflections chart a 
very interesting course as, with continuing integration, McFague’s interrelated concepts 
of God, humanity, the world, and religious vocation grow in complexity and also become 
sharper and more targeted based on her understanding of her and her readers’ context and 
the unique challenges it presents, especially the ecological and economic crises. 
Conversion One: Childhood Experience of God 
McFague begins the story of her theological journey by recollecting her initial 
entry into personal religious consciousness as a young girl, what she calls her first 
conversion. McFague grew up in Milton, Massachusetts, a suburb of Boston. Her family 
attended an Anglican church and, though this religious part of her life was 
compartmentalized and confined in terms of time and space, not being integrated into the 
fabric of her social life (family or school), the language of religion which she learned in 
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that setting apparently became real for her beyond its use in the sacred and set apart 
Sunday hour of worship. 
The first [conversion] came in two stages, occurred when I was around seven 
years old.  One day while I was walking home from school the thought came to 
me that some day I would not be here; I would not exist. Christmas would come, 
and I would not be around to celebrate it; even more shocking, my birthday would 
occur, and I would not be present. It was not an experience of non-being: I simply 
would not exist. For months, indeed years, I could not get this thought out of my 
mind; I was fascinated and terrified by it. Eventually, it began to turn into a sense 
of wonder that I was alive—and so were myriad other creatures. Over decades 
this wonder has stayed with me, growing stronger and deeper until now I believe 
that one of the most profound religious emotions is wonder at and gratitude for 
life in all its incredible shapes, colors, and sizes. Along with Annie Dillard I now 
exclaim, “My God what a world. There is no accounting for one second of it,” and 
along with Alice Walker I notice the color purple in fields when I pass by. That 
early experience of non-being has eventuated into praise to God for all beings 
fully alive.
4
 
 
McFague’s experience of finitude, her awareness of her own mortality, leads her to a 
sense of wonder at the mystery and majesty of creation. It pushes her beyond a 
conventional, day to day attitude that takes life on earth, and our participation in this life, 
for granted. Here McFague references a couple of authors that are major influences, 
Dillard and Walker, who represent McFague’s intertwined influences of 
environmentalism and feminism (Dillard being a prominent nature writer, and Walker 
being a significant feminist author). She also makes an allusion to St. Irenaeus of Lyons 
(3
rd
 Century): “The glory of God is all beings fully alive.” Irenaeus, whose theology is 
replete with creation-centered visions of the messianic hope of heaven on earth, is a 
major theological source for her. McFague is explicit in naming just a few sources that 
resonate with her experience but there are countless others. As McFague presents it, her 
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religious experience of awe and wonder at creation is a relatively common human 
experience, which finds expression in different ways depending on one’s religious or 
spiritual vocabulary. McFague’s vocabulary for her inner world from an early age is 
clearly Christian, as is her milieu, as her mention of Christmas hints.
5
  
The second stage of this first conversion, however, breaks the mold of “mundane 
spirituality” and displays the experience of a young theologian who is precocious in 
thinking and speaking about God. 
The second stage of my seventh-year conversion occurred one day when the 
teacher asked the class, “What name will you write more than any other in your 
life? Being an eager student, I immediately raised my hand to answer. 
Fortunately, the teacher did not call on me; had she done so, I would have been 
red with embarrassment. The correct answer was, of course, one’s own name, but 
I was going to answer, “God.” That incident stayed with me as I gradually 
discerned its meaning. I have decided I was not wrong: “God” is the name 
beneath, with, and in each of our names. As I have come to realize that we all live 
and move and have our being in God, the names of each person, species, creature, 
and element are superimposed over God’s name. God is reality; God is the  
source of the reality of each of us. Panentheism—seeing the world in God—puts 
God’s “name” first, but each of our names are included and preserved in their 
distinctiveness within the divine reality. My early experience of God’s name as 
primary, the experience of divine transcendence and preeminence, would stay 
with me and grow.
6
 
 
In this early experience we see a foreshadowing of important ideas which emerge later in 
McFague’s thought, such as the tension between two definitions of human identity that 
she explores at length in Blessed Are the Consumers: the ego as the center of human 
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identity in a narcissistic consumerist anthropology, versus God as the center of identity of 
the universal self. Though in an unassuming way, McFague’s story of childhood 
experiences of her finitude, the glory of creation, and the basis of human identity in God, 
indicates her natural theological or mystical bent. While on the one hand meaningful 
spiritual experiences during childhood are not rare, on the other hand McFague’s 
experiences are unique and in some ways stand in tension with her democratic and 
egalitarian notion that all Christians are capable of constructing their own theologies. 
From an early age McFague demonstrates precociousness in terms of her religious 
experience and the depth of her reflections on that experience; for example, her 
realization that she would one day die. Her experience in the classroom where she wants 
to use God language points to an incredibly important trait in terms of her overall 
theological career: McFague is fascinated by God-language and has an uncanny ability to 
imagine new ways to use this language to name the sacred in ourselves and our world.    
 Despite McFague’s lively religious experiences in her inner world as a child, 
McFague notes that she had little opportunity to express this faith during her adolescence.  
Though she had a profound sense that God’s name was preeminent over all other names 
and that the world was telling the glory of God, the structure of her life did not reflect this 
inner spiritual perception. 
My early experience of God’s name as primary, the experience of divine 
transcendence and preeminence, would stay with me and grow. It lay dormant, 
however, during my teenage years growing up in Boston as a member of a 
conventional Episcopal church. At most, God was the Great Moralizer, the 
upholder of proper appearances and conduct.
7
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The God of her church experience was the upholder of what Nasr might call a shallow 
exoterism. It was a compartmentalized religious space. Religion would be publicly 
celebrated on Sundays, and on occasional holidays, but not be part of public expression 
during the week. Yet despite this religiously stifling environment, McFague nevertheless 
enjoyed a lively internal religious experience, as evidenced by her unspoken use of 
religious language in public settings such as school. The work of integrating her 
childhood religious experiences and insights and even unspoken faith statements into her 
experience and practice of Christianity is problematized by the lack of integration 
between these experiences and her Christian practice at the time they occurred.  
McFague’s childhood religious experience strikes an interesting contrast with Nasr’s 
early involvement with Sufism. Sitting in on his father’s philosophical discussions and 
reading mystical poetry as a child, for example, allowed him to develop a balanced, 
integrated relationship between his personal experience and the Muslim tradition; or, to 
put it another way, between the esoteric and exoteric dimensions of Islam. 
Conversion Two: McFague’s Barthian Phase 
McFague’s second conversion experience is one that challenged the definition of 
God she learned growing up in a conventional suburban church setting. It will be helpful 
to the reader to see McFague’s account before any further analysis. 
My second conversion occurred at college while reading Karl Barth’s 
Commentary on Romans. Suddenly the transcendence of God took on a whole 
new meaning for me. I began to have a glimmer of what the word “God” meant. 
My boxed-in, comfortable, tribal notion of God was split wide open and like a 
cold, bracing mountain wind, the awesome presence of the divine brushed my 
life. That evening I walked home from the library in a daze; I had seen something 
I would never forget: that God is God and nothing else is. My teacher and mentor, 
H. Richard Niebuhr, would call it “radical monotheism,” and Paul Tillich 
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described it as the Protestant Principle. It is Christianity in its “Protestant” or 
prophetic mode and a necessary component, I believe, of any theology.
8
 
 
It is remarkable to note that McFague, who later questions and deconstructs this Barthian 
concept of God, still recognizes this conversion experience, her first awakening to God’s 
transcendence, as “a necessary component…of any theology.” Rather early in her career 
(in Models of God, 1987) McFague breaks theologically from what she sees as the 
distant, patriarchal God of Barthian theology. From that point on McFague nevertheless 
attempts to remain faithful to and cognizant of the transcendent dimension of God as she 
experiences it during this conversion experience. What she problematizes is Barth’s 
notion of divine transcendence that negates God’s immanence and implies a justification 
of hierarchy, especially the hierarchy of people over the rest of nature.  
For McFague, divine transcendence need not be tied to distance, maleness, 
kingship, or other patriarchal descriptions or concept-pictures. There are many other 
metaphors and models that are just as suitable, if not more suitable, for expressing divine 
transcendence in ways that also support what McFague calls the “planetary agenda.” 
What became so problematic for McFague about the Barthian notion of God’s 
transcendence is that it apparently excludes the other authentic and essential element of 
her experience of God (which began in her childhood years), namely, God’s immanence. 
For years, however, it would keep me from recognizing and growing into my 
early sense of wonder at life and its grounding in God (the “Catholic” side that 
every theology also must have). It created a dualism in my belief and actions that 
sent me on a long detour, a detour in which the world was not in God and God 
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was not with the world. The child’s love of nature was set aside for the budding 
theologian’s dedication to the transcendent—and distant—God.9 
 
McFague’s embrace of Barthian theology was exciting and awe-inspiring, yet had the 
unfortunate consequence of alienating McFague from her childhood experiences of the 
immanence of God, especially in terms of her love and awe for the natural world. In this 
way, McFague experienced firsthand how a certain type of transcendently and 
hierarchically focused Christian theology could be implicated in alienating humanity 
from the sacredness of nature and thus creating conditions for the ecological crisis on a 
deep level.  
In The Epistle to the Romans, the text which sparked McFague’s second 
conversion, Barth explicitly defines the whole realm of nature and human experience as 
the realm of the “No-God,” wherein if one tries to find or name God, one is guilty of 
setting up an idol. In quite direct terms, Barth’s Epistle to the Romans clearly disallows 
any attempt to integrate the transcendent aspect of God with the immanent aspect of God 
as she had experienced it as a child. For Barth, God cannot be known in and through 
creation. Rather, he argues that “busy concern with concrete things” is part and parcel of 
“revolt against God,” of creating an idolatrous “‘No-God.’” For Barth, our religious 
concern must be directed entirely beyond the world. Otherwise, we may not connect with 
God at all. He writes, “Enveloped in mist, we forget not merely that all that passes to 
corruption is a parable, but also that it is ONLY a parable. The glory of the incorruptible 
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God has been confused with the image (Ps. Cvi. 20) of corruptible things.”10 Calling the 
created world “ONLY a parable” surely strips it of value, and his cautions regarding 
idolatry make it hard to appreciate God’s immanence in creation.  
For Barth, the only way to safeguard oneself from spiritual rebellion against God 
and idolatry is to regard God as completely separate from the world. If one begins to 
allow any notion of divinity to enter one’s perception of the world, Barth argues: 
Complete rebellion from God soon takes to itself more pronounced forms…The 
tiny mist between God and man, by which the far distance is obscured, soon 
becomes a veritable sea of clouds. Some half-conscious resentment at the 
unknown God very soon becomes fully conscious…The Creator, the eternal 
Archetype, meanwhile grows ever more and more ‘abstract’, ‘theoretical’, 
insignificant, and unloved. The completely concrete ‘No-God’ has won his 
victory, even though there may, perhaps, remain some bleak survival of the 
Unknown behind what is thought to be genuinely significant and magnificent, 
some occasional reference to a final secret in the midst of so much busy service of 
him whom we name ‘God’…The world is worshipped and served—if it be 
necessary, quite apart from its Creator…It is not merely that the world exists side 
by side with God: it has taken His place, and has itself become God.
11
 
 
McFague’s ecological theology, especially her model of the world as God’s body, flies 
directly in the face of Barth’s critique quoted above. It is clear that maintaining an 
allegiance to Barth’s theology would have prevented her from pursuing the integration of 
her experience of God as immanent in the world with her awareness of God’s 
transcendence, since Barth so clearly, forcefully, and uncompromisingly rejects such 
integration. For Barth God must be wholly transcendent and other than the natural world. 
Barth assumes (quoting Paul erroneously) that the recognition of the divine in nature 
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somehow leads to sexual immorality.
12
 Furthermore, he assumes that devotion to the 
natural, material world must be something immoral and illicit, which decreases one’s 
devotion to God.  
In McFague’s theology, where she names God into the world—“the world is 
God’s body”—she does so quite intentionally because she believes that it is precisely the 
role of religion to inspire religious sentiments of care and devotion for the world. 
McFague’s theology is meant to get people “busy with concrete things”—not in sinfully 
indulgent ways, e.g., sexual immorality, egoism, or consumerism—but in terms of caring 
and protecting the natural world which has been given up for destruction as fodder for 
our consumer economy. McFague’s theology is precisely concerned with making a 
connection between God and the world so as to resacralize the world, to restore its 
spiritual value. Barth insists that God has nothing to do with the world besides creating it 
from a distance. This position is extremely problematic for anyone concerned with 
environmental justice, because it radically desacralizes and devalues the world by 
separating it from God.  
Interestingly, the broad sweep of the history of Western civilization’s spiritual 
relationship with nature maps quite well with McFague’s own narrative, in terms of the 
conflict between her childhood experience of God in nature which was excluded by the 
transcendent theology of Karl Barth, and only later reintegrated through McFague’s 
intentional process of theological deconstruction and reconstruction. In Western history a 
striking problem presents itself in terms of Christianity’s general rejection and lack of 
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integration of the “childhood” pagan experience of the Western world, in which the 
sacredness of nature was thoroughly acknowledged and celebrated through ritual, myth, 
belief, and associated ethical norms and practices. For pre-Christian European peoples, 
the world of nature was very much a theater of the divine, and this awareness helped to 
support sustainable ways of relating with nature.  
In its dominant historical expression, however, Christianity abstracted God from 
nature, a process dramatized by the forcible destruction by Christians of many nature-
oriented pagan rituals, practices, artifacts, and sacred places. This is a pattern 
foreshadowed in the numerous Biblical accounts of iconoclastic Israelite prophets and 
kings who destroy sacred groves, high places, and in general violently repress types of 
worship which associate the sacred with nature. Generally, such actions are given 
positive assessments by biblical authors, who seem to foreshadow Barth’s perspective on 
the transcendence of God. There are of course exceptions. Celtic Christianity (which Nasr 
also praises) represents a rare case of a more harmonious integration of Druidism’s pagan 
nature mysticism with Christianity. The distant transcendent God, who was introduced in 
the Western world by Christianity’s reactive repression of European paganism, became 
even more hyperbolically abstracted from the world in the Protestant Reformation. In 
McFague’s thought, the prophetic or Protestant dimension of Christianity is needed, but 
when unbalanced by the contemplative or Catholic dimension the view of nature tends 
towards depreciation, distance, objectification, and even hatred; rather than appreciation, 
connection, wonder, and love.
13
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In connection with McFague’s experience of the stifling effect of Barthian 
theology on her love of nature, it is instructive to draw a quick contrast between Nasr’s 
understanding of the causes of desacralization of nature and McFague’s personal 
experience. In an interview with Bill Moyers for the documentary “Spirit and Nature,” 
Nasr argues that one of the deep causes of desacralization or profanation of nature is that 
the innate childhood love for nature is deeply damaged by the secular worldview of 
modern schooling. 
Bill Moyers: “In the language of the street, what do you believe has profaned the 
natural environment?” 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr: “…First of all, on the theoretical level, you might say, the 
emphasis, in education, from the childhood up, from kindergarten on, that nature, 
is no longer the enchanted world that a child almost automatically experiences, 
which other civilizations, including Western civilization, tried to preserve, for the 
older person, through poetry, art, and science, even before modern times. Now 
this was converted to a kind of attempt to demystify nature from early times, to 
change everything to simply objects which are easy to understand and to 
manipulate; and therefore to destroy, in fact, the feeling of something sacred in 
the natural environment which I think is innate to the human being; that’s why the 
little child takes so much joy in colors and chirping of birds and seeing flowers 
and so forth.  This I think, is one.
14
  
 
In McFague’s experience, school was certainly a stifling place for her expression of faith. 
She recalls not feeling it was safe in class to share her panentheistic insight that God’s 
name is primary in all names. So in a certain sense McFague could identify with Nasr’s 
observations quoted above. However, at least in McFague’s experience, it was Barthian 
theology more so than secular schooling which played the decisive role in demystifying 
nature. Regarding the effect of Barth’s theology on her childhood wonder at nature, she 
writes: “It created a dualism in my belief and actions that sent me on a long detour, a 
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detour in which the world was not in God and God was not with the world. The child’s 
love of nature was set aside for the budding theologian’s dedication to the transcendent—
and distant—God.”15 Because of this experience, McFague is compelled later in her 
career to problematize this Barthian notion of God’s transcendence in the articulation of 
her eco-theology, insofar as Barth’s God-image set up a mutually exclusive relationship 
between her love for God and her love for nature.  
Nasr, on the other hand, had a very different experience with Islam and Sufism, 
an experience which from childhood on helped him to integrate his love for nature and 
his love for God. His point of view is true to his experience of a desacralizing secular 
science at MIT which threatened his deeply held belief that seeking knowledge of the 
natural world was a way of seeking knowledge of God. In traditional Islam and Sufism as 
Nasr experienced it, what McFague calls the Protestant and Catholic aspects of religion 
are more balanced and integrated, so that the transcendence and immanence of God are 
not perceived as mutually exclusive or unrelated; nature is appreciated for its sacredness, 
for being filled with God’s presence and at the same time pointing to God’s 
transcendence. Later on in this dissertation, we shall explore the way this experiential 
difference leads Nasr to strongly object to McFague’s deconstruction of certain Christian 
symbols she associates with the distant and disconnected transcendent God of Barthian 
theology. Nasr does not understand or approve of this deconstruction, because the same 
symbols are used in Islam in balance and proportion with symbols indicating God’s 
immanence and presence in creation, and hence do not have the same effect of 
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desacralizing nature for the believer. However, McFague’s theological project of 
deconstructing the distant God model and offering a transcendently immanent or 
immanently transcendent model of God is rooted in her search to answer this profound 
problem, not only in her own story and experience, but in the story and experience of 
Western Christianity as a whole, especially Protestantism. 
A Way Back to Nature 
McFague’s conversion to Barthian theology alienated her from nature, and from 
seeing herself as an integral part of nature. However, she eventually found her way back 
to her innate, childhood experience of the natural world through hiking. She does not 
describe this “way back” as one of her conversion experiences, but it appears to be highly 
significant. Perhaps McFague does not frame this experience as a conversion because this 
way back was not a single event; rather, it was a series of events that took place over 
many years as McFague’s practice of hiking slowly reintroduced a profound sense of the 
sacred value of nature and reawakened her consciousness of being an integral part of 
nature. 
Eventually, I found a way back (or one was given to me, as I now see it). The way 
back was through nature—I became a hiker. I did not find god in nature, but I 
found a sense of belonging, of being the “proper size” in the forest. Whenever I 
got on a trail, I immediately had a sense of proportion, of fitting in, of being 
neither too big nor too small, but “just right” in relation to the trees above me, the 
bushes and flowers beside me, and the earth under my feet. I felt in nature; it 
surrounded me; I was part of it. It felt like coming home. After many years, this 
experience on the trail came to symbolize how we (all of us creatures) fit into 
God’s world, each with space and place. What had been an experience of 
overwhelming and distant transcendence became one of equally awesome but 
now immanent and intimate transcendence. God’s magnificence, God’s 
preeminence, God’s “Godness” was manifest in and through and with the earth 
and all its creatures. I learned this first through nature; eventually, I would see it 
as what Christians call “incarnation”—God with us here and now for the 
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flourishing of all living beings. Nature can seduce us with its beauty and right 
order to love and glorify God. This is the way it happened to me.
16
 
 
McFague experiences nature as a source of revelation through hiking. Reflecting on this 
experience, she does the constructive and integrative theological work of articulating her 
experience of God manifest in nature in terms of the Christian theological concept of 
incarnation.  
McFague’s nature mysticism is a profound source of connection to Nasr, whose 
ecological theology is also grounded in experiences of what he calls “virgin nature” or 
“pristine nature.” For example, his awareness of the ecological crisis was piqued in a very 
personal way by the Route 128 beltway project that put a highway between Concord and 
MIT, physically and symbolically alienating Nasr (on the MIT campus in Cambridge, 
where the modern urban architecture disturbed him) from his nature sanctuary in 
Concord, Walden Pond. Like McFague, for Nasr hiking is a spiritual practice, and his 
frequent trips to the woods at Walden and surrounding trails were times of communion 
with the sacred. When the highway was put in between Nasr and this natural sanctuary, 
he understood with visceral insight how modern Western technology and development 
was actively alienating human beings from nature and, in turn, their own spiritual centers 
in God. Through such relatable experiences as connecting to the sacredness of nature 
through Christian, Protestant, and eco-feminist insights, McFague develops theological 
views that are quite different from Nasr’s. For example, McFague understands her 
experiences of nature through the theme of incarnation, a central theme of Christianity 
without a direct corollary in Islam. Nasr, in characteristic Muslim fashion, centers his 
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reflections on his experiences of nature in terms of the concept of tawhid (unity), Islam’s 
major theme. Besides these essential religious differences, there are also important 
ideological differences, such as McFague’s postmodernism in contrast with Nasr’s 
traditionalism. These profound differences, which produce inconvenient conflicts, are 
also what make the dialogue between McFague interesting and, potentially, mutually 
enriching. Carried out to its conclusion, this dialogue clarifies insights and opens up new 
possibilities in understanding the relationships between God, human beings, and the 
world. 
Feminist Influence: Stage of Theological Deconstruction 
Before McFague rediscovered God’s presence in nature through hiking, she broke 
away from Barthian theology through her reading of feminist theology, and subsequent 
self-identification as a feminist theologian. Through a feminist reading of scripture, 
McFague gleaned insight into the effect of patriarchal bias on the construction of the 
image of God in the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
[F]eminist theologians are saying that religious language is not only religious but 
also human, not only about God but also about us. The tradition says that we were 
created in the image of God, but the obverse is also the case, for we imagine God 
in our image. And the human images we choose for the divine influence the way 
we feel about ourselves, for these images are “divinized” and hence raised in 
status. For example, earthly kingship gains in importance when the image of king 
is applied to God. On the contrary, images that are excluded are not legitimized 
and honored, for instance, as feminists have pointed out, the paucity of feminine 
imagery for God in the Judeo-Christian tradition means a lower self-image for 
women in that tradition.
17
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Karl Barth’s picture of God as a remote transcendent being connects especially with the 
“king” motif in God language, a motif which McFague and other feminist theologians 
focus on deconstructing because of the way it divinizes a traditional patriarchal symbol of 
authority. A few notable feminist authors who have particularly impacted McFague’s 
work are Rosemary Radford Ruether (Sexism and God-Talk, 1983), Mary Daly 
(Gyn/Ecology, 1978) and Carolyn Merchant (The Death of Nature, 1980). For McFague 
the move to deconstruct traditional patriarchal language about God is originally inspired 
by feminist critique. In agreement with Reuther, Daly, Merchant, and other feminist 
theorists McFague finds that traditional male language for God reinforces oppressive 
systems of patriarchal domination of earth, women, and poor peoples. Patriarchy’s 
domination and control of the natural environment, which is often symbolized as a 
woman in patriarchal discourse, is seen by these important feminist influences of 
McFague’s as part and parcel of patriarchal domination and control of women. One of 
McFague’s most important feminist influences is Carolyn Merchant. 
In The Death of Nature Carolyn Merchant explores the traditional European 
“organic model” of earth as a “mother.” In this model, the earth is conceived as a living 
mother, and this metaphor plays an important ethical role in restraining human 
exploitation of the earth; for example, mining. In this organic model the Earth was 
literally believed to have “veins” of ore, coal, gold, etc., through which the life of the 
earth pulsated and flowed. Because of this point of view, mining a vein of coal was 
considered a violent and violating act. The modern practice of mountain-top removal coal 
mining would be seen, in this model, as an abominable mutilation of mother earth. 
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Merchant’s historical narrative traces how, with the rise of the Scientific Revolution, 
which sought to control and exploit nature, this metaphor of mother earth began to shift 
in disturbing ways.  
Sir Francis Bacon, who pioneered the exploitation of nature by scientific methods 
was also legal counsel in the persecution of witches. Disturbingly, he borrowed 
terminology from the cruel torture of witches in interrogations to describe how nature (as 
a woman) should be probed, intruded, raped, etc., by science. With the rise of 
technological exploitation of nature the organic model took on this dark side, as the 
description of nature as a woman transforms to warrant the violation of her body. 
The new image of nature as a female to be controlled and dissected through 
experiment legitimated the exploitation of natural resources. Although the image 
of the nurturing earth popular in the Renaissance did not vanish, it was superseded 
by new controlling imagery. The constraints against penetration associated with 
the earth-mother image were transformed into sanctions for denudation. After the 
Scientific Revolution, Natura no longer complains that her garments of modesty 
are being torn by the wrongful thrusts of man. She is portrayed in statues by the 
French sculptor Louis-Ernest Barrias (1841-1905) coyly removing her own veil 
and exposing herself to science. From an active teacher and parent, she has 
become a mindless, submissive body. Not only did this new image function as a 
sanction, but the new conceptual framework of the Scientific Revolution—
mechanism—carried with it norms quite different from the norms of organicism. 
The new mechanical order (Chapter 8) and its associated values of power and 
control (Chapter 9) would mandate the death of nature.
18
 
 
McFague’s attempts to reimage God in her eco-theology, notably her metaphor of the 
world as God’s body, can be seen as in large part inspired by Carolyn Merchant’s 
historical analysis of the ethical power of the organic model of Earth as mother. The 
disturbing ways in which this metaphor of Earth as a female body shifted from living 
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mother to lifeless sex object in the transition from an organic to a mechanistic model of 
the universe, highlight the very problematic nature of this transition.  
McFague’s theology from The Body of God onward can be seen as an attempt to 
provide new language for an organic model of the world, as well as to thoroughly critique 
and deconstruct the mechanistic model that Merchant identifies. McFague’s work builds 
its theological deconstruction and reconstructive largely upon the facts revealed by 
Merchant’s analysis and interpretation of history. Like Merchant, McFague values the 
ethical power of the metaphors and models we use to describe the earth. As a feminist, 
she is aware of the element of choice in all human theological construction, and 
intentionally sets out to construct a theology which “divinizes” the body of the world. 
However, it is interesting to note, McFague’s body of God is not a return to the mother 
earth metaphor, but rather a new metaphor that focuses attention on the earth not as a 
human body but as a body in the most expansive sense of the term as it applies to myriad 
animals, plants, bodies of water, etc. 
Conversion Three: Turn to Ecological Theology 
 However, as McFague describes it, her primary motivation for taking up a 
specifically ecologically focused theology was not feminist discourse per se but rather the 
moral challenge of Gordon Kaufman to make the ecological crisis a primary or ultimate 
theological concern.  
My third conversion occurred when I was teaching theology at a divinity school. I 
had several books published and was progressing nicely up the career ladder. 
There was just one problem: most of my theology was still in my head. It wasn’t 
bad theology; in fact, it was pretty good. It just didn’t actually function in my life 
and I didn’t hold to my beliefs with much fervor. I was a theologian but I didn’t 
have a vocation. However, around 1980 I read an essay by another theologian, 
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Gordon Kaufman, in which he claimed that, given the nuclear and ecological 
crises facing our planet, theology could no longer proceed with business as usual. 
It must deconstruct and reconstruct its central symbols—God, Christ, human 
being—from within this new context. What would Christians say about God and 
the world if they took the planetary ecological situation as our interpretive lens? 
How different would Christian faith be if the well-being of human beings were 
not the only criterion? What would Christianity look like from a cosmological 
rather than just an anthropocentric perspective?
19
  
 
McFague’s reception of Kaufman’s call to speak theologically to the nuclear and 
ecological crises sparked her search for new metaphors and models for understanding the 
relationship of God, the world, and humanity. While maintaining her identity as a 
feminist, which in itself has a concern for patriarchy’s role in the domination of nature, 
McFague began to make the ecological crisis her primary theological and ethical concern. 
It is interesting to note that even after The Body of God (1993) and Super, Natural 
Christians (1997), which represent McFague’s ecological theology in its systematically 
mature form, in Life Abundant (2001) McFague alludes to this period of time in her life 
as being one in which she held loosely to ideas about God. This makes sense because 
after one deconstructs familiar images, as she did in Metaphorical Theology (1982) and 
Models of God (1987), newly constructed ones might not be quite as effective. The new 
images might take time to sink into one’s consciousness and become real. They begin as 
hypothetical constructs that, while being systematically expressed, are not fully operative 
in one’s life. In McFague’s later theology, including Life Abundant (2001), A New 
Climate for Theology (2008), and Blessed are the Consumers (2013), she reports that she 
has not fully internalized the whole systematic theology expressed in The Body of God; 
rather, she reports that a few beliefs from this theology have become more and more real 
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and effective in shaping her perceptions and actions in regard to the natural world. 
Apparently, for much of the 1980’s and 1990’s, during which McFague was occupied 
with deconstructing and reconstructing Christian theology in response to ecological 
concerns, she held her beliefs loosely. Even when the construction phase was more or 
less complete, McFague still did not have a theology to call her own. Her ecological 
theology was first articulated in a hypothetical mode; only later, once specific beliefs 
from that hypothetically constructed theology settled into her consciousness, did they 
become operative convictions integrated into an effective lived faith.  
McFague’s theological journey of building through uncertainty into certainty can 
be contrasted with Nasr’s sense, at the outset of his theological journey, that he had 
discovered the absolute truth in the form of the philosophia perennis. His uncertainty 
phase, though quite intense, appears to have lasted only for a short time between his 
conversation with Bertrand Russel and his discovery of the philosophia perennis through 
the writings of Rene Guenon, Frithjof Schuon, and others. Unlike McFague, Nasr did not 
need to do the work of theological deconstruction and reconstruction to find a meaningful 
belief-system. The philosophia perennis, for him, established the relatively absolute 
validity of Islam and other religious traditions, over and against the reductionist truth 
claims of scientism (logical positivism). Interestingly, after McFague’s fourth conversion 
(when she experiences God as Love in a way that the name Love becomes for her a 
description rather than a metaphor for God) she begins to use very similar language as 
Nasr, identifying her theology (which she holds progressively more deeply) as a “relative 
absolute.” Interestingly, Nasr and McFague’s theological journeys lead to similarly 
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deeply held convictions in very different ways. “Theology matters—but we only learn 
how much when we analyze our deeply held God/world-pictures in depth. We then can 
become clear regarding the basic conviction underlying our beliefs—what I have called a 
relative absolute. We can also decide whether that conviction is worthy of our loyalty 
(‘Here I stand’), the first step toward a working theology.20” McFague’s “here I stand” 
moment is preceded by a lengthy journey of deconstruction and reconstruction, clearing 
ground for a belief structure she can stand on with integrity as an ecologically conscious 
feminist Protestant theologian. Nasr’s “here I stand” comes much more suddenly when 
his already existing Islamic worldview is confirmed by traditionalist thought over and 
against scientific reductionism.  
An analogy from the human mind should help elucidate this difference. Just as, in 
human experience, we make both snap judgments and more deliberative decisions, 
depending on the context, so it is with religious traditions. When we are asked what two 
plus two is, we answer four immediately. When we are asked what seventy-nine times 
sixty-five is, we stop and think about it for a while before coming to an answer. In 
religious traditions, a mixture of snap judgments and more deliberative thought processes 
are also needed. Some situations may be answered swiftly by falling back on ready 
answers supplied by established traditions, while others require that we think more 
deliberatively and creatively about the problem at hand because our tradition has no 
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adequate response.
 21
 While both McFague and Nasr engage in both types of thinking, 
Nasr is more predominately working in the mode of relying on established tradition, 
which he fundamentally trusts, and McFague more predominately works in the mode of 
deliberatively and intentionally seeking to do a new thing with a tradition that she judges 
cannot simply be relied upon in its current form. For Nasr, the philosophia perennis 
helped to establish trust in Islam and other major world religious, philosophical, and 
spiritual traditions. This trust leads to a method of relying on religious traditions for 
answers to the ecological crisis and other problems. For McFague, feminist critiques of 
patriarchy inculcated a hermeneutic of suspicion which highlighted the fact that certain 
core rhetorical and conceptual elements of the Christian tradition—such as male language 
for God and the divinization of patriarchal hierarchy through that language—are highly 
problematic and cannot be relied upon for a vision of social or ecological justice. While 
McFague still uses core themes from the Christian tradition to construct her theology, 
such as the incarnation and kenosis, and relies upon insights received in prayerful 
meditation, she nevertheless must carefully delve through the tradition in order to extract 
elements for her theology that she does not believe are intrinsically problematic.  
Nasr and McFague change roles in this regard of falling back on tradition versus 
deconstructing and reconstructing when it comes to science. McFague feels she can trust 
postmodern biological and astrophysical sciences as a cosmological basis for her 
theology. She sees traits in these sciences that resonate with key themes in her theology 
and she feels confident relying on these sciences. Nasr, on the other hand, is highly 
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suspicious of modern science (he does not distinguish much between modern and 
postmodern science), because of its clashes with traditional thought, and therefore works 
through the phases of deconstruction of modern Western science and reconstruction of 
traditional Islamic science rather than simply accepting contemporary Western science as 
a given in his environmental thought or otherwise. These issues will be discussed further 
later in this dissertation. 
Gordon Kaufman’s challenge to Christian theologians to do the work to bring the 
public from an anthropocentric to a cosmological theology, and to deconstruct and 
reconstruct the central symbols of Christian theology to serve the ecological agenda was 
compelling for McFague. She accepted the call, which gave purpose to the deconstructive 
task of feminist theology that she had already adopted, setting a goal of replacing 
anthropocentric and andropocentric theology not merely with human-focused theology 
that was female-oriented, gender inclusive, or gender neutral, but with theological 
language that shifted human focus to what McFague calls the planetary agenda, a concern 
not merely for human life or human bodies, but with all life and all bodies, both animate 
and inanimate, which together comprise the organic world body.  
McFague found in this call to reconstruct theology an opportunity to integrate her 
experiences of the holy in nature with the theological language and concepts of 
Christianity. Reading Kaufman inspired a conviction in McFague that mirrors Nasr’s 
conviction upon reading the philosophia perennis for the first time. While, again, 
McFague’s conviction was caught in suspense in a certain sense while in the process of 
deconstruction and reconstruction, one might say that the seed was planted in an instant. 
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I believed that Kaufman was dead right. I revamped my teaching and research 
agendas in this direction and settled down to learning something about 
cosmology, evolutionary biology, and ecological science—about which I knew 
nothing. It has been a deeply instructive exercise, given me some “ecological 
literacy,” and shown me the tiny niche that my work can fill for the planetary 
agenda. It also refashioned my sense of who we are in the scheme of things. My 
sense on the hiking trail that we humans fit into nature, can feel comfortable in 
our proper place, was confirmed by my readings. We do indeed fit here but not at 
the top of the head as we have supposed. Rather, we fit as one species among 
millions of others on which we depend for the air we breathe and the food we eat 
and for whom we are increasingly responsible. What I learned about our place in 
the scheme of things has become central to my belief that a paradigm shift in our 
consumer lifestyle will be critical to our well-being as well as our planet’s.22 
 
In response to Gordon Kaufman’s prompting, McFague began a program of research 
which acquainted her with the subject-matter necessary to begin constructing an 
ecological theology. Unlike Nasr, whose studies of the sciences preceded his explicit 
concern with the ecological crisis, McFague began to study the ecological sciences 
specifically with the intention of developing a theology which incorporated scientific 
ideas about the role of human beings in the planetary ecosystem. McFague embraces a 
contemporary scientific outlook because it supports her intuition about the place of 
human beings in the natural world and also because she believes it is the only 
intellectually credible position from which to proceed into the field of ecological 
theology. 
This third conversion, while intellectual and theological, was certainly vocational 
as well. I believed that teaching and writing books that attempt to help people, 
especially Christians, shift from an anthropocentric to a cosmological paradigm—
a way of being in the world that supports the flourishing of all life—is a form of 
activism. I saw it as a way in which my beliefs, which were increasingly 
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becoming more defined and deeply held, could be embodied. I believed that this 
kind of work was a form of Christian activism.
23
 
 
McFague’s “Christian activism” could be compared to Nasr’s traditionalist jihad; 
however, for Nasr ecological theology is not his core issue, but rather traditionalism 
itself. Just as for McFague ecological and feminist concerns intertwine to form a coherent 
whole, so too Nasr’s traditionalism and environmentalism are intimately intertwined.  
McFague centers more in ecological theology, but her feminist “jihad” is still active, 
insofar as the models of God she presents advance a cosmological rather than 
anthropocentric framework. At the same time she deconstructs patriarchal images of God 
and patriarchal (hierarchical) cosmologies.  
Though this is not a possibility for either author existentially, one might 
hypothetically abstract each author’s ecological concern from their feminist and 
traditionalist concerns, though in both cases the concerns are intimately intertwined. 
However, when one gets deeper into their writings in a comparative mode of theological 
reflection, one wonders whether the necessary connection both authors see between their 
feminism and traditionalism, respectively, and their environmentalism, are absolutely 
necessary. McFague’s modus operandi of feminism in the service of environmentalism 
and Nasr’s modus operandi of environmentalism in the service of traditionalism make 
sense existentially and rhetorically because of each author’s convictions and audiences. 
In a process of reflective comparison it is possible to abstractly differentiate these 
elements of their thought so that one can recognize that the tension between their 
feminism and traditionalism need not imply a discord in the essential substance of their 
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environmental concern or priorities. The essential substance of their environmentalisms, 
this essayist maintains and will demonstrate, is that they both identify a loss of a sense of 
the sacredness of creation as being a primary cause of the problem. They both share in a 
kind of nature mysticism, a strong experiential sense of the intimate connection between 
God and the world. Their common solution to the ecological crisis is the resacralization 
of nature, although they go about this project quite differently. 
Influence of Teilhard de Chardin 
 The theology of Teilhard de Chardin became increasingly important to McFague 
over the course of her career. Teilhard’s work supported McFague in terms of providing a 
rationale or warrant for incorporating evolutionary theory as a theological resource. Also, 
on a personal level, his theology helped McFague integrate her two loves; that is, her love 
for God and her love for the world. Again here it is important to remember the profound 
disjunction or wedge placed between these two loves for McFague by Barthian theology. 
For Barth any such wedding or equating of these two loves is idolatrous. Through 
Teilhard, however, McFague found affirmation of the possibility of integrating her love 
for God and her love for the world. 
Simultaneously, I was waking up to experiences of transcendence and 
immanence, but they were not connected. Years later when I read that Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin at seven years old wrote that he had a passion for God and a 
passion for the world and could not give up either one, I knew my theological 
journey mirrored his. However, it took many years before I could see the way that 
radical transcendence and radical immanence might be one.
24
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For McFague, the unity of transcendence and immanence would come together in her 
concept of the transcendently immanent, which will be explored in chapter four.  
Teilhard’s theology played a seminal role in propelling McFague beyond Barthian 
God/world dualism into a theology that integrates God and the world. These reflections 
regarding Teilhard come from McFague’s very recent autobiographical essay, “Falling in 
Love with God and the World.” In The Body of God Teilhard’s influence on McFague’s 
thought is evident in her constructive theological strategy of building her theology on a 
cosmology based in evolutionary theory. However, Teilhard’s influence on McFague 
clearly went beyond her acceptance of evolutionary theory as a theological resource. She 
identifies with his theology, but more importantly with his story and his bold path of 
integrating his love for God and the world against the grain of a religious tradition with a 
long history of God/world dualism. Teilhard’s story of weaving apparently incompatible 
ideas supported McFague in her journey to integration. 
And it has been a long journey for me (and for many others over the last fifty 
years) to move toward an understanding of God and the world in which one’s 
passion for the world and passion for God can come together. Like Teilhard de 
Chardin, I discovered that I did not have to give up either; in fact, as I 
experimented with the model of the world as God’s body I came to see how 
loving the world is loving God. As a Christian, I no longer see God off in the sky 
(or even as an infinite abstraction), but as the spirit of the body we call the earth. 
God is always everywhere with each and every smidge of creation as the loving 
power of life to all in their sufferings and joys.
25
 
 
Teilhard served as an essential bridge figure in McFague’s theological journey, one who 
helped her see a path forward beyond the patriarchal sky God of Barth to the 
incarnational, immanently transcendent God whom she loves through loving the world. 
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He inspired McFague to do the difficult and controversial work of transforming the 
Christian faith so as to integrate in it a robust concern for the well-being of the natural 
world. 
Conversion Four: Spiritual Awakening 
After McFague’s vocational conversion when she began to labor in the field of 
ecological theology as a form of Christian activism, she experienced another conversion 
on a deeply personal level. 
But there was still a piece missing. That piece was me. I have always been 
intrigued by Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s comment that he began as a theologian, 
became Christian, and finally grew into a “contemporary.” I think what he meant 
was that he started as an academic Christian, became a practicing Christian, and 
finally became an embodied, “present” one. In other words, God finally became 
daily and immediate to him; God’s presence was the milieu, the “world” within 
which he lived when imprisoned during World War II.
26
 
 
While it may seem to be counterintuitive, insofar as one might expect theology to be a 
last step, preceded by Christian experience and practice, nevertheless this was the flow of 
both Bonhoeffer’s and McFague’s journeys. For both authors, their faith began in their 
heads, was later expressed in actions, and finally became lodged in their hearts.  
My fourth conversion has been something like Bonhoeffer’s sense of becoming 
contemporary with God. Finally, after years of talking about God (what 
theologians are paid to do!), I am becoming acquainted with God. This conversion 
has occurred quite deliberately: I engaged a spiritual director and have undertaken 
a daily pattern of meditation. I am doing what is called “practicing the presence of 
God,” setting aside time for relating to God. To say that it has been instructive 
would be a gross understatement; it has been revelatory. Revelation, as I now see 
it, is God’s loving self-disclosure, and that is what I have experienced. I am 
meeting God and God is love.
27
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McFague’s fourth conversion transformed her personal relationship with God. It also 
impacted her theology in significant ways. Earlier McFague maintained that we can only 
speak of God using metaphors and models, such as mother, lover, friend, or the world as 
God’s body; all of these metaphors and models carry a dimension of “yes” and “no,” of 
“is” and “is not.” Only after her spiritual awakening does she feel certain that God is 
love, without implying any aspect of “is not.” She also begins to refer to God as “reality,” 
another descriptive rather than metaphorical term. McFague’s deconstruction of 
traditional models for God, especially the model of God as king, challenges the 
conventional Christian concept of scriptural revelation; by asserting the “is not” 
dimension of a model for God frequently employed in the Bible, she calls into question 
the idea that the Bible is a revealed book. Her fourth conversion, though not implying an 
acceptance of scriptural revelation, does imply an acceptance of the idea of divine 
revelation as such. For example, the fact that “God is love” is a biblical phrase does not 
mean that McFague takes this statement on faith as a result of reading the Bible. 
McFague experiences God’s love as an immediate and personal revelation, and this 
experience apparently corresponds with the experience of the author of the Gospel of 1 
John.   
 Besides its profound effect on McFague’s theology, this fourth conversion also 
led McFague into a transformation of her consciousness. “Since I have undertaken the 
daily practice of prayer, I have gradually felt my center, the center of my being, shifting 
from myself to God. From the burdensome task of trying to ground myself in myself, I 
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have let go and allowed God to become the One in and for whom I live.”28 McFague’s 
experience of God and her transformation of consciousness personalize her description of 
the ethic of kenosis and transition to a sense of “universal self.” 
 I hasten to add two qualifications. First, I am a newcomer to living in this 
reality—I know little about it except the undeniable belief that it is reality, mine 
and that of everything else. Second, trying to live in God’s reality in no way 
detracts from my reality; in fact, it enhances and fulfills it. I feel more “me” than 
at any other time in my life. I am also more aware of the distinctiveness and 
concrete particularity of other things: faces are more luminous, the color purple is 
brighter.
29
 
 
Although in characteristically humble and unassuming terms, McFague is apparently 
describing a kind of mystical awakening as a result of her fourth conversion. Through 
this conversion McFague enters into the experience of the “universal self” which she 
believes was attained by such Christian saints as John Woolman and Francis. 
Its signature characteristic is that is has no boundaries: the understanding of the 
self here does not stop with one’s own body, or the bodies of one’s loved ones, or 
the bodies of similar people, or the bodies of human beings, or even the bodies of 
other animals, or amazingly even all bodies, for it includes the systems that keep 
bodies flourishing (water, land, climate, air). For these folks, nothing less than the 
world was their body.
30
 
 
McFague’s experience of the universal self, of feeling that the world is her body, fits 
naturally into the framework of her conception of the world as God’s body. The 
experience presupposes the bodily nature of the world, and the unity of one’s own body 
and the other bodies of the world in God, that is, as parts of the world as God’s body. 
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Following her fourth conversion, the theme of kenosis or self-emptying becomes 
very important to McFague’s thinking. In terms of spirituality, kenosis implies a 
movement from an ego-centered consciousness to a God-centered consciousness; as one 
enters this God-centered consciousness one discovers the universal self which is not 
limited to regard for one’s own body but includes compassion for other bodies; it even 
includes an awareness of and love for the world as one’s own body. This love for the 
world as one’s own body grows organically out of the metaphor of the world as God’s 
body, which encourages believers to have love for and identification with the world.  
Conclusion 
Sallie McFague is one of the most original and influential voices in Christian 
ecological theology. Her theology is richly conversant with feminism, contemporary 
science, economics, and culture, and is especially relevant for North American middle 
class Christians. In her understated way, McFague presents some of the most innovative 
Western Christian concepts, metaphors, and critiques in the field of ecological theology 
and ethics, at the nexus of feminism, religion-science dialogue, and ecological 
economics. McFague consistently presents her story and her theology as an offering for 
her reader’s consideration. She strives for an egalitarian conversation with her reader, 
respectfully suggesting rather than forcefully pressing her ideas. She apparently wants the 
reader to take her ideas and experiences seriously, but not to forget his or her own 
experiences and convictions. Tracing the arc of McFague’s career as an author, one 
recognizes a pattern of discovery in her work, as she continually enters new linguistic and 
academic fields, searching for a theology for a planet in peril that can speak to middle 
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class Americans and wake us up to what we are doing to the Earth and why. In chapter 4, 
before our comparison of McFague and Nasr begins in earnest, we will describe the 
substance of McFague’s ecological theology in more depth. 
 In closing, we will consider a characteristically humble self-assessment of 
McFague’s career from her latest book, Blessed Are the Consumers (2013). McFague 
conceives of her theological contribution to the ecological and economic crises not in 
grandiose terms as the solution, but rather as a tiny contribution which she is committed 
to advance in the best possible way.  
Do I feel confident that we will turn things around, that we will in fact begin to 
live within a different model at all levels of our existence? No, I do not. So, I 
think small, like Dorothy Day; I think of the little way, the tiny fragment that I 
can bite off and chew on during the particular day that lies ahead of me. I am 
trained to think and write, specifically as a Christian theologian. I have spent most 
of my life trying to figure out the particular contribution that the Christian model 
(or one interpretation of it) has to make to the betterment of life on our planet for 
all its creatures. It is a small piece, but my responsibility is to do it as well as I can 
and to keep working at it day after day.  At two years old, I was determined to 
learn to tie my own shoes. I worked at this task for over a month until I finally 
succeeded—I didn’t tie my shoes very well, but I did tie them. Things can’t get 
much smaller than that. I am still trying to learn to tie my shoes better, and even if 
I don’t succeed, I will have made an effort. That is, perhaps, all we can do—but 
we do need to try to tie those shoes.
31
 
 
The picture McFague presents here, comparing her theological efforts to her two year old 
self trying to tie her shoes for the first time, subverts the image of the “senior” academic 
and theologian who speaks authoritatively and defines the parameters of her field in 
which junior colleagues must function. Through this imagery of the determined child, 
McFague presents her theology as experimental, mundane (we all have shoes to tie), and 
hopeful. It is hopeful because although McFague is unsure what effect an ecological 
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model of Christian theology might have on the world at large, she believes that the 
discovery of this model, which serves life and can guide Christians through the 
challenges of the ecological and economic crises, is indeed there for the finding; and, 
with persistent effort, this model will be found just as surely as the child will learn to tie 
her shoes.  
To appropriate this wonderful, hopeful picture for the purposes of this essay, we 
might imagine that one of the string-ends of this shoe is the traditionalist Muslim 
ecological thought of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and the other string-end of this shoe is the 
postmodern eco-feminist theology of Sallie McFague. This dissertation represents an 
attempt to tie these shoe strings together, so as to prepare us to take the next step. 
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CHAPTER 3 
  
NASR’S ECOLOGICAL THEOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter we will explore Nasr’s diagnosis of the intellectual and spiritual 
crisis underlying the ecological crisis, as well as his proposed solutions to this crisis. Nasr 
traces the roots of the ecological crisis to the desacralization of nature in Western Europe, 
especially during the Renaissance and Enlightenment, and the subsequent emergence of 
what he calls Promethean man, which is a desacralized version of humanity that uses 
science and technology without restraint to control and exploit nature for its own gain. 
Nasr’s critique focuses on a criticism of modern science, especially the dualistic and 
mechanistic view of the world associated with Rene Descartes. However, this critique 
also includes a criticism of historical Christianity, insofar as its reaction to Greek 
naturalism led to a rather severe split in its worldview between the natural and the 
supernatural. Nasr believes the boundary that Christianity placed between the natural and 
the supernatural helped to encourage the development of a reductionist science in the 
West which profaned nature and sought to establish human domination and control of 
nature. In response to the problem of reductionist science, Nasr asserts the need for a 
sacred science that restores the hierarchy of traditional metaphysical sciences over the 
physical sciences. In response to the anthropology of Promethean or modern man, Nasr 
lays out his anthropological vision of Pontifical or traditional man, who serves as a bridge 
between heaven and earth and a channel of grace to resacralize the natural world. In this 
regard, Nasr especially highlights the contemplative or mystic as the ideal form of 
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Pontifical man. He calls for Christianity to restore its own contemplative tradition by 
recovering the spiritual vision of nature of notable figures such as Francis of Assisi and 
Hildegard of Bingen, as well as through dialogue with the living contemplative and 
metaphysical traditions of Islam and other Eastern religions.  
This chapter is meant to introduce a few major aspects of Nasr’s response to the 
ecological crisis, which will be elaborated upon further in the dialogical comparison and 
synthesis of McFague and Nasr’s perspective in chapters 5, 6, and 7. Interestingly, Nasr’s 
response to the ecological crisis focuses primarily on the relationship of metaphysics and 
science, and the topic of anthropology, rather than on the doctrine of God. Nasr criticizes 
Christianity insofar as it diverges from the integration of the natural and supernatural 
found in other traditional religions, such as Islam; however, he does not call for a 
reconstruction of Christian doctrine, but rather for a recovery of the Christian tradition’s 
spiritual vision of nature, which he argues was not emphasized enough or properly 
integrated into the Western intellectual tradition in the historic development of 
Christianity. For Nasr, Christianity, Islam, and other traditional religions and spiritualties 
are only implicated in the ecological crisis insofar as they have failed to assert their 
spiritual visions of nature and ethics, and thus allowed modern reductionist science to 
usher in a worldview that desacralizes nature and absolutizes humanity. While many of 
the ideas explored in this chapter are relevant to our comparison of Nasr and McFague, 
and represent either points of tension, agreement, or complementarity, we will not 
explore these many connections here. Part of the design of this dissertation is to model a 
form of dialogic engagement between two interlocutors representing different 
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communities of faith. In order for such dialogue to be successful, it is essential for 
interlocutors first, to understand who the other is and where he or she is coming from and 
second, to gain an understanding of the other’s ideas on the topic at hand. This 
groundwork allows both interlocutors to begin to understand what might be at stake for 
the other and the community they represent when engaging differences, commonalities, 
and potential forms of collaboration. In this chapter we continue to introduce Nasr to the 
reader as a way to prepare for the forthcoming dialogic comparison with McFague. 
A Traditional Response to a Modern Problem 
At the same time as Nasr became aware of the ecological crisis through his 
experience of living in urban America, he was also becoming engrossed in the 
traditionalist writings of Rene Guenon and Frithjof Schuon which would shape his 
response to the ecological crisis. Nasr’s response to the ecological crisis represents an 
adaptation and application of key elements of traditionalist thought, especially the thesis 
that the Western notion of progress is illusory and that the move away from traditional 
ways of knowing is a sign of intellectual and spiritual regress. As Nasr’s career 
developed, the ecological crisis became an increasingly important subject for him; it 
dovetailed well with his overall project of restoring the legitimacy of traditional Islamic 
cosmology and science (and other forms of traditional knowledge) and critiquing 
scientific reductionism (as well as other forms of thought that reduce the theological or 
spiritual aspects of the world to the physical, social, or mental).  
Nasr approaches the ecological crisis, and the spiritual crisis at its root, as a 
problem that begins with “modern Western man.” He acknowledges the global spread of 
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the values and practices which are responsible for humanity’s present destruction of 
nature; with regard to the Islamic world, he admits that it has adopted modern Western 
technology and consumerism and is actively engaged in the destruction of the 
environment. Yet Nasr maintains that the origin of this global wave of ecological 
destruction is Western; and he believes that the root of this global scourge on the 
environment can be understood and uprooted through a historical and philosophical 
criticism of modern Western science. 
In fact the Islamic world is not totally Islamic today and much that is Islamic lies 
hidden behind the cover of Western cultural, scientific and technological ideas 
and practices emulated and aped to various degrees of perfection, or one should 
rather say imperfection, by Muslims during the past century and a half. The 
Islamic attitude toward the natural environment is no more manifest than the 
Buddhist one in Japan or Taoist one in China, all as a result of the onslaught upon 
these lands of a secular science based upon power and domination over nature and 
a technology which devours the natural world with no respect for the equilibrium 
of nature, a science and technology of Western origin which have now become 
nearly global, eclipsing for the most part what has remained of the sacred sciences 
in various non-Western civilizations.
1
 
 
This critique emphasizes the way secular Western science has, in practice, displaced 
traditional religious perspectives on the environment throughout the world. For Nasr, 
Christianity is the first in a series of traditional religions to be overrun by a domineering 
science of nature that now controls humanity’s global relationship to nature.  
Nasr argues that modern Western science was developed in a spirit of rebellion 
against heaven during the Renaissance and Enlightenment; by denying the sacred both in 
and above nature it absolutizes humanity, making humanity the sole measurer of the 
value of the world; by absolutizing humanity it in turn validates attempts to dominate and 
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exploit nature in order to satisfy insatiable human desires for power, money, material 
goods, and conveniences. In light of the problematic nature of modern Western science, 
Nasr seeks an alternative, traditional form of science and cosmology that integrates 
knowledge of the natural world with metaphysical knowledge, and restores humanity’s 
relative authority over earth under heaven. Nasr argues that traditional Islamic sciences 
and cosmologies, and other traditional views of the world, including traditional Western 
Christian ideas such as the Great Chain of Being and the symbolic aspect of natural 
entities as creations of the divine mind, need to be restored. Only by combining and 
integrating insights from the natural sciences and the metaphysical sciences, he argues, 
can one describe the totality of reality, both the seen and the unseen. Hence, claims to 
describe the whole world only based on a science of the material universe are reductionist 
and degrading of the inherent spiritual value of nature. Nasr asserts that only the ultimate 
sacred science of metaphysics can provide a stabilizing context and horizon of meaning 
for sciences such as physics and chemistry, which are limited in scope to the physical 
world. Nasr’s response to the ecological crisis might at first glance look like a rather 
simple application of his traditionalist ideology to a particular problem; it could be seen 
as a kind of rehearsal of why, in view of the ecological crisis, one might adopt this 
ideology. This may be how Nasr begins, but it is not how his engagement with the 
ecological crisis ends. Nasr’s engagement with the ecological crisis is what brings his 
thought to the doorstep of dialogue with other interlocutors who are far removed from his 
own traditional Muslim perspective yet equally passionate about responding to the 
ecological crisis. 
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Historical Roots of the Ecological Crisis 
For Nasr, the ecological crisis is a spiritual crisis originating in Western Europe. 
In explicating the causes of the ecological crisis Nasr employs the disciplines of the 
philosophy and history of science and religion. Through the modern sciences humanity 
has come to perceive the natural world as mere stuff that came into being randomly; the 
world has been reduced to mathematical quantities and machine-like functionality and is 
no longer appreciated in terms of its symbolic meaning as a revelatory creation of God. 
For Nasr the problem is ignorance and the solution is knowledge. In order for the 
ecological crisis to be reversed humanity must rediscover the sacred quality of nature, 
that is, its symbolic meaning, intrinsic value, and connection with God; also, humanity 
must recover a self-understanding that is sacralized and replete with religious 
significance. Such a resacralization of science and humanity would bring about a 
resacralizion of nature in humans’ perspectives. 
That the harmony between man and nature has been destroyed, is a fact which 
most people admit. But not everyone realizes that this disequilibrium is due to the 
destruction of the harmony between man and God. It involves a relationship 
which concerns all knowledge. And in fact the modern sciences themselves are 
the fruit of a set of factors which, far from being limited to the domain of nature, 
concern all Western man’s intellectual and religious heritage…That is the reason 
why it is necessary to begin our analysis by turning firstly to the natural sciences 
and the views held concerning their philosophical and theological significance, 
and then to the limitations inherent within them which are responsible for the 
crisis that their application, and the acceptance of their world view, have brought 
about for modern man.
2
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For Nasr, modern science is at the heart of the ecological crisis. The principles of 
desacralization and domination of nature are implicit in modern science and are therefore 
necessarily expressed in the technological applications of this science. Nasr’s critique of 
modern science focuses on Descartes, Newton, and the mechanical, reductionist world 
view associated with their theories of the physical universe. However, Nasr’s analysis of 
the problem of knowledge in Western thought traces the longer story of the decay of the 
fabric of Christian thought and the rebellion against God that began to emerge in 
intellectual and artistic circles in the Renaissance. In Nasr’s view, it was the weakening 
of the intellectual concept of God and of traditional Christian ideas about the universe 
that opened the door to a view which reduced nature to mere stuff and mechanism, 
devoid of any sacred character or content. 
While Nasr does not agree with the critique of Lynn White, Jr. and others that 
traditional Christian theology is essentially problematic in its view of the relationships 
between God, nature, and human beings, he does acknowledge the historical role that 
Christianity played in desacralizing nature in the Western European worldview. Nasr’s 
call for the restoration of Christian metaphysics in the West, therefore, is not merely a 
call for a simple return to Christian theology as it always has been. To be clear, Nasr 
places the major burden of blame for the ecological crisis on scientific reductionism and 
rebellion against God, rather than on Christianity; he clearly calls for a revival of 
Christianity and a reintegration of Western science with Christian spirituality and 
metaphysics. Still, his historical analysis implicates the Christian tradition to a certain 
extent and imagines a return not to the way Christianity expressed itself dominantly 
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throughout Western history, but to a form of Christianity that is rebalanced in relation to 
nature by the contemplative or mystical aspect of Christianity. This aspect of the 
tradition, he argues, may be rediscovered in part by mining the writings of Hildegard of 
Bingen or Saint Francis, and in part by engaging in dialogue with the still living and vital 
contemplative and mystical traditions of Islam, Hinduism, and other major philosophies 
and religions.  
Christianity’s Role in the Ecological Crisis 
 Though Nasr identifies the most direct intellectual and spiritual causes of the 
ecological crisis as developing in the Renaissance and Enlightenment, he recognizes that 
the disequilibrium that brought about the ecological crisis has indirect roots very early in 
the history of the Christian West. Again, Nasr does not blame Christianity for the 
ecological crisis to the extent that he would call for a radical deconstruction and 
reconstruction of the Christian tradition, or departure from the tradition altogether. 
Instead, Nasr defends Christianity as a religion which is essentially capable of supporting 
a robust appreciation for the sacred quality of nature and the sacred duty of human beings 
to conserve and protect nature. However, Nasr does acknowledge that the way 
Christianity developed in the West, in reaction against Greek naturalism, led to a 
dysfunctional relationship between Western Christianity and nature.  
 According to Nasr’s historical analysis, as Christianity emerged as a major 
religion in Western Europe in the third and fourth centuries it found itself in a 
problematic intellectual and religious context.   
Christianity, when it was called upon to save a civilization rather than a few souls, 
was faced with a world in which naturalism, empiricism and rationalism were 
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rampant, where knowledge of a human order had become divinized and where an 
excessive attraction to nature seemed to the Christian eye a blasphemy that 
blinded men to the vision of God.
3
 
 
In the story Nasr tells, Christianity, in its early stages of becoming the dominant religion 
of Western Europe, finds itself in a situation of competition with opposing philosophical 
and religious trends. As its power grows, Christianity asserts its superiority over 
naturalism, empiricism, and rationalism by subordinating all three to its sacred revelation; 
its reaction against naturalism, especially, was problematic for its view of nature.  
Christianity, therefore, reacted against this naturalism by emphasizing the 
boundary between the supernatural and the natural and by making the distinction 
between the natural and supernatural so strict as to come near to depriving nature 
of the inner spirit that breathes through all things. To save the souls of men in the 
particular atmosphere in which it found itself, Christianity had to forget and 
neglect, or at least belittle, the theological and spiritual significance of nature.
4
 
 
Nasr portrays Christianity’s problematic reaction to the problem of naturalism as being 
unavoidable and forgivable. On the one hand, he agrees with the subordination of 
empiricism and rationalism to revelation, and appears to acknowledge this as somehow 
necessary to the salvific mission of Christianity; on the other hand, he clearly regards the 
boundary line that Christianity drew between the natural and the supernatural as being 
too strict and unfortunate in its degradation or concealment of the spiritual value of 
nature. Nasr observes that because of this historic boundary line designating nature as 
outside the realm of the supernatural and spiritual, “the study of nature from a theological 
point of view did not occupy a central place in Western Christianity.”5 Nasr’s argument is 
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that Christianity’s historic neglect of the spiritual value of nature is accidental rather than 
essential, and can be corrected going forward by reviving contemplative or mystical 
Christian traditions that recognize the Spirit in nature. He includes biblical sources 
among the positive aspects of Christian tradition in this regard. 
The Birth of Modern Science and Promethean Man 
For Nasr the boundary between the natural and the supernatural drawn by 
Christianity was problematic not only because it separated nature from God, but also 
because it did not effectively neutralize the problems of rationalism and humanism; 
rather, it only contained them temporarily. Later on, in the Renaissance, as the power of 
Christianity waned in Western Europe, these ideas would blossom again in full force. 
While during what is called the Renaissance, science in the West was still of a 
basically traditional character, philosophical ideas based on rationalism and 
humanism were becoming dominant and preparing the ground for that scientific 
revolution that was brought about primarily by Descartes, Galileo, Kepler, and 
finally Newton. Between Robert Grosseteste and Newton, at least the Newton of 
the Principia, or Roger Bacon and Francis Bacon, a transformation took place in 
the West in the understanding of the very goal, meaning, and methodology of 
science that was not at all either emulated or repeated until much later in the 
Islamic world on the basis of what had occurred in the West.
6
  
 
In the Islamic world, Nasr argues, there was no corresponding divide to the West’s 
separation between the supernatural and natural worlds, or divine revelation and human 
reason. In the Christian West a split between the natural and the supernatural, unknown in 
the Islamic world, bifurcated the world of theology from the world of the natural 
sciences, creating major divergences and an antagonistic competition between the two 
fields. In the West one finds major strains of anti-religious science and anti-scientific 
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religion which, in the Islamic intellectual world, are not nearly as prevalent. While of 
course there are tensions between the two domains of knowledge, they are far more 
integrated in the Islamic world.  
In opposition to the typical narrative of the progress of science in the West, Nasr 
describes Western science’s development as anomalous rather than inevitable. For Nasr 
the development of modern reductionist science is not the result of a necessary 
development or purification of thought, but rather the result of a strange and unnatural 
turn of intellectual events. Nasr believes that Western science, rather than displacing or 
updating all other worldviews, as in a typical triumphalist narrative, must relearn from 
traditional worldviews how to appreciate the sacredness of nature. 
The modern astronomy and physics of Galileo and Newton were based on an 
already secularized view of the cosmos, the reduction of nature to pure quantity, 
which could then be treated mathematically, and a complete separation between 
the knowing subject and the object to be known based on Cartesian dualism. A 
new science was indeed born, one that discovered much in the realm of quantity, 
but at the price of losing the traditional worldview and neglecting the spiritual 
dimension and qualitative aspect of nature—a tradeoff the bitter fruits of which 
are only now being fully tasted through the consequences of the environmental 
crisis.
7
 
 
While Nasr argues that rationalism and humanism were pre-existing tendencies in the 
West which only intensified during the Renaissance, he argues that the science birthed 
out of the intensification of these tendencies was indeed new. Never before had a 
desacralized view of nature been so complete. Of course the Renaissance was a 
rediscovery of Greek humanism, but it was a stronger wave. In the pagan world with the 
ubiquity of deities throughout all of nature the desacralization of nature would have been 
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impossible in its modern form. However, insofar as Christianity purged nature of its 
sacred character in its zeal to destroy paganism and naturalism, and isolated God and the 
sacred in a transcendent supernatural realm (not wanting to encourage pagan tendencies 
to worship nature in any way), the stage was set for the Renaissance rebellion against 
Heaven which would leave the modern Western world with a totally desacralized view of 
nature and an absolutized humanity with supposed free reign to dominate and exploit the 
world for its own selfish purposes.  
 For Nasr, the ecological crisis is the direct result of the desacralization of nature 
in the West, and the major cause of this desacralization is modern science. Christianity, 
Nasr argues, should not be blamed for the crisis but should be looked to instead for a 
solution to it. Christianity may have accidentally and indirectly aided in the 
desacralization of the cosmos in the West, but it in no way supports modern science’s 
radical devaluation of nature or gives license to humanity to dominate and control nature 
for its own selfish and short-sighted purposes. 
Modern man, faced with the unprecedented crisis of his own making which now 
threatens the life of the whole planet, still refuses to see where the real causes of 
the problem lie. He turns his gaze to the book of Genesis and the rest of the Bible 
as the source of the crisis rather than looking upon the gradual de-sacralization of 
the cosmos which took place in the West and especially the rationalism and 
humanism of the Renaissance which made possible the Scientific Revolution and 
the creation of a science whose function, according to Francis Bacon, one of its 
leading proponents, was to gain power over nature, dominate her and force her to 
reveal her secrets not for the glory of God but for the sake of gaining worldly 
power and wealth.
8
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For Nasr, the ecological crisis, while not unrelated to the history of religion in the 
Western world, is fundamentally profane and irreligious. It is a crisis brought about by 
the desacralization of nature which can only be remedied through nature’s resacralization. 
Rebellion Against Heaven 
One of the key themes in Nasr’s diagnosis of the spiritual crisis underlying or 
motivating the ecological crisis is rebellion. In Nasr’s understanding the zeitgeist 
propelling the Western world’s destructive relationship with nature is outright rebellion 
against God, the peak of which is the denial of the existence of God and the 
absolutization of humanity. Nasr traces this rebellion against God to the emergence of 
what he calls “Promethean man” during the Renaissance.  Nasr contrasts Promethean 
man with traditional man. He uses these metaphorical concepts to represent what he sees 
as the fundamental differences between the self-understanding and activity of modern 
humanity versus the self-understanding and activity of traditional humanity. For Nasr 
traditional or pontifical man is the bridge between heaven and earth; he is subject to God 
and accepts responsibility to rule nature according to God’s will. As opposed to an 
anthropocentric view, where humanity rules nature absolutely, Nasr refers to this 
pontifical relationship of humanity standing between heaven and Earth, and ruling Earth 
in subjection to God, as anthropocosmic. Ultimately, he argues, this is a theocentric 
rather than anthropocentric world view. On the other hand, modern or Promethean man, 
in open rebellion to a traditional conception of the universe, displaces God as absolute 
ruler of earth and declares total license to dominate and exploit nature in service of his 
own interests and desires.  
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Considering the fact that many Christian theologians and critics of Christianity 
have identified the biblical view of human beings as having God-given dominion over 
nature as being problematically anthropocentric and unhelpful for an ecological theology 
and ethics, it is important to explain in more detail how Nasr distinguishes between the 
Bible’s anthropocosmic view of humanity, which he argues is theocentric, and the 
anthropocentric view of humanity characteristic of the modern Western world view. For 
Nasr, the biblical view is not anthropocentric because although it places human beings at 
the center of heaven and earth, and presents God as giving human beings authority over 
other creatures, it does not make human beings the locus of meaning and value. It is 
anthropocosmic because it places human beings in a sacred context where values that are 
above and beyond human beings control human actions and inspire respectful and careful 
use of the power that human beings have over the rest of nature.  
For Nasr, the anthropocentric human is best exemplified by the Cartesian I who is 
centered not in God but in his or her own conscious mind or ego. In the tradition of 
Sufism, al-Hallaj is famous for saying “I am the Truth,” much in the same way that Jesus 
identifies his union with God in the Gospel of John. In Knowledge and the Sacred Nasr 
compares al-Hallaj’s “I am the Truth” with Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum.” The former is 
anthropocosmic because it centers the human being in God, the Divine I, the source of all 
being; the latter is anthropocentric because it makes “the thinking of the individual ego 
the center of reality and the criterion of all knowledge.” For Nasr, al-Hallaj’s statement 
issues from “the Divine Self which alone can say I” whereas Descartes’ statement issues 
from his “individual…‘illusory’ self, which was placing its experience and consciousness 
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of thinking as the foundation of all epistemology and ontology and the source of 
certitude.”9 Descartes’ self-centered individual emerges out of the Renaissance quest for 
a center and root of knowledge besides revelation or divinely given intellect. 
In seeking a new basis for certain knowledge Descartes appealed neither to the 
Intellect as it functions in the heart of man and as the source of reason nor to 
revelation, but to the individual consciousness of the thinking subject… As it was, 
he made the thinking of the individual ego the center of reality and the criterion of 
all knowledge, turning philosophy into pure rationalism and shifting the main 
concern of European philosophy from ontology to epistemology.
10
 
 
For Nasr anthropocentrism emerges in the Western world’s transition away from 
theocentrism that Descartes represents. Such anthropocentrism is not feasible in the 
context of a traditional view of nature or the human being as standing at the center of 
heaven and earth. For Nasr a traditional anthropocosmic worldview is far removed from a 
modern anthropocentric worldview. In regards to the ecological crisis, he regards this 
difference as crucial. An anthropocosmic human being, centered in the Sacred, would be 
an agent of the resacralization and restoration of the natural world; an anthropocentric 
human being, centered in his or her own thinking experience, would be an agent of 
continuing desacralization and desecration of the natural world. 
Nasr argues that this anthropomorphic conception of the universe as the theatre of 
Promethean man’s activity developed in the Renaissance when humanism eclipsed 
theism, as reflected in that era’s philosophical, artistic, scientific and other cultural 
productions. During the Renaissance, Nasr argues, the ancient Greek myth of Prometheus 
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was revived in Western Europe as a way to explain the new conception of human 
nature.
11
 
The new idea of Prometheus, far from being seen negatively as symbolizing 
man’s rebellion against Heaven, came to be viewed in a positive light...There was 
thus born the prototype of modern man whom we can call Promethean in contrast 
to the traditional or pontifical man who always remains aware of his role as bridge 
(ponte) between Heaven and Earth, in submission to Heaven and ruler of Earth in 
the name of Heaven and in harmony with cosmic laws. The conception of the 
order of nature as pure quantity perceptible to man’s senses and object of man’s 
reason and the development of a science founded upon the exercise of power over 
nature would not have been possible without the replacement in the West of 
pontifical man by the Promethean man so much extolled by Renaissance 
philosophers from Bouvelles to Bruno and celebrated so forcefully by a sculptor 
and painter such as Michelangelo, who depicts man in the Sistine Chapel as 
almost the equivalent of God.
12
 
 
For Nasr the emergence of Promethean man is the key element in the development of the 
paradigm of unbalanced relationship between humanity and nature, which has 
precipitated the wave of ecological destruction we are currently witnessing. For Nasr it is 
not so much any particular concept of God that might have driven the ecological crisis 
but rather the displacement of God by humanity as absolute. Although Nasr 
acknowledges the problem in Christian theology of an overly supernatural God distant 
from creation as an indirect cause of the ecological-spiritual crisis, in the age of 
Promethean man theology itself becomes secondary in importance to anthropology. 
While theological adjustments are of course needed, when God is relative and humanity 
is absolute, the concept of God becomes inconsequential in terms of shaping human 
attitudes and behaviors. 
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The main characteristics of Renaissance humanism can be in fact summarized in 
the new Promethean conception of man, with a reason made independent of 
revelation, a Protean being ready to rebel against Heaven and to master and 
dominate the Earth. Of course, the imprint of Christianity could not be obliterated 
from the soul of the new European man so quickly, but it was weakened enough 
for the new Promethean man to announce his declaration of independence from 
religion and revelation in many domains, of which the most significant for our 
present study was the order of nature.
13
 
 
For Nasr the emergence of “Promethean man” provided the platform for the development 
of modern science, which absolutizes the limited perspective of human observation and 
makes of it a total description of reality. It was this anthropocentric point of view that 
allowed for the development of a view of nature as being profane, totally disconnected 
from any higher power or purpose, and at the same time existing solely as a means to 
accomplishing the ends of human beings. 
Renaissance humanism gave birth to a man who saw no limit upon his right to 
destroy nature. By stealing a la Prometheus the fire of knowledge of the world 
that he came to divorce from all divine principles, this new man set out to conquer 
both other peoples and the world of nature…Other conquerors had come and 
gone, but none were equipped with such knowledge based on domination, with a 
technology that knew no bounds in its destructive powers, nor with a self-image 
so divorced from that of a being in harmony with the cosmic ambience. Five 
hundred years of the devastating actions of Promethean man, opposed to both 
tradition and the world of nature, have borne consequences too evident to deny. It 
is not, therefore, an overstatement to speak of the tragic consequences of 
humanism understood not as a general appreciation of man but as placing earthly 
man at the center of the scheme of things and leading of necessity to an even 
greater secularization of man and ultimately to the subhuman.
14
 
 
Nasr recognizes the problem of Promethean man’s domination not only of nature but of 
other peoples, that is, the problem of Western imperialism and colonialism. Of course the 
human tendency to create empires based on the principles of domination and exploitation 
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of foreign peoples is not new with modern man, as Nasr acknowledges, but this tendency 
has been augmented and become more problematic given the modern West’s 
technologically advanced modes of destruction and social control, including nuclear 
weapons. Nasr argues that modern man is in a constant state of war with nature, and that 
until this state of disequilibrium and aggression is resolved there is no chance there will 
be peace between peoples. Likewise, until humanity ceases from exploiting and 
dominating nature, the exploitation and domination of people will continue to intensify. 
“In the end what we can say with all certainty is that there is no peace possible among 
men unless there is peace and harmony with nature. And in order to have peace and 
harmony with nature one must be in harmony and equilibrium with Heaven, and 
ultimately with the Source and Origin of all things.”15 
One element lacking from Nasr’s critique of Promethean man is that he does not 
trace the implications of this general tendency as it manifested in the field of economics, 
especially in the development of capitalism, the economic system which has worked in 
tandem with the technology of modern science to propel the ecological crisis to epic 
proportions of destruction. This lacuna may be due simply to the fact that Nasr’s training 
and expertise, as well as the particular angle of critique of modernity of the traditionalist 
school, leads him to focus on the problem of reductionist science and the dominating 
technology developed through it. Later in this essay we will explore ways in which 
McFague’s critique of modern economics complements Nasr’s critique of modern 
Western science and technology. It may be argued that modern economics itself 
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developed as a subset of secular science, presupposing its desacralized view of nature and 
its view of humanity as separate from nature. Clearly, in Nasr’s view, economics would 
be one of the sciences in need of resacralization and reintegration with metaphysics. 
McFague engages in this task of resacralizing Western economics by bringing this 
science into conversation with ethical principles from the Christian tradition such as 
economic equality, redistribution, limits and restraint—all within the theological 
framework of kenosis.  
There are profound synergies in the way modern Western economics rebelled 
against heaven, particularly in its break from the traditional Christian prohibition on 
usury, and its embrace of mechanistic modes of production which have dehumanized 
both workers and consumers. The mechanization and commodification of the order of 
nature, which now includes the mechanization and commodification of humanity itself, 
has indeed led to what Nasr calls the “subhuman.” 
Resacralizing Science and Humanity 
Nasr was aware, from the beginning of his public engagement with the ecological 
crisis, of the option of harmonizing religion and science by looking to emerging scientific 
trends and theories for common ground. Nasr rejects this method because he believes it 
fails to get at the roots of the problem discussed above. Furthermore, Nasr believes that 
the nature of religious truth is absolute and unchanging, and therefore cannot be yoked to 
scientific theories which change rapidly in response to new findings and observations. 
All too often the principles and tenets of religion, which are transcendent and 
immutable, are presented as being in conformity with the latest findings of 
science, again following the well-known tendency of reducing the greater to the 
lesser. Furthermore, by the time this process of conforming theology to current 
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scientific theories is carried out and religion is made ‘reasonable’ by appearing as 
‘scientific’, the scientific theories themselves have gone out of vogue.16  
 
For Nasr, therefore, a strategy of integrating science and religion as equal partners in 
meaning-making is not tenable. As is telegraphed by Nasr’s narrative of what went wrong 
in the West that led to the desacralization of nature and the ecological crisis, he does not 
regard Christianity as carrying equal responsibility with modern science in the creation of 
the catastrophic ecological conditions we now face. Modern science is much more to 
blame, and therefore needs to change much more. Furthermore, the idea that religion 
should conform itself to science is, for Nasr, in violation of the proper hierarchy of 
knowledge. The fact that scientific knowledge is often considered more accurate or 
reliable than religious knowledge in the West is part and parcel of the problem of modern 
Western science’s inappropriate claim to absolute ontological status. 
If one glances over the whole field of the relation between science, philosophy 
and theology…one becomes immediately aware of the lack of common ground 
between these three domains. Metaphysical doctrine, or that gnosis which alone 
can be the meeting ground of science and religion, has been forgotten, and as a 
result the hierarchy of knowledge has crumbled into a confused mass in which the 
segments are no longer organically united.
17
 
 
Nasr believes that the hierarchy of knowledge needs to be restored to solve the problem, 
namely the traditional hierarchy of metaphysics over physics. He therefore rejects any 
attempt to integrate science and religion in a mode in which religion conforms itself to 
contemporary scientific theories, thus reversing what he believes to be the needed 
hierarchical relationship between metaphysics and knowledge of the physical world. In 
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his view, traditional religion should not be modified by contemporary science, but instead 
contemporary science should be put in its proper context and, in important ways, 
corrected by traditional metaphysical knowledge. 
For Nasr the dualistic, mechanistic perspectives of Western modernity tracing 
back to Rene Descartes remain dominant today. He does not regard post-modern 
worldviews and types of science as viable alternatives, and does not give much credence 
to the notion that there is a way forward from modern to postmodern science that will 
repair the situation. Rather, he argues consistently for a return to traditional sciences as 
the only viable pathway to the restoration of cosmology. In the West, where the problem 
began, this means mostly a return to traditional Christian points of view (although Nasr 
also values traditional Native American views of nature, for example, and recommends 
those as well as potential avenues to rediscovery of the sacred in nature). 
Descartes’s physics lost the day to Newton’s, but his thoroughly mechanistic 
conception of the order of nature based on the radical dualism between mind and 
matter and also between the knowing subject and the known object won the day 
and wielded an influence that is to be seen everywhere today in the modern view 
of nature. Descartes removed from nature all its ontological reality save its aspect 
of quantity, and he helped to create the mechanical notion of the order of nature 
and the vision of nature as a pure “it” shorn from all spiritual realities, a view that 
dominates the horizon of modern civilization despite all the later transformations 
of Western philosophy and science.
18
 
 
For Nasr, the “later transformations of Western philosophy and science” which have 
moved the discourse away from the certainty of logical positivism and a world 
completely described by classical physics and chemistry, to a greater openness to the 
mystery of life as explored by newer fields such as the ecological and astrophysical 
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sciences, are inadequate. There may seem to be greater fellowship between religions and 
the contemporary or postmodern discourse of science, but this discourse is still rooted in 
the assumptions of scientific reductionism and the disqualification of religious truth-
claims by logical positivism. Only a radical reordering of the relationship between 
religion and science, according to a traditional metaphysical framework, could restore 
both religion and science to their proper places in defining our view of the world. 
The Need for a Sacred Science 
 Along with Nasr’s criticism of modern Western science, he has repeatedly voiced 
the need for a sacred science which could be modeled on traditional Muslim science 
rather than science as it developed in the West. “From my earliest works written in the 
1950s and 1960s, I have claimed that there is such a thing as Islamic science with a 
twelve-hundred-year tradition of its own and that this science is Islamic not only because 
it was cultivated by Muslims, but because it is based on a worldview and a cosmology 
rooted in the Islamic revelation.”19 For Nasr, it is important to assert the existence of 
Islamic science as a distinct tradition from Western science as a way to challenge the 
triumphalist narrative of modern Western science, and to showcase the possibility of a 
cosmological perspective integrating metaphysics and the physical sciences. Nasr’s 
analysis of Islamic science reveals a complex and highly developed science which 
operates within the bounds of traditional Muslim metaphysics. Nasr first advances this 
view in his dissertation, which was published as Science and Civilization in Islam (1968).  
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Among the many notable figures and accomplishments of Islamic science, Nasr 
describes the principle of the limitation or control of science by metaphysics as 
demonstrated in a famous textual conflict between al-Ghazzali, a Sufi mystic and 
metaphysician, and Averroes, an Aristotelian scientist. In Deliverance from Error, al-
Ghazzali attacks materialism and rationalism, asserting the primacy of Sufi metaphyics 
and cosmology. One of Al-Ghazzali’s central arguments, which he also advances in The 
Incoherence of the Philosophers (over and against a rationalistic or materialistic notion of 
causality) is that God is the essential cause of all manifestation in the physical world: 
“The basis of all these objections is the recognition that nature is in subjection to God 
most high, not acting of itself but serving as an instrument in the hands of its Creator. Sun 
and moon, stars and elements, are in subjection to His command. There is none of them 
whose activity is produced by or proceeds from its own essence.”20 Averroes responded 
directly to this attack against rationalism with a defensive piece, titled The Incoherence of 
Incoherence. In this work he challenges al-Ghazzali’s doctrine of divine causality: 
To deny the existence of efficient causes which are observed in sensible things is 
sophistry, and he who defends this doctrine either denies with his tongue what is 
present in his mind or is carried away by a sophistical doubt which occurs to him 
concerning this question. For he who denies this can no longer acknowledge that 
every act must have an agent…The man who reasons like theologians does not 
distinguish between what is self-evident and what is unknown, and everything 
Ghazzali says in this passage is sophistical…Denial of cause implies the denial of 
knowledge, and denial of knowledge implies that nothing in this world can really 
be known, and that what is supposed to be known is nothing but opinion, that 
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neither proof nor definition exist, and that the essential attributes which compose 
definitions are void.
21
 
 
In this fundamental show-down between a rationalistic mode of knowing the world, and a 
mystical mode of knowing the world, Nasr notes that gnosticism prevailed in the Islamic 
world. Averroes’ reply to al-Ghazzali “was nowhere nearly as effective in the Islamic 
world as the attack.”22  
The fact that al-Ghazzali’s point of view prevailed can be seen, for example, by 
the fact that the Ptolemaic model of the universe was preserved in the Islamic tradition of 
science, whereas it was overturned in the West during the Renaissance. Although 
significant questions were raised about the Ptolemaic model, Nasr notes that the 
hierarchy of knowledge in Islamic science did not allow for such a change. 
No one can overestimate the influence of the astronomical revolution upon the 
minds of men. And as long as the hierarchy of knowledge remained intact in 
Islam, and scientia continued to be cultivated in the bosom of sapientia, a certain 
“limitation” in the physical domain was accepted in order to preserve the freedom 
of expansion and realization in the spiritual domain. The wall of the cosmos was 
preserved, in order to guard the symbolic meaning which such a walled-in vision 
of the cosmos presented to most of mankind. It was as if the old scientists and 
scholars foresaw that the breaking of these walls would also destroy the symbolic 
content of the cosmos, and even obliterate the meaning of “cosmos” (literally 
order) for the great majority of men, for whom it is difficult to conceive of the sky 
as some incandescent matter whirling in space and at the same time as the throne 
of God.
23
 
 
For Nasr, the Islamic world’s maintenance of the Ptolemaic model despite the scientific 
evidence against it displays the value of Islamic science for the hierarchy of knowledge. 
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Giorgio De Santillana, Nasr’s academic advisor at Harvard and author of the preface to 
Science and Civilization in Islam, finds it highly problematic that “the traditional 
curriculum of Muslim universities has gone on teaching Ptolemaic astronomy, embedded 
in a frame of geocentric cosmology and philosophy, with a ‘modern’ system available as 
an option but presented as ‘hypothesis.’”24 For De Santillana, this failure of Islamic 
science to update its astronomical system to the most empirically accurate form shows a 
lack of intellectual integrity; such may be the impression, generally speaking, from the 
standpoint of the Western tradition of philosophy and science. However, Nasr stands by 
the principle of imposing metaphysical limits on physical sciences as a way to preserve 
the symbolic integrity and meaning of the cosmos.  
This same conflict of values animates Nasr’s opposition to the theory of 
evolution, which he finds to be a desacralizing theory of the origins of life on earth. For 
Nasr, empirical evidence of evolution cannot take away from the metaphysical or 
theological truth-claim that God is the essential cause of creation. His argument against 
modern theories of evolution is, essentially, a recapitulation of al-Ghazzali’s arguments 
against the materialist and rationalist philosophers of his day. In schools and universities 
throughout the Islamic world, the theory of evolution is more often presented as a 
hypothesis than as fact, precisely because of the danger of upsetting the belief in God as 
creator and in the creation as symbolic of God. In chapter 5 we will explore Nasr’s view 
on evolution in more depth as it emerges as one of the major differences between his 
ecological theology and that of Sallie McFague who, following Teilhard de Chardin and a 
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host of progressive Christian eco-theologians, accepts the contemporary theory of 
evolution. In The Body of God McFague adopts the common creation story as her 
cosmology, a narrative which focuses on the big bang and the process of evolution to 
describe the origins and parameters of the world in which we live. For Nasr, however, 
such a cosmology, based on the physical world, is not worthy of the name cosmology. 
Cosmology is a science dealing with all orders of formal reality, of which the 
material order is but one aspect. It is a sacred science which is bound to be 
connected to revelation and metaphysical doctrine in whose bosom alone it 
becomes meaningful and efficacious. Today there is no modern cosmology, and 
the use of the word is really a usurpation of a term whose original meaning has 
been forgotten.
25
 
 
For Nasr, the quest to restore cosmology must start with the reintegration of the physical 
sciences into a traditional metaphysical framework. In this process, the modern Western 
sciences must be relativized in comparison with other ways of knowing the world, and 
ultimately subordinated to a sacred knowledge of the cosmos long forgotten in the West. 
This process suggested by Nasr for the reestablishment of a sacred science is quite 
different than the proposal to unite the peoples of the world through the common creation 
story based on the big bang and evolution, ideas from modern Western science. The latter 
assumes the triumph of modern Western science over other ways of knowing the world, 
and the displacement of the myriad traditional cosmologies of the world by an updated 
and more empirically accurate Western cosmology. McFague and others argue that 
spirituality and meaning can be integrated into the common creation story, and assume 
that all peoples of the world will sooner or later adopt this point of view. From Nasr’s 
point of view, however, the acceptance of the big bang or evolutionary theory as the basis 
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of a new world-wide cosmology represents a fundamental reversal of the hierarchy of 
knowledge, which assumes a metaphysical rather than physical basis for cosmology. 
“The knowledge of the whole Universe does not lie within the competence of science but 
of metaphysics. Moreover, the principles of metaphysics remain independent of the 
sciences and cannot in any way be disproved by them. One must realize the different 
forms of knowledge and place each within its own bounds.”26 
In The Need For A Sacred Science Nasr acknowledges that the Islamic view of 
nature is being displaced in practice by the widespread adoption of modern Western 
technology. However, Nasr sees hope in the “refusal of Islamic society to surrender 
completely to the dicta of the machine despite the attempt of leaders of that world to 
introduce Western technology as much as and as soon as possible.”27 When Nasr began 
his teaching career in Tehran, the dominant academic philosophy was a French positivist 
persuasion. However, Nasr was fairly successful in promoting a return to traditional 
Islamic cosmology in Iranian academic settings, including Tehran University. Nasr’s 
success in this regard, in terms of governmental, intellectual, and popular support for his 
efforts against Western scientific reductionism, shows that the Iranian perspective on 
science is quite different than the typical Western perspective. For Nasr, the intellectual 
effort to reestablish a sacred science in the Islamic world and beyond can be seen as 
corollary to his resistance to environmentally destructive Western technologies that have 
become ubiquitous in the Muslim world. 
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 By restoring the hierarchy of knowledge and the primacy of the metaphysical 
over the physical sciences, Nasr would hope to reestablish the awareness of God as al-
Muhit, “the ultimate environment which surrounds and encompasses man.” For Nasr, 
sciences which deny the divine causality behind everything in creation in effect 
deconstruct the sacred symbolic envelope of God as al-Muhit around the physical world. 
In Nasr’s vision of a sacred science, physical sciences operate within a divine 
environment that bounds and limits human beings, not only intellectually, but also in how 
they use technology on earth. He does not see this as an oppressive restraint, but rather as 
a benevolent, preserving restraint; it limits humans scientifically and technologically, but 
liberates them spiritually and ensures their connection with the divine.  
The destruction of the environment is the result of modern man’s attempt to view 
the natural environment as an ontologically independent order of reality, divorced 
from the Divine Environment without whose liberating grace it becomes stifled 
and dies. To remember God as al-Muhit is to remain aware of the sacred quality 
of nature, the reality of natural phenomena as signs (ayat) of God and the 
presence of the natural environment as an ambience permeated by the Divine 
Presence of that Reality which alone is the ultimate ‘environment’ from which we 
issue and to which we return.
28
 
 
Nasr’s call for the reestablishment of a sacred science is a call for the reestablishment of 
balance between scientific rationality and what Nasr calls the intellect, the spark of the 
divine within each person through which the Sufi metaphysician or gnostic intuits the 
presence of the divine within and beyond the world. For Nasr, quite simply, the 
knowledge of the intellect is above the knowledge of the rational mind, and a sacred 
science must acknowledge this hierarchy. When the observations of the scientific mind 
contradict or overshadow the knowledge of the divine which is known intuitively, the 
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latter must be guarded from the former. The only truly certain view of nature, for Nasr, is 
that view of nature in its ineffable and mysterious connection to the Divine, as symbol 
and manifestation of God. For Nasr, modern Western science should not be the standard 
for how humanity views nature; rather, it should be viewed as an unfortunate anomaly 
based on the near-total eclipse of knowledge of the divine by rationalistic knowledge of 
the material world. This desacralized knowledge, which has spread globally, must be 
reformed on the deepest level and reintegrated into a sacred science. 
Pontifical Man 
 Nasr’s call to replace reductionist science with a restoration of sacred science is 
complemented by his call for the rebirth of Pontifical or traditional man as opposed to 
Promethean or modern man. Nasr distinguishes these two types of human being 
according to the way they relate to both Heaven and Earth, with Promethean man being 
characterized by rebellion against and denial of Heaven, on the one hand, and domination 
and exploitation of Earth, on the other. Pontifical man, on the other hand, is characterized 
by submission and openness to Heaven, and loving stewardship of Earth. 
The concept of man as the pontiff, pontifex, or bridge between Heaven and earth, 
which is the traditional view of the Anthropos, lies at the antipode of the modern 
conception of man which envisages him as the Promethean earthly creature who 
has rebelled against Heaven and tried to misappropriate the role of the Divinity 
for himself... He [Pontifical man] is the vicegerent of God (khalifatallah) on earth, 
to use the Islamic term, responsible to God for his actions, and the custodian and 
protector of the earth of which he is given dominion on the condition that he 
remain faithful to himself as the central terrestrial figure created in the “form of 
God,” a theomorphic being living in this world but created for eternity.29 
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Nasr believes that this traditional conception of man, which he knows most directly 
through Islam, if embraced, could restore harmony to creation by restoring the integral 
connection between Heaven and Earth.  
One important proviso of Nasr’s definition of Pontifical man is that his “vice-
gerency” or “dominion” over earth is conditional to his faithfulness to God. Nasr is well 
aware of the liability for abuse of this concept of “vice-gerency” or “dominion” in the 
context of the ecological crisis. In a traditional Islamic perspective, the subjection of 
nature to man is balanced by man’s subjection to God; yet, for an absolutized humanity 
that no longer considers itself responsible to God, the concept that man has a right to 
dominate nature becomes highly problematic. Nasr argues that “many modern Muslims 
thirsty for the power which modern science bestows upon man” have misappropriated the 
Quranic teaching that “God has subjected (sakhkhara) nature to man” to validate their 
“conquest of nature”.30 This kind of ideology is highly destructive of nature. 
There is no more dangerous a creature on earth than a khalifat Allah who no 
longer considers himself to be ‘abd Allah and who therefore does not see himself 
as owing allegiance to a being beyond himself. Such a creature is able to possess a 
power of destruction which is truly Satanic in the sense that “Satan is the ape of 
God”; for such a human type wields, at least for a short time, a godlike but 
destructive dominion over the earth because this dominion is devoid of the care 
which God displays towards all His creatures and bereft of that love which runs 
through the arteries of the universe.
31
 
 
While Nasr clearly recognizes the danger of a misused concept of khalifat Allah, 
he stands by this concept when properly interpreted. For Nasr, the Islamic concept of 
khalifat Allah, which has its corollary in the Biblical concept of stewardship, is not in 
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itself problematic, but becomes incredibly dangerous in the hands of an absolutized 
humanity. But the absolutization of humanity is essentially an irreligious rather than 
Islamic turn of thought. Nasr argues that the absolutization of humanity and human rights 
is the result of Renaissance humanism’s rebellion against God. In Islam, responsibilities 
precede rights, and human rights are not absolutes. Nasr writes, “In the traditional Islamic 
world, since the human state was never absolutized, man’s rights were never made 
absolute in total forgetfulness to the rights of God and also of His other creatures.”32 
However, this situation changed when the West began to dominate the Islamic world, 
bringing with it the Western ideas, values, and practices which are responsible for the 
ecological crisis.  
 Rather than being “anthropocentric” Nasr regards this traditional Muslim 
perspective as “anthropocosmic”, the perspective of “pontifical man” who is a bridge 
between heaven and earth, who perceives the world of nature as symbols of the divine 
rather than secular facts. Nasr fully embraces the mainstream Islamic model of the God-
Human-Earth hierarchical relationship, but also generalizes it and claims this model as a 
more or less universal or perennial aspect of all traditional philosophies and religions.  
To be sure, the image of man as depicted in various traditions has not been 
identical. Some have emphasized the human state more than others and they have 
envisaged eschatological realities differently. But there is no doubt that all 
traditions are based on the central and dominant images of the Origin and the 
Center and see the final end of man in the state or reality which is other than this 
terrestrial life with which forgetful or fallen man identifies himself once he is cut 
off from revelation or religion that constantly hearken man back to the Origin and 
the Center.
33
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In this generalization of pontifical man, Nasr embraces less hierarchical models but it 
does always seem that the traditional points of view afford humanity a central role that 
recognizes the responsibility of humanity to preserve harmony and balance in creation. 
For Nasr it is not so much a matter of lowering the status of man, but rather un-reducing 
and un-secularizing man; though he still retains power vis-à-vis nature he is required to 
use this power in a wise and prudent way as a representative of God on Earth, not in our 
current version of Promethean man where humans clearly and unashamedly represent 
their own immediate interests and desires in terms of their exploitation of Earth. 
Nasr argues that the Islamic world and other nations which have been dominated 
by the Western world have all adopted the mindset and practices of Promethean man, 
although their traditional religious values stand opposed to this modern concept of 
absolutized humanity. Nasr cites Islamic Egypt, Buddhist Thailand, Hindu India, 
Christian Ethiopia, Shinto-Buddhist Japan, and the Navajo nation as examples of 
traditional cultures which have acquiesced to adoption of destructive Western 
technological practices, not because of any weakness or deficiency in their religions or 
spiritualties, but because of the need to “overcome the economic consequences of this 
domination.”34 As previously discussed, Nasr does cite Western Christianity’s deficiency 
in terms of recognizing “the spiritual significance of nature in its mainstream theology 
even before the Renaissance” as a circumstance that allowed for the desacralization of 
nature to occur in the Western world. However, Nasr also notes that “neither Christian 
Armenia nor Ethiopia nor even Christian Eastern Europe gave rise to that science and 
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technology which in the hands of secular man has led to the devastation of the globe.” In 
the Christian West, there is serious discussion amongst Christian theologians about how 
Christian theology has helped fuel the West’s destructive relationship with nature. Ever 
since Lynn White Jr.’s famous article, “The Historical Roots of the Ecological Crisis,” 
Christian theologians have called into question the Biblical doctrine of dominion, which 
many have held responsible for the ecological crisis. Nasr does not accept the story that 
Christianity is itself a root cause of the ecological crisis. For Nasr no traditional religious 
concept of human nature is to blame, certainly not an Islamic one, but rather it is the 
Promethean (anti-religious) man that is behind the ecological crisis. This is the 
secularized modern man, which began in the West and is now a global reality.
35
   
 In Nasr’s view, Promethean man has achieved dominance globally, even in areas 
of the world where religious beliefs and cultural forms stand in stark opposition to 
desacralization of nature and absolutization of humanity. Yet an essential element of 
Nasr’s perspective is that Pontifical man, though marginalized, is still alive, not merely 
conceptually but actually. 
` That man who remains man and continues to survive here and there even during 
this period of eclipse of spirituality and the desacralization of life is the being who 
remains aware of his destiny which is transcendence and the function of his 
intelligence which is knowledge of the Absolute…He knows that the grandeur of 
man does not lie in his cunning cleverness or titanic creations but resides most of 
all in the incredible power to empty himself of himself, to cease to exist in the 
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initiatic sense, to participate in that state of spiritual poverty and emptiness which 
permits him to experience Ultimate Reality.
36
 
 
For Nasr, the living model of Pontifical man that he refers to is the model of the Sufi 
sage—a model he knows through his own personal experience. “Journeying from the 
earth to his celestial abode, which he has left inwardly, man becomes the channel of 
grace for the earth, and the bridge which joins it to Heaven.”37 Through the achievement 
of gnosis, or perfect knowledge of God and nature, the Sufi becomes united with God and 
nature and fulfills the role of the Universal Man, who is a conduit or channel through 
which heavenly grace flows down to earth. In this role, he or she serves the essential 
function of casting spiritual light into the world of nature.
38
 
 For Nasr, the solution to the ecological crisis must be not only an intellectual 
revival of the concepts of sacred science and Pontifical man, but a contemplative spiritual 
awakening of select persons whose spiritual guidance and power will help the rest of 
humanity achieve balance in their role as intermediary between heaven and earth.  
Contemplatives who are of a gnostic bent are channels of grace for nature. They 
hear the invocation of nature in the solitude of high mountains and deserts, along 
the shore of the sea and in the heart of forests. They pray with nature and act as 
her protector and intermediary vis-à-vis the Divine Presence. The minds of such 
sages are indeed a mirror that reflects the light shining in their hearts… 
Once that light ceases to reflect upon the mind, the fundamental connection 
between humanity and the inner significance of nature becomes severed. Not only 
do the metaphysical and cosmological doctrines concerning nature become 
opaque and meaningless, but people lose the capacity to hear the prayer of nature 
and pray with her.
39
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Al-Ghazzali, whom Nasr cites as an exemplary representative of the metaphysical 
knowledge of the Absolute which kept materialism and rationalism at bay in the Islamic 
world, was also a Sufi mystic who wrote a famous commentary on the Quran’s “Verse of 
Light” called The Niche for Lights. The niche or heart of the gnostic is the lamp through 
which the light of God shines into the world. The metaphysical knowledge of nature that 
Nasr believes is so necessary for establishing a sacred cosmology and science cannot be 
comprehended apart from experiential mystical knowledge of God. Furthermore, the 
actual heart-mind activity of the sage, casting light upon the world of nature, is essential 
for maintaining the spiritual connection between humanity and nature. Therefore, Nasr 
calls his readers to discover a new mystical awareness of nature. One practice he suggests 
is the contemplation of virgin nature. Although Nasr believes that only the mystic who 
has attained to transcendent and direct knowledge of God can truly understand the 
spiritual messages of nature, he believes that even for the spiritual novice simply by 
being “in her bosom and within the embrace of her spiritual presence, which is the 
reflection of the Spirit Itself, man’s spirit is rejuvenated and he is reborn.”40 Ultimately, 
what Nasr believes is the goal of human life—that is, the attainment of knowledge of 
God—is also what he believes to be the necessary condition for restoring creation. 
Man cannot save the environment except by rediscovering the nexus between the 
Spirit and nature and becoming once again aware of the sacred quality of the 
works of the Supreme Artisan. And man cannot gain such an awareness of the 
sacred aspect of nature without discovering the sacred within himself and 
ultimately the Sacred as such.
41
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Nasr’s Call for Christian-Muslim Dialogue 
In his historical analysis of the root spiritual and intellectual causes of the 
ecological crisis, Nasr identifies Western Christianity’s lack of emphasis on the spiritual 
value of nature as an indirect cause of the ecological crisis, insofar as it allowed for the 
desacralization of nature and science. However, Nasr believes that Western Christianity 
can become part of the solution to the ecological crisis, and heal the original gap in 
humanity’s spiritual vision of nature which allowed the crisis to begin, by remembering 
and restoring its particular spiritual vision of nature. Nasr’s call to the Western Christian 
world is clear: if you want to help save nature, you must remember your tradition. 
Because of this callous disregard for the rights of nature and other living things, it 
is high time for those who are really concerned with the state of man to turn to 
this long tradition of the study of nature within Christianity and to seek to restore 
the metaphysical doctrines of Christianity with the help of Oriental metaphysics. 
Only the revival of a spiritual conception of nature that is based on intellectual 
and metaphysical doctrines can hope to neutralize the havoc brought about by the 
applications of modern science and integrate this science itself into a more 
universal perspective.
42
 
 
For Nasr, the ecological crisis is a reason for Western Christians to revive their 
spirituality and metaphysics, and of course Nasr imagines this happening more or less 
according to the values of traditionalism and through a dialogue especially between 
Christianity and Islam. Because the Islamic tradition is quite close to Christianity 
doctrinally, except in that it has generally emphasized the love of nature to a greater 
degree, it could serve as a good model for how to recover and reemphasize Christianity's 
spiritual vision of nature. 
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When we turn to Islam we find a religious tradition more akin to Christianity in 
its theological formulations yet possessing in its heart a gnosis or sapientia similar 
to the metaphysical doctrines of other Oriental traditions. In this, as in many other 
domains, Islam is the ‘middle people’, the ummah wasatah to which the Qur’an 
refers, in both a geographical and metaphysical sense. For this reason the 
intellectual structure of Islam and its cosmological doctrines and sciences of 
nature can be of the greatest aid in awakening certain dormant possibilities within 
Christianity.
43
 
 
Nasr’s thesis regarding the relationship of Islam and Christianity, especially in terms of 
the ecological crisis and its underlying spiritual crisis, is that Islam can help Christianity 
to recover dormant possibilities within its own tradition for understanding the cosmos. 
Essentially, Nasr hopes for a dialogical encounter between Christianity and Islam. 
However, for various reasons, this dialogue has not yet occurred in a fruitful way. 
Nasr has attempted to make contributions to Christian ecological theology while 
at the same time disagreeing rather strongly with this theology. Nasr laments that 
contemporary Christian authors do not appreciate the resources available in traditional 
Christian thought, too easily acquiesce to modern secular thinking, and do not recognize 
what Nasr sees as the fundamental inadequacy of modern Western science to describe the 
substance and meaning of nature and humanity. Nasr has been especially forthright in his 
criticism of Teilhard de Chardin and thinkers influenced by him. This approach is in 
keeping with his traditionalist forebears, especially Frithjof Schuon, who repeatedly 
criticized Teilhard de Chardin, styling him as a kind of Judas character in the drama and 
power struggle between religion and science in the West. One of the Christian eco-
theologians with whom Nasr has the most disagreement is Sallie McFague. Her 
theological method, which is very different than Nasr’s traditionalist method, calls for 
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deconstruction of significant elements of the Christian tradition and reconstruction of this 
tradition upon the basis of a cosmology drawn from contemporary science. Although 
Nasr and McFague have significant common ground in terms of their ecological 
theologies, significant ideological barriers have stood in the way of constructive dialogue 
between these two thinkers. After further exploration of McFague’s theology on its own 
terms in chapter 4, we will begin in earnest to compare these thinkers, beginning with 
their major differences in chapter 5. 
As this essay proceeds, we will have the opportunity to consider McFague’s 
response to the ecological crisis, first on its own terms, and then also in light of Nasr’s 
call to Christians to rediscover the spiritual significance of nature. Although Nasr’s 
reception of McFague’s work has been quite critical, an argument can be made that on 
many levels her work fulfills Nasr’s hopes for Western Christianity. Our dialogic 
comparison between Nasr and McFague presents an opportunity to discover common 
ground between the authors in the hope of indicating that common ground which Western 
Christians might hope to find with Muslim interlocutors, which might mutually reinforce 
each other’s efforts to resacralize the cosmos through religious action. 
Nasr’s historical and intellectual assessment of the causes of the ecological crisis 
leads him to issue his impassioned call for the transformation of Western Christianity into 
a more spiritually active, nature-loving tradition that can pull up the ecological crisis by 
its roots by restoring the Absolute to its intellectual and spiritual place in the West. For 
Nasr, this transformation must happen through a return to tradition, and would be aided 
by a remembrance occasioned by using “Oriental metaphysics” as a kind of refresher in 
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the philosophia perennis still alive in the Islamic world, but more or less dormant in the 
West. Of course, for McFague, there is also a recognition of the need for transformation 
of Christianity, but she envisions this change coming, in typical Protestant fashion, 
through reformation of tradition moving forward rather than return to tradition moving 
backwards. However, both dynamics of forward and backward are needed to shake up 
our current Christian worldview and disencumber and disentangle our view of nature 
from the reductionism of the economic machine bent on exploiting nature for the 
enrichment of the few. Just as much as God is immanent and transcendent, just as much 
as we need love for and knowledge of God and the world, so also we need to look ahead 
while at the same time looking back.  
A certain level of trust is needed between interfaith interlocutors, in order to 
present their perspectives to the other knowing that these perspectives must travel over a 
contextual gulf, so to speak, into the field of their interlocutor. Nasr cannot know fully 
what his ideas will mean for McFague in her context, and vice versa, because it is not 
possible for either to fully know the other’s field of life. In interfaith dialogue one must 
release control of one’s idea as it departs from one’s own field and enters the field of 
one’s interlocutor, and one must trust the goodwill of one’s interlocutor to use one’s idea 
in the best way possible. In order to trust one’s interlocutor one must know one’s 
interlocutor. One must have some understanding of one’s interlocutor’s ideological, 
cultural, and religious field of meaning so that one has at least some idea how and why 
one’s interlocutor might react to an idea one shares. Without such knowledge, it is likely 
that distrust, resentment, and an unwillingness to engage in dialogue with one’s 
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interlocutor may quickly develop because of his or her apparently arbitrary and unfair 
interaction with one’s ideas and beliefs. By reviewing the general contours of Nasr and 
McFague’s life-stories and theologies, we are simulating a trust-building phase in this 
dialogic comparison that will hopefully allow for a fruitful exchange of ideas to occur. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
MCFAGUE’S ECOLOGICAL THEOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 Beginning with Models of God in 1988, all of Sallie McFague’s books have been 
concerned with articulating a theological response to the ecological crisis. They have 
explored the fundamental question of how God, the world, and human beings are related. 
McFague has been especially concerned with what those relations look like to us in the 
subconscious pictures, metaphors, and models of the God-world relationship that guide 
human behavior. McFague is perhaps most famous for introducing the metaphor of the 
world as God’s body into contemporary Christian discourse. For McFague, this metaphor 
becomes the primary vehicle for advancing what she calls an organic model of the 
universe, what she also refers to as the body model. McFague presents this body model in 
sharp relief to the mechanistic or machine model of the world, primarily associated with 
Descartes. While body versus machine is the primary theme in McFague’s ecological 
theology, it is also important to take note of the deconstructive theological method 
through which she clears the space to construct her organic, body-focused theology.  
In the deconstructive phase of her theology, which precedes, logically and 
chronologically, the constructive phase, McFague problematizes the distantly 
transcendent patriarchal God of medieval and Barthian theology. She seeks to deconstruct 
this picture of God, epitomized by the symbol of God as King. In this phase of her 
theology the primary theme is transcendence versus immanence. In her deconstruction of 
the traditional patriarchal sky-God imagery, McFague redefines the concept of 
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transcendence, speaking of God as “transcendently immanent,” that is, transcendent in a 
way that does not take away from God’s nearness and intimacy with nature. In both 
major phases of her theology, McFague’s work advances themes that combine her 
concerns as a feminist and an environmentalist. From her deconstruction of the primary 
symbol of patriarchal religion, to her construction of a natural theology based on the 
theme of the body, McFague manifests a solidly feminist theology which is at the same 
time incredibly focused on one primary existential concern: the ecological crisis. 
The deconstructive and constructive elements of McFague’s theology are fully 
present in McFague’s texts in the period before her fourth conversion and continue to 
play an important role in her thinking in her post-fourth conversion texts. However, after 
her fourth conversion, when through a spiritual practice of meditation she discovers a 
more immediate awareness of God’s presence, her theology begins to include a mystical 
and kenotic element. McFague’s texts before conversion four lay out many of the most 
essential themes in terms of her dialogue with Nasr—especially the themes which cause 
the most ideological friction with Nasr, such as her emphasis on egalitarianism, 
deconstruction of traditional Christian symbols, embrace of contemporary evolutionary 
theory, and critique of the traditional concept of transcendence in its theological and 
cosmological sense. All of these points of tension with Nasr will be explored in the next 
chapter, which focuses on their major differences. As the conversation continues in an 
exploration of the common ground of Nasr and McFague, her writings from the period 
after conversion four will be explored more fully in relation with certain ideas from 
Nasr’s writings that are quite complementary with her views. McFague’s spiritual 
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awakening provides a new point of comparison and dialogue with Nasr’s perspective, 
which is also mystically grounded. For example, McFague’s growing interest in the 
universal self after her fourth conversion, which experiences unity with God and nature 
through a process of self-emptying or kenosis, has profound parallels with the Sufi 
concept of the Universal Man as Nasr interprets it. There are also important shifts in the 
way she describes God and the way she views the God-world relationship after 
conversion four, which arguably bring her cosmological view much closer to Nasr’s.  
Two Periods of Ecological Theology 
The first period of McFague’s ecological theology is defined by four texts: 
Metaphorical Theology, where she develops the methodological rationale for her 
theological project; Models of God, where she first introduces the model of the world as 
God’s body; The Body of God, where she further develops the model of the world as 
God’s body in relation to postmodern science in search of a functional cosmology where 
science and theology are integrated; Super, Natural Christians, which continues to 
explore the interplay of science and theology, integrating the model of the world as God’s 
body into a broader subject-subjects model for the human relationship to nature which 
she presents in sharp contrast to the Cartesian subject-objects model. In these texts, 
McFague’s thinking covers much of the same conceptual ground as Nasr’s ecological 
theology, providing numerous points for comparison and dialogue. She takes a 
fundamentally different position in regards to the relationship of religion and science in 
general and the theory of evolution in particular. Nevertheless, she is on the same page as 
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Nasr insofar as she seeks to forge a meaningful relationship between religion and science 
in the quest for a functional cosmology.  
The second period of McFague’s ecological theology (post conversion four), Life 
Adundant, A New Climate for Theology, and Blessed Are the Consumers, continues to 
address the topic of ecological theology, and begins to draw on perspectives and 
arguments from ecological economics in addition to the ecological sciences. In many 
ways, her constructive engagement with economics mirrors her earlier engagement with 
the sciences, insofar as she follows the same method of correlating her postmodern 
theology with an interdisciplinary other which is also postmodern. In her earlier works 
McFague proposes a theology that is integrated with postmodern science to create a 
functional cosmology (rejecting a theology paired with the Enlightenment view of the 
world). So too, in these later texts, McFague proposes a theology that would exist in a 
mutually reinforcing relationship with ecological economics, a new economic paradigm 
that takes into consideration the problem of the ecological crisis and global poverty 
(rejecting a theology that justifies classical Enlightenment economic theory). Yet the 
quality of this engagement is quite different because of McFague’s spiritual awakening, 
which opens up many new possibilities for her theologically. For example, McFague 
articulates a spirituality and ethic of kenosis or self-emptying, tied concretely to her call 
to middle class North American Christians to radically reduce their consumption. In this 
connection of postmodern ecological economics with a postmodern theology turned 
mystical, McFague develops the concept of the “universal self” as an ethical ideal for 
human beings in relation to nature. The universal self’s bodily awareness extends, as it 
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were, beyond the boundaries of the ego-bound individual person, encompassing the 
whole physical world, including other people, animals, plants, rivers, trees, oceans—all 
of nature.  
McFague’s writings from her second theological period build upon her earlier 
work; for example, they retain her focus on the ecological crisis, her concept of the world 
as God’s body, and her integration of evolution and theology in the tradition of Teilhard 
de Chardin. However, the theological center of focus in McFague’s thought becomes 
more pronounced and more powerful, drawing together the main strands of her thought in 
a bold mystical awareness of the reality of God. This spiritual shift has definite 
conceptual results. In the first period of her thought, McFague believes that all God-
language is metaphorical, but as a result of her fourth conversion, McFague becomes 
convinced that love is not a metaphor for God but a description of God’s nature. 
Moreover, the significance of God’s love, which is kenotic or self-emptying, is 
understood by McFague increasingly in economic terms; giving food to the hungry is the 
paradigmatic act of imatatio dei in this model.
1
 Another description of God that becomes 
increasingly important for McFague besides “God is love” is “God is reality.” This 
description of God as reality transforms McFague’s cosmological perspective in terms of 
the way religious and scientific elements comingle in the story of origins, making the 
religious aspect of the story primary and necessary; earlier in her journey McFague 
“wanted the world to stand on its own” but in this period she comes to believe that “the 
world is hidden in God”: “human existence takes place within God’s Spirit” and “the 
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world does not have a separate existence for Christians.”2 This idea of the world existing 
in God is strikingly similar to Nasr’s concept of God as al-Muhit, the divine environment 
in which the natural environment exists.  
This essay cannot possibly explore the thought of either Nasr or McFague fully, 
but in the interest of constructing a dialogue between Nasr and McFague it focuses on 
major themes in their respective works which directly relate to each other. Interestingly, 
the only direct engagement (at least textually) between McFague and Nasr has been 
Nasr’s critique of several of McFague’s writings from the first period of her ecological 
theology. His criticisms highlight the major disagreements and ideological obstacles 
between McFague and himself. It is also interesting that McFague never replies directly 
to Nasr’s criticisms, although it is possible to read in her works both responses to Nasr’s 
criticisms and criticisms of Nasr. Many of the most compelling of these possible 
responses to and criticisms of Nasr are found in writings from McFague’s second period. 
At this stage in our essay, it makes the most sense to focus on the development of 
McFague’s thought in the first period of her theological journey, as we move towards a 
discussion in chapter 5 of the tensions between McFague and Nasr which are raised by 
Nasr’s direct engagement with her pre-conversion four writings. Later on in our essay, as 
our conversation develops, aspects of McFague’s thought in her second period will 
become more relevant to the conversation and will be explored in greater depth than in 
this chapter.  
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The Role of Science 
Both Sallie McFague and Seyyed Hossein Nasr identify the mechanistic and 
secularized scientific worldview of the Renaissance and Enlightenment as a major cause 
of the ecological crisis. Insofar as it stripped the natural world of meaning and value, it 
set the stage for its exploitation, domination, and destruction. As each theologian makes 
proposals for how to resacralize the natural world, they both inevitably grapple with the 
problem of what role science ought to have in shaping the way human beings view the 
world. If a reductionist science more or less displaced a religious view of the universe in 
the Renaissance and Enlightenment, with disastrous results, what needs to change in 
terms of the way we value science in order for the sacred to be reintroduced into our view 
of the world? How can a unified view of the world that includes both scientific and 
spiritual dimensions be restored? This chapter explores the ways in which McFague has 
responded to these and related questions, at times pausing to note the relation of her 
argument to Nasr’s. Because of their different contexts, religious traditions, and 
intellectual genealogies, McFague and Nasr come at these questions very differently. 
McFague envisions a new synthesis of science and religion in the postmodern era, 
inspired in large part by Teilhard de Chardin and thinkers influenced by him, such as 
Thomas Berry and Mary Evelyn Tucker. On the other hand, Nasr focuses on recovering a 
traditional perspective on nature by recovering a lost paradigm. It dates back to a time 
before the rise of modern science in the West and its global spread, a time when Islamic 
science and theology were integrated in a cosmology that allowed for humanity to live in 
harmony with nature. Having reviewed Nasr’s arguments in the last chapter, in this 
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chapter we review McFague’s. This will provide a setting to consider their tensions and 
differences in chapter 5, their common ground in chapters 6 and 7, and ways in which 
their ideas might be creatively synthesized in chapter 8.  
 For both McFague and Nasr, the question of the relationship between science and 
theology is central to their formulations of ecological theology and ethics. For Nasr, 
modern reductionist science carries most if not all the blame for the ecological crisis. 
Secondarily, he acknowledges that Western Christian theology has also contributed to the 
problem insofar as it has advanced the concept of a separation between the natural and 
the supernatural. For McFague, this ranking of causes is often reversed. Although she 
recognizes that reductionist science has played a key role in terms of shaping a negative 
relationship between human beings and the world, in her interpretation it is often seen as 
second in terms of responsibility to the theology of a distant, controlling God that she 
believes made scientific reductionism a possibility to begin with.
3
 Because McFague 
identifies theology itself as a major cause of the problem, much of her focus is on the 
deconstruction of what she sees as the offending theological models, and the construction 
of new ones which she believes correct the imbalances and shortcomings of previous 
models.  
In the texts considered in this chapter, McFague repeatedly problematizes the 
image of a distant, transcendent God who is not intimately connected to the world, but 
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controls it from a distance. As a corrective, McFague develops a concept of God that is 
highly immanent and incarnational, and images God in intimate, inseparable relationship 
with the world. Her primary metaphor in this regard is that the world is God’s body. Just 
as a distant God who is wholly other than the world enabled the mechanistic worldview 
of Descartes and Newton to define modernity, McFague believes that, in the postmodern 
era, a picture of God as decidedly immanent and world-related could help bring about a 
shift in our cosmology—to one which includes the sacred dimensions of the world and 
promotes care for it.  
Conceptual Groundwork 
McFague laid conceptual groundwork for her proposition that we imagine the 
world as God’s body in Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language 
(Fortress, 1982). An essential part of that groundwork was exploring the question of how 
theological models relate to scientific theories, and vice versa. Although McFague’s 
answer to this question shifts radically, the question itself remains central to much of her 
later thought. “The broadest type of theological model—the metaphysical model of the 
relations between God, human being, and the world—is without limit and hence 
unfalsifiable…Whatever is, is only in relationship to God, both its hold in existence and 
the possible transformation of that existence toward fuller realization.”4 Later in her 
career, McFague would experiment with such a broad theological model in her attempt to 
address the ecological crisis theologically—the world as God’s body. At the same time as 
McFague first articulates the meaning and function of metaphysical models of God-
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world-human relationship, she also notes the tension and competition between science 
and religion in terms of proposing and defining such models. This competitive tension 
between science and religion will become an important part of the discussion as we 
compare McFague and Nasr’s ecological theologies, especially in terms of how they 
navigate this problem area.  
For McFague, at this early stage, the conflict between scientific and religious 
models of the world is manageable, given good boundaries. 
[A]s Frederick Ferre notes, the basis for the conflict between science and religion 
is the false assumption that religion is advancing empirically testable assertions 
rather than metaphysical statements of unlimited scope, while science has been 
viewed, again falsely, as making metaphysical assertions rather than advancing 
limited empirical statements…[S]cientists as scientists are not metaphysicians and 
even their paradigms, the assumptions within which normal science is conducted, 
undergo radical shifts of a sort uncommon to religious traditions.
5
  
 
In the above quotation McFague endorses a clear dividing line between religion and 
science. Religion deals with metaphysical assertions, and science deals with empirically 
testable assertions. Theological truth claims are also more permanent than scientific truth 
claims. She seems to believe that the conflict between religion and science is false or 
illusory, based upon a faulty understanding of the domains of both disciplines.  
A fourth and final difference between scientific and theological models is, baldly 
stated, that scientific models refer to the quantitative dimension of the world 
while theological models refer to the qualitative dimension…The difference is 
between the ways the world is known: science knows the world from the 
perspective of its physical phenomena while theology knows the world from the 
perspective of human valuation.
6
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Again in the above quotation, McFague affirms a neat distinction between theology and 
science along the lines of qualitative and quantitative viewing. McFague takes for granted 
the quantitative nature of modern, reductionist science and seeks to construct a theology 
that makes an essentially different species of truth claim. By staking out clear territorial 
boundaries between these two ways of knowing the world McFague brokers a kind of 
peace between science and religion. This allows her to work within what she sees as the 
borders of theology, articulating and constructing theological models that she believes 
should serve as a more permanent, qualitative and non-falsifiable metaphysical context in 
which science can continue to make its changing, quantitative and empirically verifiable 
truth statements without theological interference.
7
  
However, as McFague begins to develop the model of the world as God’s body, a 
model not conceived of or introduced in Metaphorical Theology, she makes it a priority 
to present this model in a scientifically credible way. As she does so, the clear lines 
proposed above become blurred as McFague begins, much like Nasr, to seek an 
integrated relationship between science and religion via her model of the world as God’s 
body and what she sees as its scientific or cosmological counterpart, the common creation 
story. In doing so McFague apparently leaves behind the boundary line implicit in her 
statement above that scientific paradigms and theories “undergo radical shifts of a sort 
uncommon to religious traditions.” In fact, while embracing the relatively new biological 
science of evolution as a primary source for Christian theology, McFague will propose 
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radical shifts in Christian tradition that mirror the shifts from modern to postmodern 
science. Effectively, in making these intellectual moves, McFague goes beyond the 
peace-time borders between religion and science that she previously established, 
suggesting instead a unified state, if you will. These moves are what produce the most 
conflict and tension between McFague and Nasr.
8
  
In Metaphorical Theology McFague determines that the root metaphor of 
Christianity has traditionally been the model “of a personal God relating to responsible 
and responsive persons,” and suggests the model of God as friend as the best expression 
within that general metaphorical model or mode of theological expression.
9
 However, she 
is deeply unsatisfied with this overly human-focused model of God and at the end of the 
book suggests that the Christian tradition may be in need of a more mystical and holistic 
turn in its theology. 
The Christian tradition has narrowed its metaphors and models of God, excluding 
natural images and focusing on hierarchical, authoritarian, anthropocentric ones. 
Primitive religions as well as Eastern religions support the mystics and the writers 
of the Psalms by insisting that experiences of God cannot be so limited, for much 
of what we feel in worship demands them. Ecstasy and awe cannot be contained 
in models of God as parent or friend—the ocean, the sky, and the earth express 
them more fully.
10
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McFague’s future work in ecological theology, especially her introduction of the model 
of the world as God’s body, emerges out of the foundational questions and theoretical 
principles articulated in Metaphorical Theology. As McFague explores metaphors and 
models for God beyond traditional Christian concepts of God as parent or friend, in quest 
for ways of imaging God as more intimately connected to the natural world, her initially 
clear boundaries between religion and science will blur. Even as we can already see how 
this development in her thought conflicts with Nasr’s on important points, at the same 
time we can note the deep affinities that are appearing.  
In the above quotation, for example, one finds a statement that clearly resonates 
with Nasr’s perennialist perspective and method, in terms of McFague’s way of looking 
to “primitive” and Eastern religions, as well as mysticism, in her search to expand 
Christianity’s narrowly anthropocentric and anti-naturalistic interpretation of God. This 
connection with other faiths is one line of thought that McFague does not develop 
explicitly in her later work, but it nevertheless points to a substantial potentiality for 
common ground with Nasr. Both authors do in fact articulate their environmental 
theologies in ways that emphasize God’s connection to the natural world rather than 
anthropocentric images. While McFague does not engage heavily in comparative 
religious thinking in her future books, her suggestion that other world religions may 
support a more nature-oriented Christian theology presents a question that we will 
explore at length in conversation with Nasr: To what extent should Christian ecological 
theology benchmark other religious traditions in terms of defining its own parameters? 
This question raises a point of tension insofar as Nasr’s explicitly comparative 
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traditionalist theology defines McFague’s innovative theological assertions as breaking 
with and implicitly invalidating traditional religions in general by invalidating and 
deconstructing elements of traditional Christianity shared by other world religions.  
Insofar as ecological theology is necessarily global, given the global scale of the 
ecological crisis and the solutions needed to solve it, care should be given to the 
implications of how a Christian theology interacts not only with science, but with other 
religious traditions. This type of sensitivity is generally missing in Christian theologians 
such as McFague who have followed in the path blazed by Teilhard de Chardin, insofar 
as he promoted a concept of Christian exceptionalism or triumphalism; namely, that 
Christianity alone among world religions would and could combine with evolution and 
endure into the future to shape the worldview and behavior of human beings. The 
assumption that other religions would pass away has long been assumed by Christian 
thinkers, though this assumption carries little weight empirically or metaphysically. This 
is one place where the dialogue between McFague and Nasr will bring us down an 
untraveled path toward common ground between not only McFague and Nasr but 
between other global ecological theologians—Christians, Muslims, and others. 
Introducing the World as God’s Body 
In Models of God McFague first introduces the organic, metaphorical model of 
the world as God’s body as an alternate to imaging God’s relationship with the world in 
the classical, monarchical model. McFague sharply criticizes the monarchical model, 
where God is envisioned as the sovereign king of the world, for three reasons: “in the 
monarchical model, [1] God is distant from the world, [2] relates only to the human 
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world, and [3] controls that world through domination and benevolence.”11 One of her 
primary concerns with this model is its tendency to place God outside of and apart from 
the world. Conceived of as king of the world, God is set apart in another realm above the 
world we live in.  
In this picture God is worldless and the world is Godless: the world is empty of 
God’s presence, for it is too lowly to be the royal abode…Whatever one does for 
the world is not finally important in this model, for its ruler does not inhabit it as 
his primary residence, and his subjects are well advised not to become too 
involved in it either. The king’s power extends over the entire universe, of course, 
but his being does not: he relates to it externally, he is not part of it but essentially 
different from it and apart from it.
12
  
 
In her initial presentation of the model of the world as God’s body, McFague primarily 
contrasts it to the model of God as king. As a feminist, McFague joins colleagues in 
critiquing this model’s support of patriarchal systems and norms. As an ecological 
theologian, her critique also focuses on how this model implicitly devalues the natural 
world and places inordinate focus on human beings as being separate from the world. 
Domination Problem 
McFague does not completely accept Lynn White Jr.’s argument blaming the 
ecological crisis on the Judeo-Christian concept of human “domination” of nature found 
in Genesis. However, she does argue that domination language in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition is dangerous given humanity’s power to destroy life on earth.  
If we are capable of extinguishing ourselves and most if not all other life, 
metaphors that support attitudes of distance from, and domination of, other human 
beings and nonhuman life must be recognized as dangerous. No matter how 
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ancient a metaphorical tradition may be and regardless of its credentials in 
Scripture, liturgy, and creedal statements, it still must be discarded if it threatens 
the continuation of life itself.
13
  
 
Clearly, for McFague, models of God or cosmologies that support or endorse human 
domination are not salvageable in our contemporary world. Even if they cannot be shown 
to be directly responsible for the ecological crisis they are nevertheless dangerous and 
untimely given that this crisis of ecological destruction is well underway. For this reason, 
despite any affinity with or sympathy for the monarchical medieval model of the God-
world relationship, she cannot accept it as a viable theology for our present age.  
But McFague is also unhappy with the monarchical model of God insofar as God 
is pictured not as domineering but as benevolent. “The king as domineering sovereign 
encourages attitudes of militarism and destruction; the king as benevolent patriarch 
encourages attitudes of passivity and escape from responsibility.”14 Even the benevolent 
God-king of the world does not suggest an appropriate human response to the ecological 
crisis. For McFague, the idea that God is king of the world is a “metaphorical tradition” 
that needs to be jettisoned because it is potentially harmful and not particularly helpful in 
terms of the ecological crisis. It is very important to note this principle of the option to 
jettison aspects of one’s tradition, which differentiates McFague’s postmodern 
theological method from Nasr’s traditionalist theological method.  
 Following her deconstruction of the model of God as king of the world, McFague 
suggests a novel model, the world as God’s body. She suggests that the model of the 
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world as God’s body could serve as the basis for a new Christian understanding of the 
God-world relationship, one which she believes is appropriate given the ecological crisis 
in the world. In Models of God McFague describes her attempt to introduce this new 
metaphor for the God-world relationship as “experimenting with a bit of nonsense to see 
if it can make a claim to truth.”15 
The metaphor of the world as God’s body has the opposite problem to the 
metaphor of the world as the king’s realm: if the latter puts too great a distance 
between God and the world, the former verges on too great a proximity. Since 
both metaphors are inadequate, we have to ask which one is better in our time, 
and to qualify it with other metaphors and models. Is it better to accept an 
imaginative picture of God as the distant ruler controlling his realm through 
external and benevolent power or one of God so intimately related to the world 
that the world can be imagined as God’s body?16 
 
McFague argues that the world as God’s body is preferable, and that it makes just as 
much sense as the God-as-king-of-the-world model. While she recognizes that her new 
model is far more immanent and loses something that is perhaps desirable in terms of the 
transcendent dimension of God, she is willing “to qualify it with other metaphors and 
models” to make up for any deficiencies.  
In Models of God McFague explores at length three other models of God—
mother, lover, and friend—which she argues could complement the model of the Earth as 
God’s body, speaking to the personal and transcendence dimensions of God. These 
complementary models help McFague make her case that she intends the model of the 
Earth as God’s body to be panentheistic rather than pantheistic:  
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Without the use of personal agential metaphors, however, including among others 
God as mother, lover, and friend, the metaphor of the world as God’s body would 
be pantheistic, for the body would be all there were. Nonetheless, the model is 
monist and perhaps most precisely designated as panentheistic; that is, it is a view 
of the God-world relationship in which all things have their origins in God and 
nothing exists outside God, though this does not mean that God is reduced to 
these things.
17
 
 
Besides the fact that the model of the world as God’s body highlights the sacredness of 
the natural world, another important pay-off in McFague’s trade between the world as 
king-realm or God’s body is that the model of God as king is especially problematic from 
a feminist point of view. McFague accepts the use of some male language for God such 
as the traditional Christian metaphor, father (along with her preferred use of mother), yet 
she continues to critique the God-as-king model. With its overtones of dominion over 
Earth and its implicit support for patriarchal systems of control and domination, this is a 
model that McFague opposes from both an ecological and feminist perspective. She is not 
alone among eco-feminist authors who have argued that patriarchal systems of 
domination and control are implicated in the ecological crisis, and that the issues of 
oppression and exploitation of the earth and of women cannot be disentangled.
18
  
Science, Evolution, and Teilhard de Chardin 
After Models of God (1988), McFague further explores the model of the world as 
God’s body in The Body of God (1993). In the latter work, the most considerable addition 
to the model as McFague initially presents it, McFague makes an argument that the world 
as God’s body makes sense in terms of contemporary scientific theories, especially the 
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Big Bang and evolution, what she refers to (following Thomas Berry) as the “common 
creation story.” With her embrace of contemporary scientific theories as comprising a 
story of origins she relies upon theologically, McFague blurs the lines she establishes 
between religion and science in Metaphorical Theology where she limits science to 
“advancing limited empirical statements” rather than “metaphysical statements of 
unlimited scope.”19 In The Body of God McFague embraces a “cosmology” based on “the 
common creation story” as a context for her ecological theology; the way she uses the 
word “cosmology” it is more along the lines of making “metaphysical statements of 
unlimited scope” than “advancing limited empirical statements.” The common creation 
story reflects the current scientific consensus on the process of how the universe and life 
came into being. While McFague does not regard this story as absolutely true in the sense 
that it will not change, she nevertheless believes it is an essential element of a 
contemporary functional cosmology.  
The common creation story is the story of the physical universe, the story of 
embodiment, or, more precisely, the story of everything that exists on the 
matter/energy continuum. It claims that no special entity, principle, or substance 
needs to be or should be introduced to explain the evolution of the universe from 
its simple beginning to its present outcome—on our planet, to human beings with 
brains or minds (and some would claim, spirits). For our purposes, the point to 
underscore is the focus of the common creation story on matter, physicality, 
embodiment.
20
 
 
McFague embraces the common creation story as a good partner for her theology of the 
world as God’s body because it is a story that is focused on “matter, physicality, 
embodiment.” From her point of view, its focus on matter rather than spirit in the creation 
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process better supports her concept of a God found not beyond the world but in and 
through the world; it forces us to picture God as being embodied, if we want to picture 
God at all. The common creation story is metaphysical in its implications, yet being a 
story of modern scientific origins it is confined to the quantitative realm. The one part of 
the story that is difficult to swallow from a theistic religious perspective, however, is the 
idea that “no special entity, principle, or substance needs to be or should be introduced to 
explain the evolution of the universe.” The obvious problem is that God as traditionally 
understood, as divine Being, is not needed in this story. It is metaphysical in the sense of 
making unlimited truth claims that cannot be verified or falsified: how can one say 
whether or not God is behind the process of evolution considered only as a quantitative 
phenomenon involving physical matter? And yet it is not metaphysical because it does 
not go beyond the physical, but rather confines itself and all other concepts, including 
God and the human being, to matter. 
It is first of all a cosmology, that is, an account of the universe as a whole or of 
the whole of reality. Cosmology is not limited to scientific accounts; in fact, until 
recently most cosmologies have been religious, philosophical, or mythical. For 
instance, during early medieval culture, when fact and value distinctions were 
unknown, cosmology was a joint enterprise of philosophy, religion, the arts, and 
the science of the day. One of the aims of this essay is to move us back in that 
direction, toward a unified view of reality, one in which theology is done in the 
context of and contributes to the picture of reality current in our time. Such a 
unified view would give us a functional cosmology, one in which we could 
understand where we belong, both as human beings and as Christians, in the 
scheme of things as currently interpreted rather than operating as many do in a 
schizophrenic fashion, now in a secular world and now in a religious one.
21
 
 
McFague recognizes that this science-based story or cosmology makes statements of 
unlimited scope about the nature of everything that exists. As she notes in Metaphorical 
                                                        
21
 Ibid., 40-41. 
  
176 
Theology, when science makes such metaphysical or unlimited claims it does tend to 
come into conflict with religion, just as when religion challenges the empirical truth 
claims of science. For McFague, this conflict is welcome. She embraces the common 
creation story insofar as it says, as it were, “in the beginning was matter.” This is a story 
that can support a theology that posits “the world is God’s body” as its foundational 
definition of God, and treats the spirit of God as a less definite aspect of God’s being. 
McFague hopes this theological shift will lead to a shift in attention on the human level 
that also puts more priority on the bodily aspects of humanity, and the human connection 
with other bodies on Earth rather than with a transcendent spirit fundamentally beyond or 
other than the physical world. For McFague, who is seeking to deconstruct and 
reconstruct the Christian picture of the God-world-human relationship, this disruptive 
story of origins, this new subversive cosmology or scientific myth, is a welcome 
ingredient in her theological reformulation of God. 
This is where McFague and Nasr come into their most impressive conflict: 
McFague’s unified view of reality which mixes religious metaphor with the common 
creation story comes into conflict with Nasr’s traditional Muslim cosmological and 
theological truth claims about God and the world. Nasr rejects the major elements of the 
so-called “common creation story,” which he views as an illegitimate overreach of 
limited empirical sciences into the realm of cosmology or metaphysics. For Nasr the 
place this story gives to the spiritual and the unseen dimensions of reality is woefully 
inadequate, especially insofar as the common creation story reverses the assumption of 
traditional metaphysics that what is lower (matter) proceeds from what is higher (spirit). 
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He repeatedly and forcefully rejects the theory of evolution, arguing that it is a scientific 
theory that lacks empirical verification but is defended with dogmatic zeal because of the 
pseudo-religious function it plays as a cosmological story of origins for a world trying to 
forget about God. Furthermore, Nasr is adamantly opposed to the theology of Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin and the many Christian environmentalists who are inspired by it, and 
this is precisely the current of thought that McFague draws on in terms of advancing what 
she sees as a “unified view” of scientific and religious myth.  
While McFague’s particular imagery and theological language is quite different 
from Teilhard’s, insofar as she uses different religious metaphors and interprets the 
science itself differently from Teilhard at many points, her overall project of unifying 
Christianity with the scientific story of evolution as a new story of origins follows in the 
path blazed by Teilhard. In a time when the theory of evolution was incredibly 
controversial and widely disputed in the Christian world, Teilhard, being not only a Jesuit 
but a paleontologist involved with the discovery of Peking Man, was one of the first 
Christian theologians to publicly endorse the theory of evolution and to work with it in a 
constructive theological mode. Because of pressures from the Vatican much of Teilhard’s 
work remained secret during his lifetime and was only published posthumously. Teilhard 
creatively synthesized Christian eschatology and the theory of evolution, conceiving of 
the classic Christian concept of Christ as Omega as a goal which would be reached not so 
much by a literal second coming of Christ, but by the evolution of humanity to a higher, 
Christ-like state of consciousness. Through adopting a worldview based on the theory of 
evolution, Teilhard believed that Christianity itself would evolve and fulfill its potential 
  
178 
as the religion which would help to advance the consciousness of humanity towards the 
Omega point.  
McFague adopts Teilhard’s basic project of discovering a new functional 
Christian cosmology that affirms the story of evolution. This is the creative project that 
she continues, as it were, in Teilhard’s name, albeit in a time where the theory of 
evolution itself has gained widespread acceptance among the majority of Christians in the 
West. However, despite widespread acceptance of the theory of evolution as such, the 
integration of this theory with Christian theology or religious thought in general remains 
a controversial and unfinished task. In an autobiographical essay published late in her 
career, “Falling In Love with God and the World,” McFague describes her identification 
with Teilhard’s thought as helping her to meet her need to integrate her two great loves, 
for God and for the world. For McFague, these two loves also correspond to the 
transcendent and immanent aspects of God, respectively. The integration of her love for 
God and for the world addresses her need to integrate theology and science, spirit and 
matter, transcendence and imminence. McFague looks to Teilhard as her primary 
antecedent and inspiration in this constructive theological work. Even after her fourth 
conversion when her picture of the God-world relation shifts away from her initial 
Teilhardian cosmology based on the science of evolution, she continues to resonate 
deeply with Teilhard and his thought insofar as it comes to symbolize for her the need to 
integrate her fundamental “two loves.”  
In terms of her cosmological shift after her fourth conversion, it is important to 
point out that McFague does not become skeptical about evolution. However, she shifts 
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from a cosmology based on evolutionary science to a cosmology based in God as reality 
that is commensurate with the Big Bang and evolutionary science, that is, the common 
creation story. In this new story, God rather than matter is primary. In Life Abundant, 
McFague writes: “We (the universe) come from God and return to God, and in the 
‘interim’ we live in the presence of God—even when we do not know or acknowledge 
it.”22 McFague argues that everything begins and ends with God, and creation is a “going 
out from God’s self” or embodiment of God. McFague’s worldview has become 
decidedly more theocentric. Basing her thought on an intuitive and immediate awareness 
of God as reality, she is still interested in maintaining credibility with the contemporary 
scientific worldview. “It is a story that can be imagined without sacrificing one’s 
intellect, although contemporary cosmology and evolution do not give special support to 
this religious tale.”23 McFague does not present her metaphysics-based cosmology as a 
challenge to the legitimacy of contemporary science. However, her argument seems to 
acknowledge the potential of science to shift over time, even to the extent that the idea of 
God as reality will have a much more permanent value than is the case in current science.  
In A New Climate for Theology, McFague continues to address this question of 
the God-world relationship, setting her original model of the world as God’s body within 
the context of two other metaphors: “first, as we are to our bodies, God is to the world 
(the body infused, enlivened by mind/soul/spirit); and second, the world is in God as a 
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baby is in the womb.”24 McFague argues that without these additional metaphors the 
model of the world as God’s body might be seen as pantheistic. The first metaphor, 
however, is not new to McFague’s second theological period. McFague’s model of the 
world as God’s body always included the transcendently immanent dimension of the 
Spirit animating the body of the Earth. The second metaphor, however, is new to her 
second theological period. She restates this idea of the world being in God like a child in 
the womb in her most recent text, Blessed Are the Consumers: “the world exists ‘within’ 
God and is internally related to God at every moment and direction of its existence.”25 
Enlightenment and Medieval Models 
 Another area of important agreement between McFague and Nasr in terms of the 
religion and science discussion can be seen most clearly when one looks at McFague’s 
next book after The Body of God (1993)—Super, Natural Christians (1997). In this text 
McFague offers a critique of the development of the modern scientific worldview during 
the European Renaissance, and how that worldview set the stage for the ecological crisis. 
While she does not use the same terms as Nasr, her critique tells the story of the 
desacralization of nature and the displacement of a sacred cosmology with the mind-body 
dualism of Descartes and the mechanism of Newton, which left the world of nature void 
of meaning and value. In this way, she sets up the problem and its solution—the need for 
the resacralization of nature—in much the same way that Nasr does. 
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Whereas people in the Middle Ages had lived in a world as subjects among many 
subjects, animal and plant ones (as well as angelic and demonic ones, with the 
Subject, God, presiding over everything), human beings were now alone…We 
now live in a world in which we have eliminated all other subjects; is it, then, 
such a crime to get rid of their bodies? Grim as this may sound, it does reflect the 
common modern (Newtonian) view of reality: the split between the internal, 
subject, human world and the exterior, object-like, natural world.
26
 
 
It is important to note that in McFague’s critique of the Enlightenment worldview that 
emerges after the Renaissance she clearly prefers what she calls the “Medieval view.”  
Although she does not recommend a return to the world view of the Middle Ages, she 
does recognize that it is a kind of subject-subjects model of viewing the world. Although 
the relationship of beings was conceived of in a traditional hierarchy with “the Subject, 
God, presiding over everything” it was nevertheless a subject-subjects model closer to 
what McFague is proposing.  
Although she is faced with essentially the same problem that faces Nasr—that is, 
the desacralization of nature by the dominant modern scientific view of reality—
McFague’s solution to this problem is quite distinct from Nasr’s. She does not suggest 
going back to a traditional or medieval cosmology, but instead believes that postmodern 
science provides a better picture of reality, ecologically speaking. 
As Christians, then, how should we understand nature?...The big answer is that 
we should think of nature in terms of the picture of the physical world coming to 
us from postmodern science and ecology. The natural world, according to this 
picture, is characterized by evolutionary change and novelty, structure as well as 
openness (or law and chance), relationality and interdependence, with individual 
entities existing only within systems, systems that can be expressed by the models 
of organism and community.
27
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McFague speaks broadly of three different models of understanding nature in Super, 
Natural Christians: the medieval, the Newtonian, and the postmodern. Her rejection of 
the Newtonian is hard, and her clear preference is for the postmodern, but she does not 
reject the medieval model in the way she rejects the Newtonian.  
The medieval picture (as we will see in the third chapter) was in many ways a 
successful model integrating God, humans, and world, with nature as symbolic of 
God and hence seen as a way to God. It brought these three crucial elements of 
any worldview into a coherent unity: people lived in close proximity to other 
animals and plants while at the same time seeing them as emblems of God. While 
the picture was anthropocentric and hierarchical, with its focus on the salvation of 
human individuals, it can still provide us with an interesting case study in God-
human-nature integration as we attempt to undo the much more devastating 
effects of the Newtonian worldview, the one that dominates contemporary 
thinking.
28
 
 
When one reads Nasr’s description of the Islamic view of nature, drawing on the Quran, 
Sufism, and classical Islamic science and cosmology, it is clear that it is closest to what 
McFague would describe as the “medieval view.” Nasr would agree that traditional 
Islamic cosmology shares much with the medieval view of reality, and in general would 
see his work of reintroducing or reasserting such a traditional religious view of the 
relationship between God, humanity, and nature as an attempt to undo the desacralized 
view of nature that developed during the Renaissance and Enlightenment and, as 
McFague points out, “dominates contemporary thinking.” While McFague is going in a 
different direction, she does seem to acknowledge the legitimacy of Nasr’s primary 
direction or orientation. What this dissertation suggests is that there is an important and 
needful dialogue that should take place between McFague’s postmodern religious 
cosmology and Nasr’s pre-modern religious cosmology. Elements of both, strategies 
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from both, understandings from both, will be needed as we seek to emerge from the 
paradigm of modernistic scientific reductionism which has laid the groundwork for the 
ecological crisis by radically devaluing nature in human eyes.  
What is important to recognize as we engage in this dialogue is the profound unity 
of intention of the authors, in their search for a way of viewing the world which escapes 
the destructive reductionism of the Cartesian/Newtonian worldview. While at first glance 
there may appear to be a fundamental or irreducible conflict between Nasr’s alternative to 
modernism and McFague’s, there may also be ways to creatively synthesize aspects of 
both. And, where there is not any way to reconcile divergences, there is still the 
possibility to recognize the common intention of the two approaches, in terms of their 
goal of moving away from a common antagonist (modern scientific reductionism) toward 
a view of the world that integrates scientific and theological ways of knowing. 
 One of the tasks of this dialogue is to identify, along with the differences between 
the authors, clues to the reasons for these differences that emerge out of the cultural 
narratives, theological sources, personal histories, and other contextual differences 
between the authors. When interlocutors recognize the reasons for their differences it 
makes negotiating the meaning of their shared world more productive, because they have 
a better idea of how to push and pull on the other in ways that may lead to new insights, 
rather than destructive conflicts or dead-end conversations. Dialogue gives a chance to 
assess what terms are negotiable, and which are not, for interlocutors and the persons 
they represent. Such dialogue is not aimed at conversion of the other, and is conducted in 
a free and equal exchange of ideas rather than in a situation where one interlocutor has 
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some power to coerce the other; it includes acceptance of the simple truth that persons 
from different cultural contexts, in this case ecological theologians, will not in the end 
think the same. Uniformity is not a reasonable or desirable goal of interfaith dialogue. 
However, in the negotiation of meaning and the sharing of perspectives, not only is there 
an opportunity for mutual enrichment and genuine learning, there is also a shared 
understanding that emerges and a knowledge of the semantic and conceptual field that 
exists at the intersection of the worlds of the interlocutors. This shared understanding 
allows the interlocutors (both individually and collaboratively) to fashion narratives, 
theories, and other forms of speech which can bring together their worlds in creative and 
meaningful ways, uniting persons from both worlds in common vision, shared purpose, 
and concerted action.  
In terms of facing the global ecological crisis, the ability to do theological ethics 
effectively at the intersections between different cultural, political, and religious worlds is 
essential. Dialogue between competent and authoritative representatives of different life 
worlds is the first step towards creating the shared understanding necessary to speak 
about the ecological crisis in mutually meaningful and effective ways. Such engagement 
could bring distinct peoples together to reach common goals, and to be transformed in the 
process of collaboration, without losing or degrading their distinctiveness in any way. 
Interfaith dialogue is not easy, nor can just anyone do it effectively. It takes patience, 
concentration, particular gifts, passion, knowledge, etc. Of course it can be popularized, 
but intellectual leaders are needed to take on this challenging discourse and practice this 
empathetic art. 
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Summary Overview 
 In this chapter we have reviewed the major themes that emerge in what might be 
called Sallie McFague’s first phase of ecological theology, in which she focuses on the 
problem of developing a functional cosmology that she believes would shape human 
attitudes and behaviors towards nature for the postmodern era in ways which would 
reverse humanity’s present course of destruction of nature. McFague suggests that we 
conceive of the world as God’s body, and move from a subject-object model to a subject-
subjects model of human-nature relationship. McFague critiques a Christian theology 
which presents a distant, overly transcendent God who controls the world but is not 
intimately related to it; her idea of the world as God’s body goes in the opposite direction 
by proposing a much more immanent God which is only subtly distinguishable from the 
world itself. This theological move complements her later articulation of the subject-
subjects model of human-nature relationship, insofar as both of these models seek to 
restore subjectivity and life to nature and to promote human love for the world of nature.  
McFague’s work explores different ways of combining theological reflection and 
postmodern science into a coherent, functional cosmology that could provide a new basis 
for human behavior in and towards nature. We have already begun to highlight the 
differences and tensions between McFague and Nasr in this regard. In chapter five, this 
comparison will be deepened and extended, focusing especially on differences and 
tensions in both authors’ attempts to integrate science and religion into a functional 
cosmology that captures the sacred dimensions of nature and the human-nature 
relationship. In chapter six, the focus will shift to the common ground of the authors.  
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And in chapter seven, the dissertation will conclude by pointing toward ways to 
creatively synthesize the ideas of the authors. Then it will suggest paths for further 
research and dialogue that could help create a functional dialogue between Christian and 
Muslim theologians and religious leaders who are concerned about the global ecological 
crisis. 
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CHAPTER 5  
MAJOR DIFFERENCES 
Introduction 
Though Sallie McFague and Seyyed Hossein Nasr are both seriously concerned 
with the spiritual crisis that has precipitated the ecological crisis, their approaches to this 
crisis differ radically and present considerable obstacles or roadblocks to dialogue and 
cooperation. The overarching tensions in their perspectives emerge from cultural, 
religious, and ideological differences. McFague, as an eco-feminist Christian theologian, 
brings a decidedly progressive approach to the theological task. She pursues a strategy of 
deconstructing and reconstructing metaphors and models for the God-world relationship 
in the Christian tradition in order to effectively address spiritual and ethical problems 
related to the ecological crisis. Nasr, as a Muslim thinker in the traditionalist or 
perennialist school, brings a very different set of tools to the problem of the ecological 
crisis; rather than  deconstructing or reconstructing elements of the Muslim tradition or 
any other religious tradition—a practice which in his point of view would violate the 
authority of Revelation and Tradition—Nasr attempts to recover traditional doctrines, 
practices, and views from Islam and other religious traditions that he believes address the 
problems at hand. Nasr’s theological method involves a good deal of comparative work 
between religious and philosophical traditions, with multiple witnesses being invoked to 
confirm the eternal validity of religious and philosophical truth claims about the nature of 
reality. He presents these claims not as mere human-constructed truths, but as truths that 
derive from the Divine Source, what he often refers to as the Principle or the Absolute. 
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In particular, two of the major areas of difference that emerge as roadblocks to 
dialogue between McFague and Nasr relate to how the authors address the relationship 
between religion and science, and to how they address God’s relationship to the world. 
Both McFague and Nasr are concerned with the relationship between religion and science 
because both are forces that shape our overall view of the natural world, our cosmology.            
For its part, cosmology has major implications for how we relate to the world, that is, our 
ethics in regard to nature. Both authors find the mechanistic and dualistic scientific 
worldview that developed in the West during the Enlightenment as a primary driver of 
the attitudes, technologies, and economic practices that have precipitated the ecological 
crisis. This common critique of Enlightenment science is, in fact, a core element of their 
common ground which will be explored in depth in the next chapter. This chapter will 
focus on how differently McFague and Nasr conceptualize the relationship between 
religion and science.  
Nasr envisions metaphysics as the supreme science which ultimately controls the 
natural sciences, and to which they must conform. McFague envisions religion and 
science as equal players in an intellectual dialogue where religion needs to adjust its truth 
claims to match the prevailing cosmology of contemporary science, especially the theory 
of evolution. For Nasr, evolutionary theory is false insofar as it contradicts concepts from 
traditional metaphysics regarding the cosmic hierarchy of the Great Chain of Being, 
where higher forms of life give birth to lower forms. Therefore, it needs to be adjusted to 
accord with metaphysics. For McFague, at least up until her fourth conversion (and the 
publication of Life Abundant in 2001) the opposite is true: evolutionary theory upends the 
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causality of the Great Chain of Being by suggesting that more complex forms of life and 
consciousness (which are higher on the Great Chain of Being) evolve from simpler forms 
of life (which are lower on the Great Chain of Being). McFague’s evolutionary 
conception of the origin of life follows Teilhard de Chardin’s concept of “spiritual 
evolution,” that spirit is “a function of matter”1 and that through the process of evolution 
“the world is advancing towards the spiritual.”2 Nasr, a traditionalist, favors hierarchy; 
McFague, a feminist, opposes hierarchy. This difference applies not only in their views 
regarding religion and science but also to their overall vision of the relationship of God 
and the world. For Nasr, God is above and beyond the world, that is, primarily 
transcendent; for McFague, God is primarily seen in the world, as immanent, and 
transcendent—not in the traditional sense of being beyond or apart from the world, but 
transcendently immanent. This difference has implications for both authors in terms of 
the ecological spirituality they suggest. McFague favors a spirituality that focuses on an 
experience of God as immanent within creation; she characteristically speaks of loving 
God through loving the world. Nasr favors a spirituality that focuses on experiencing God 
as a transcendent being beyond the world, and then through that otherworldly experience 
gaining an appreciation for the symbolic meaning of nature insofar as all creation points 
beyond itself to the Creator. One particularly thorny way this issue of God-world 
relationship surfaces between McFague and Nasr is in the issue of whether God ought to 
be imaged as the King of the world. McFague finds this metaphor or model of God to be 
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deeply problematic and dangerous, whereas Nasr finds McFague’s attempt to deconstruct 
this traditional model of God theologically unacceptable. 
This chapter highlights and explains these major differences that have indeed 
prevented meaningful dialogue between Nasr and McFague. However, as will be 
demonstrated in the coming chapters, despite these differences, it is quite possible to 
locate considerable common ground between Nasr and McFague’s diagnosis of and 
proposed solutions to the ecological crisis. McFague and Nasr differ in terms of the 
strategies they employ, but they are essentially addressing the same problem, the 
desacralization of nature. They view this problem through very specific cultural, 
ideological, and religious lenses, which lead them to see the problem differently and 
propose different solutions.  Nevertheless, they also perceive the problem in compatible 
ways and share in common their ultimate goal, the resacralization of nature. If they are 
both trying to get from the same point A to the same point B, there is surely a way for 
these authors to dialogue and cooperate in doing so while at the same time having 
significant ideological and religious differences about how exactly to accomplish their 
common goal.  
Nasr’s Critique of McFague 
 One of the most direct ways to understand the conflict and ideological obstacles 
between Sallie McFague and Seyyed Hossein Nasr is to consider Nasr’s explicit criticism 
of McFague in Religion and the Order of Nature, the text of his 1994 Cadbury Lectures 
at the University of Birmingham. These lectures followed closely after Nasr’s in-person 
encounter with McFague and her thought at the Spirit and Nature Symposium at 
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Middlebury College in 1991, where both presented lectures. Their reflections on the 
conference were also captured in a documentary on the conference, by Bill Moyers,  
which aired in 1991 on PBS. Their papers, along with those of thought leaders from other 
major faiths, were published in 1992 in Spirit and Nature: Why the Environment Is a 
Religious Issue.  
In the paper McFague contributed to Spirit and Nature, “A Square in the Quilt: 
One Theologian’s Contributions to the Planetary Agenda,” McFague emphasizes themes 
from her previously published works, Metaphorical Theology and Models of God, 
especially her critique of the monarchical model of God as King. However, even in this 
essay she does prefigure her major theological moves in The Body of God (yet to be 
published at that time) by commenting extensively about the need to embrace the 
common creation story of the big bang and evolution as a new cosmological context for a 
Christian understanding of God as creator. Sallie Mcfague, Thomas Berry, Mary Evelyn 
Tucker, and other environmental thinkers who use the term “common creation story” are 
inspired by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. McFague explicitly claims Teilhard de Chardin as 
a theological influence in The Body of God, a text which Nasr also cites in his review of 
McFague’s thought in Religion and the Order of Nature. In his critique of McFague’s 
ecological theology, Nasr does not explicitly label McFague’s work as being party to 
“Teilhardism,” although it does exhibit the defining trait of “Teilhardism”—the 
acceptance of evolutionary science as cosmological context. He instead focuses on other 
theological issues such as McFague’s metaphorical reading of the Bible and her 
suggestion of alternative models of God besides the patriarchal, monarchical model.  
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 Nasr critiques McFague’s concept of metaphorical theology in general and in 
particular seeks to invalidate her deconstruction of the monarchical model of God as 
king. Nasr takes issue with McFague’s theology, to begin with, because his concept of 
scripture and tradition is so different than hers. “For her the language of revelation is not 
itself sacred but is only metaphorical to be changed by theologians according to changing 
circumstances. The description of God in the Bible is finally only a “model” that she sets 
out to criticize and finally replace by another ‘model.’”3 Clearly, Nasr and McFague have 
very different norms for interpreting scripture. It is important to recognize that 
McFague’s theological method is controversial even within Christian theology. Many 
conservative and fundamentalist Christian theologians, and even mainstream Christian 
thinkers, would agree with Nasr’s point of view that scripture is sacred and that the 
description of God in the Bible is unalterable. However, it is also important to recognize 
that the Qur’an is very different than the Bible, and is less problematic (not 
unproblematic) when interpreted as a literal verbal revelation. The Bible does not present 
a single description of God, but rather a panoply of descriptions from distinct historical 
periods and communities; these descriptions often contradict each other in significant 
ways. The Qur’an, having only one prophet of origin, is much more internally consistent 
than the Bible and thus is much easier to regard as a revealed book. Of course many 
Christians do see the Bible in such terms and regard each word as revealed by God, but 
with the variety of genres in the Bible, including poetry, historical narrative, inventory 
lists and genealogies, letters written by and to humans, sometimes imaging a xenophobic 
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or narrowly tribal God, sometimes a universal God of humanity, etc., it is very difficult to 
view the Bible as a literal verbal revelation of God’s word. Among Christian theologians, 
for example, it is common to view even the synoptic gospels, which contain Jesus’ 
teachings in the most authentic form available, not as revelations but as witnesses to the 
revelation of God’s word in Jesus himself. It has often been suggested that the Qur’an in 
Islamic conception is more analogous to Jesus than to the Bible in Christian conception. 
Because of these differences between the texts of the Bible and the Qur’an, it is important 
to recognize that Christian and Muslim interlocutors in interfaith dialogue will often be 
working with very different underlying assumptions about the authority of their sacred 
texts and how to interpret them. This of course does not explain away the very real 
differences between McFague and Nasr’s views of scripture, but it does help to set them 
in context.  
Proceeding from his initial objection to her treatment of scripture in general, Nasr 
goes on to counter McFague’s suggestion for a new, extra-biblical theological model. 
McFague begins her criticism by attacking the “monarchical model” because it 
makes God distant from the world and concerns only human beings on the basis 
of domination, as if monotheisms did not consider God to be the king of the 
whole Universe and as if the majesty of God expressed in His role as king 
excluded His beauty and mercy. She also criticizes this “model” because it is 
hierarchical, a characteristic to which she is strongly opposed. Only in a world 
where the majesty of God is forgotten and the hierarchy which is innate to the 
nature of existence denied could the enfeebled vestiges of the symbol of kingship 
and its concomitant hierarchy be conceived as the cause of the environmental 
crisis, and the symbol of God as king, which is far from being limited to 
Christianity, reduced to a dangerous metaphor. One needs to remember that it is 
only now, when the very idea of majesty and hierarchy are being obliterated in the 
modern world, that the environment is being destroyed with an unprecedented 
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fury on the basis of not hierarchy and majesty but egalitarianism, materialism, and 
greed.
4
 
 
Nasr strongly disagrees with McFague’s criticism. The idea of getting rid of the 
monarchical model, which is so prevalent in the Qur’an, Bible, and sacred texts of other 
traditions, is unthinkable for Nasr. Nasr responds in the strongest terms, and it is obvious 
that he values the language of majesty for God as sacred and inviolable. Not only is the 
concept of God as king prevalent in the Qur’an and in Islam in general, one should also 
consider Nasr’s personal experience in Iran, where the fall of the Shah was disastrous for 
his life and, as he viewed it, unhelpful for the nation as a whole. It is easy to see why 
McFague’s rejection of monarchy provokes such a strong response from Nasr. Nasr’s 
conception of the universe, metaphysically and cosmologically speaking, is also 
hierarchical. McFague, like all eco-feminists, sees hierarchy (and in particular patriarchy) 
as a contributing factor in the ecological crisis. Nasr counters that egalitarianism is to 
blame; that is, the egalitarianism of consumer culture. In general, and this is important to 
note, McFague favors egalitarianism, Nasr favors hierarchy. That is a general ideological 
divide that pertains to the fact that McFague is a feminist, whereas Nasr is a traditionalist; 
or, to put it in other terms, McFague is post-modern in her sensibilities, and Nasr is pre-
modern. 
This ideological divide shapes the way these authors view not only God but also 
nature and knowledge, leading to sharp divergences in each category. McFague sees 
nature as a non-hierarchical web of life; she focuses on the idea of the interdependence of 
all beings and rejects the idea that humans are above or in any way separate from other 
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species. Nasr sees nature as innately hierarchical, arranged from top to bottom in the 
Great Chain of Being, with God at the top and matter at the bottom, and human beings 
distinctly above the rest of creation. In terms of knowledge, McFague consistently frames 
her perspective as being her truth that the reader is welcome to engage with in the 
creation of her or his own theology; she does not assume that she is an expert or that her 
theology is universally valid. Furthermore, she believes that all Christians should be 
engaged in the theological task. Nasr, on the other hand, sees his theology as an 
expression of the absolute truth. For him, theology and metaphysics cannot and will not 
be understood by the masses, but such knowledge is rather reserved for the few who are 
qualified and capable. He emphasizes his status as someone who knows what he is 
talking about, who is both intellectually and spiritually qualified, and has the legitimate 
authority to make the claims he does. Another example of this general ideological 
difference, in regards to knowledge, is the way that Nasr and McFague conceive of the 
relationship of science and religion. For Nasr, metaphysics is the supreme science dealing 
with the highest plane of reality, the divine, and all other sciences that deal with the 
physical world are seen as below and subordinate to metaphysics. For McFague, at least 
in her first period of writing, theology and science are equal players on a fundamentally 
flat field of knowledge; their relationship is defined by mutual give and take rather than 
hierarchically, where one has power to limit or control the other.  
Eco-Feminism and Traditionalism 
Although Nasr notes briefly that McFague is a theologian who “combine(s) 
concerns of feminism with Christian theology,” he does not seem to be fully aware of the 
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larger discourse of eco-feminism that shapes McFague’s work. Nasr appears to assume 
that McFague’s departure from patriarchal Biblical language arises merely out of her 
concern for the ecological crisis. 
Her compassion for the world of nature and her awareness of the acuteness of the 
environmental crisis cause her to forgo rather easily the perennial description of 
God as contained in the Bible and also mentioned explicitly by Christ, as at the 
beginning of the Lord’s Prayer with its patriarchal language. Could one in fact 
change “Our Father who art in Heaven” to something else such as “Our Mother 
who art in or on Earth” without destroying the very channels through which 
Christianity has revealed its message? In Islam the Names al-Rabb (the Lord) and 
al-Malik (the King) are Names of God, sacred not only in their meaning but also 
in their form, and it is beyond the power of man to change them even for what 
might appear to be a worthy purpose. The equating of symbol in its traditional 
sense as contained in revealed descriptions of God of Himself with metaphor to 
be changed at will by humans is, to say the least, most problematic from the 
traditional theological point of view.
5
 
 
For Nasr, McFague departs from revealed patriarchal language for God for the sake of 
the environment. Nasr acknowledges what he sees as the good intensions of “compassion 
for the world of nature and her awareness of the acuteness of the environmental crisis” 
that lead her to make this move. However, he finds this move highly problematic insofar 
as it reduces sacred symbol to mere metaphor. For Nasr, this type of theological move is 
self-defeating because, as a traditionalist, he believes that making such changes would 
break the connection between Christianity and the Sacred which is mediated by Christian 
revelation. As a traditionalist his modus operandi is to preserve traditional religious forms 
that mediate between humanity and the Divine source of traditional religious forms.  
However, for McFague, as a feminist Christian, the meaning of such a 
deconstruction of traditional patriarchal language is very different than what it means to 
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Nasr or what he supposes it means to her. It is not a move that cuts one off from the 
source of revelation, but rather a move that allows women to participate in religion 
without feeling self-alienated, excluded, belittled, or oppressed. From Nasr’s point of 
view, the fact that Judaism and Christianity, as well as Islam and Hinduism, feature 
monarchical language for the deity, further cements the legitimacy of this language: if 
undermining Christianity’s monarchical language for God calls into question not only the 
Bible but the sacred texts and doctrines of several other major faith traditions, then such a 
theological move must be illegitimate. According to the traditionalist doctrine that all 
great faiths come from the same source, the fact that several agree on patriarchal and 
monarchical language for God further affirms the authenticity of this language as indeed 
issuing from the divine principle itself.  
For McFague and other feminist theologians, however, patriarchal language for 
God is not divinely ordained, but rather socially constructed by males who are complicit 
in the oppression of women via the system of patriarchy, a global system. Consider, for 
example, this statement from Mary Daly’s Gyn/Ecology: 
Patriarchy is itself the prevailing religion of the entire planet, and its essential 
message is necrophilia. All of the so-called religions legitimating patriarchy are 
mere sects subsumed under its vast umbrella/canopy. They are essentially 
similar, despite the variations. All—from buddhism and hinduism to islam, 
judaism, christianity, to secular derivatives such as freudianism, jungianism, 
marxism, and maoism—are infrastructures of the edifice of patriarchy. All are 
erected as parts of the male’s shelter against anomie. And the symbolic message 
of all the sects of the religion which is patriarchy is this: Women are the dreaded 
anomie. Consequently, women are the objects of male terror, the projected 
personifications of “The Enemy,” the real objects under attack in all the wars of 
patriarchy.
6
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Daly’s theology shows how a feminist perspective on patriarchy in traditional world 
religions can yield a much sharper opposition to Nasr’s traditionalist perspective than, for 
example, McFague’s does. Nasr views these religions (excluding their “secular 
derivatives”), with their patriarchal symbolism and organizational structures, as deriving 
from a common divine source. Daly views these religions not as divinely inspired or 
ordained, but as part and parcel of the oppressive system of global patriarchy, a system 
that subjugates women worldwide and is also chiefly responsible for the corresponding 
control, objectification, oppression, and destruction of nature. Because McFague’s 
ecological theology is intimately linked to the larger discourse of eco-feminism, 
including authors such as Mary Daly, it is important to situate her work in that context.  
McFague’s solution to the problem of patriarchal language in Christianity is to 
seek alternative metaphors and models, noting how traditional monarchical and father 
language can be problematic. This seems radical to a traditionalist such as Nasr. In light 
of Mary Daly’s approach—which goes far beyond deconstructing certain metaphors and 
models within Christianity by delegitimizing the entire religion along with all other 
patriarchal religions—McFague’s proposal can rightly be seen as moderate within the 
context of eco-feminism, generally speaking. McFague’s theology is one that 
intentionally affirms the validity of Christianity and, by implication, other world 
religions, while at the same time bringing a firm feminist critique of Christianity. 
McFague’s deconstruction of the traditional biblical model of God as king of the world is 
a move that restores the credibility of Christian religion for an audience that 
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acknowledges the problem of patriarchy and will not accept a God that is imaged as a 
patriarchal figure who implicitly supports the structures and norms of patriarchy. 
Feminist or even simply progressive Christian theologians need not have an 
ecological concern to justify moving away from patriarchal biblical language. Apart from 
any concern about the environment, in many Protestant theological circles the issue of 
male language for God and humanity is hotly contested as being sexist. At the time of the 
writing of this dissertation, the norm throughout academia in the United States, at least, is 
to speak of “humanity” rather than “man,” and to balance the use of the generic pronouns 
“he” and “she”; also, in liberal seminaries and churches, it has become quite normal to 
use gender-neutral or gender-balanced language for God, whether using the word “God” 
in place of “He” and “Him,” or calling God alternately She, He, Mother, Father, etc. 
McFague and Nasr are playing by very different rules when it comes to the use of male 
language not only for God but also for humanity. This has been a rather contentious issue 
throughout academia, especially in Protestant seminaries where one often hears the 
argument that Nasr presents about the scriptural provenance of male language for God 
and humanity, and how departing from this language undermines scripture’s authority. 
However, it should be noted that in McFague’s academic and ecclesial context, Nasr’s 
style of patriarchal anthropological and theological language was certainly out of favor in 
the 1990’s when Religion and the Order of Nature was published, and is even more out 
of favor at the time of this writing. In Muslim religious circles, however, male language 
for God and humanity is much less contested. 
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 McFague and Nasr are swimming in different waters in terms of norms for 
general usage of male language for God and humanity. Nasr does not acknowledge this 
problem. Also, although he is apparently aware that McFague’s work emerges out of the 
discourse of eco-feminism, including such notable works as Carolyn Merchant’s The 
Death of Nature and Mary Daly’s Gyn/Ecology, Nasr does not engage this discourse in 
detail. He writes, 
One of the strands of thought that has sought to combine the concern with the 
environment with feminism is “eco-feminism,” which identifies the subjugation 
of the Earth in Western civilization with the suppression of women, some of its 
exponents questioning the very structure of Christianity as it has existed during 
the past two millennia. Others have left formal Christianity in favor of “earthy” 
religions, the revival of sorcery and magic, earth-goddess figures and the like, 
with which, as already mentioned, we are not concerned with here.
7
 
 
It is somewhat difficult to get an accurate reading of McFague without being concerned 
with authors such as Mary Daly, quoted above, who sharply criticize the patriarchalism 
of the Bible: not only its male language for God, but also on a deeper level, its patriarchal 
ethical and social norms, narratives, and attitudes. Carolyn Merchant’s The Death of 
Nature is another text which has had a considerable influence on McFague’s thinking. 
Merchant argues that the rise of scientific and commercial activity based on the 
domination and exploitation of Earth was enabled by radical shifts in cosmological views 
in Western Europe, from an organismic view of nature as a living mother, to a 
mechanistic world view of nature as a soulless machine.  
The ancient identity of nature as a nurturing mother links women’s history with 
the history of the environment and ecological change. The female earth was 
central to the organic cosmology that was undermined by the Scientific 
Revolution and the rise of a market-oriented culture in early modern Europe. The 
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ecology movement has reawakened interest in the values and concepts associated 
historically with the premodern organic world. The ecological model and its 
associated ethics make possible a fresh and critical interpretation of the rise of 
modern science in the crucial period when our cosmos ceased to be viewed as an 
organism and became instead a machine.
8
 
 
In investigating the roots of our current environmental dilemma and its 
connection to science, technology, and the economy, we must reexamine the 
formation of a world view and a science that, by reconceptualizing reality as a 
machine rather than a living organism, sanctioned the domination of both nature 
and women. The contributions of such founding “fathers” of modern science as 
Francis Bacon, William Harvey, Rene Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, and Isaac 
Newton must be reevaluated. The fate of other options, alternative philosophies, 
and social groups shaped by the organic world view and resistant to the growing 
exploitative mentality needs reappraisal.
9
 
 
In many ways, Sallie McFague’s work picks up on the research agenda Carolyn Merchant 
defines in The Death of Nature. McFague employs key phrases that Merchant uses, such 
as “the ecological model” and “organic world view,” as she seeks to sketch out a 
contemporary Christian vision of the world as a living organism, that is, God’s body.  It 
is significant to observe that McFague does not opt to image the world as being feminine 
per se, although she does strongly favor an organic model. Furthermore, her critiques of 
the science, technology, and economic practices that are legitimized by the mechanistic 
model of the universe closely follow Merchant’s. McFague’s understanding of the ethical 
implications of the model she proposes is also close to Merchant’s understanding of how 
our models of the world imply our ethics. As she argues throughout The Death of Nature, 
the organic model of the universe encouraged ethical restraint in terms of human use of 
natural goods. 
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Controlling images operate as ethical restraints or as ethical sanctions—as subtle 
“oughts” or “ought-nots…” It is important to recognize the normative import of 
descriptive statements about nature. Contemporary philosophers of language have 
critically reassessed the earlier positivist distinction between the “is” of science 
and the “ought” of society, arguing that descriptions and norms are not opposed to 
one another by linguistic separation into separate “is” and “ought” statements, but 
are contained within each other. Descriptive statements about the world can 
presuppose the normative; they are then ethic-laden.
10
 
 
Such presuppositions about the ethical importance of descriptions of nature drive 
McFague’s project of deconstructing and reconstructing models and metaphors for the 
God-world relation. For McFague, it is essential to Christian ecological ethics that God 
be imaged in such a way that God is intimately related to Earth; therefore, she favors 
metaphors and models of God that emphasize God’s immanence in the world rather than 
God’s transcendence above the world. In the model of the world as God’s body, God’s 
spirit animates the world, which is conceived as a sacred, living body.  
Moral restraints were thus clearly affiliated with the Renaissance image of the 
female earth and were strengthened by associations with greed, avarice, and lust. 
But the analogies were double edged…Sanctioning mining sanctioned the rape or 
commercial exploration of the earth—a clear illustration of how constraints can 
change to sanctions through the demise of frameworks and their associated values 
as the needs, wants, and purposes of society change. The organic framework, in 
which the Mother Earth image was a moral restraint against mining, was literally 
undermined by the new commercial activity.
11
 
 
The process of mechanizing the world picture removed the controls over 
environmental exploitation that were an inherent part of the organic view that 
nature was alive, sensitive, and responsive to human action.
12
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McFague’s theology draws upon feminist discourse in ways that produce tension with 
Nasr’s thought, but also in ways that contribute to their common ground, especially their 
mutual opposition to the mechanization of the world during the Renaissance.  
For the purposes of a mutually enriching and constructive dialogue between 
figures such as McFague and Nasr, it is vital for both interlocutors to understand the 
contexts in which the other is operating, so as to be able to evaluate where he or she 
stands in relation to his or her audience. The distinctly Christian character of McFague’s 
theology could be lost on a reader who does not see how it relates to the larger body of 
feminist literature related to Christianity and the ecological crisis. Nasr apparently views 
McFague’s work in a rhetorical vacuum, that is, without specific knowledge of feminist 
discourse; therefore, he may misinterpret her work as invalidating key Christian symbols 
and the doctrine of revelation, blind to the significance of deposing God as king because 
of good intentions to save the planet. He does not recognize how she makes careful 
theological and rhetorical moves to situate her eco-feminist theology within the Christian 
tradition. The fact that Nasr does not explore eco-feminist sources in depth puts him at a 
disadvantage in terms of understanding McFague’s thought. 
 However, it is important to highlight that McFague’s feminist influences and 
identity do not merely cause her to espouse views that conflict with Nasr’s. The theories 
and approaches of other eco-feminist authors who have influenced McFague, especially 
Carolyn Merchant, supply McFague with ideas that she shares with Nasr. In fact, 
Merchant’s critique of the rise of a mechanistic worldview, and her lament of the loss of 
the organic world view (which identifies Earth as mother) actually mirrors in many ways 
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Nasr’s perspective, including his repeated lament (so common in ecological justice 
discourse) of the “rape of nature.” Clearly, patriarchal domination of women, including 
rape culture, mirrors the oppression of nature, especially since nature is so often seen as a 
woman. McFague draws heavily on Merchant in formulating her postmodern eco-
theology of the world as God’s body. She is clearly trying to bring back a form of an 
organic rather than mechanical worldview, while at the same time editing out the 
anthropocentric and humanly gender-specific aspects of this organic model in early 
iterations of the model in Western history. She is going for a world as God’s body that 
does not highlight the human body, much less the female body, but raises awareness of 
all bodies. Whereas other feminist authors and activists concerned with the environment 
are trying specifically to revive goddess worship in the tradition of European paganism, 
McFague is taking earlier models of the Earth as Mother and appropriating elements of 
them for a new theology of the world as God’s body which she carefully constructs 
within the parameters of Christian thought. This discussion will have to be taken up 
further in the next chapter, which focuses on their common ground. Feminist discourse is 
complex, and the elements McFague draws from this discourse sometimes put her in 
opposition to Nasr’s traditionalism, and sometimes contribute to their common ground. 
Rhetorical Questions – A Reflective Interlude 
Nasr’s engagement with McFague’s work is more in the mode of refutation than 
dialogue. The one point where he finds agreement with McFague is in terms of how 
seriously she takes the crisis. In a summary of McFague’s description of the ecological 
crisis, Nasr does not advance any criticism, which signals his basic agreement. 
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She mentions the necessity of stressing Creation rather than simply personal 
redemption while reminding us that the evil within us manifested in selfishness, 
greed, etc., is real and a sin in the Christian meaning of the term. The destruction 
of the environment is in fact the result of sin in the theological sense. 
Consequently, human beings must first of all admit their role in the despoiling of 
the planet, and, second, realize their responsibility for preserving the community 
of life. There must be a general repentance, and the “planetary agenda” must be 
the top concern of all religions.
13
 
 
Nasr’s apparent agreement with McFague’s basic understanding of the problem of the 
ecological crisis and her call for radical transformation and religious responses has deep 
resonances with Nasr’s own position. This alone could be a basis for dialogue and 
cooperation. These authors can find mutual respect in the fact that they are both taking 
the ecological crisis very seriously, even while recognizing how their different religious 
and ideological backgrounds orient them to the same task very differently. As will be 
demonstrated, these authors have substantial common ground in their visions of 
resacralization, something that Nasr does not recognize in his brief notes on McFague’s 
theology in Religion and the Order of the Sacred. There is an overarching common 
ground that spans problem and solution that, if identified as a basis for mutual respect in 
dialogue, could become a launch pad for cooperation between these two authors. Insofar 
as they are prominent thought leaders of the Christian and Muslim communities on the 
topic of the ecological crisis, the functionality of their conversation might support 
dialogue and cooperation between the constituencies they represent. 
Questions arise at this point about authorial priorities that emerge in this 
exploration of the tensions between McFague and Nasr. What is Nasr’s primary purpose, 
to promote the ideology of traditionalism or to conserve and protect nature? What is 
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McFague’s primary purpose, to deconstruct Christian patriarchy or to conserve and 
protect nature? Do these authors simply attach pre-existing ideological agendas and 
purposes to the issue of the ecological crisis in order to increase the urgency and 
relevancy of these pre-existing ideological agendas? To what extent are the authors 
willing and able to modify their ideologies which they inherit from earlier figures and 
share with living communities of discourse, or rather subordinate them to the emerging 
need to avert, reverse, or slow down the ecological crisis?  
These are mainly rhetorical questions to which there is no direct answer. Both 
authors are assumed to be sincere in terms of advancing their ideological positions 
regarding the proper way to interpret scripture, the use of gendered language for God, the 
relation of religion and science, etc., while at the same time being sincere in their concern 
to understand the causes of the ecological crisis and address them. It would be inauthentic 
for the authors to bracket out their cultural, theological, and ideological identities in 
addressing the ecological crisis. However, what is problematic is that the authors have 
not been able to effectively discern their common ground regarding the ecological crisis, 
and thus engage in collaborative discourse (let alone action) because of their competing 
and contradictory ideological agendas, with which they are apparently preoccupied.  
As the ecological crisis worsens, it is quite possible that the next generation of 
ecologically concerned and motivated theologians will be much more willing and able to 
subordinate their ideological purposes and concerns, so that it becomes clearer that they 
are primarily concerned or ultimately concerned with the ecological crisis, at least when 
that is the subject about which they are writing or dialoging. Were the ecological crisis 
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more clearly the ultimate or absolute concern of interfaith interlocutors from very 
different contexts, contextual differences might well become more manageable, 
especially if a basic project of moving from a desacralized to a resacralized picture of the 
natural world were to be established as the common project of the interlocutors. My 
argument is that such a basis for productive and cooperative dialogue between Nasr and 
McFague is discernable, in hindsight and with much research, though it was not detected 
by the authors themselves through the thicket of charged ideological differences 
described in this chapter. 
Science and Evolution 
One of the most remarkable areas of difference between the environmental 
theology of Sallie McFague and Seyyed Hossein Nasr regards the relationship of religion 
and science. Both thinkers seek to define a functional cosmology, where religion and 
science complement each other in describing the universe. Nasr speaks of “the need for a 
sacred science.” McFague speaks about the need for a “functional cosmology,” and a 
religion that incorporates contemporary scientific knowledge. Nasr, positing that 
traditional religious truth is unchangeable, argues that the physical and biological 
sciences find their place in the hierarchy of sacred science, where theology or 
metaphysics rules supreme as the ultimate science. McFague, viewing religion and 
science as equal players on an egalitarian field of knowledge, puts more emphasis on 
deconstructing and reconstructing theology to incorporate the truth claims of 
contemporary science. The basic tension that emerges here is that, in seeking unity 
between science and religion, Nasr emphasizes that science must change to conform to 
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religious truth claims, and McFague emphasizes that religion must change to conform to 
scientific truth claims. This chapter will explore the contextual and theological 
differences that cause these two thinkers to approach the same problem so differently.  
McFague’s and Nasr’s disagreement over the relationship between religion and 
science is exemplified by their conflict regarding the theory of evolution. One of 
McFague’s major influences, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, firmly supported and 
participated in the development of evolutionary theory, and believed that Christian 
theology needed to be substantially reconfigured and conceptualized to complement the 
emerging story of evolution. On the other hand, Nasr’s major influence in the theory of 
the relationship between religion and science, the Perennialist author Frithjof Schuon, 
scathingly criticized Teilhard de Chardin for betraying the eternal truths of religion to 
what he saw as the distorted worldview of reductionist science. While for McFague 
Teilhard is a pioneer of ecological theology who helped her integrate her “two loves”—
for God and the world—for Nasr he is a misguided theologian who has created a new 
heresy by combining Christianity and evolution. In fact, not only does Nasr reject the 
idea that Christianity and evolution somehow complement each other, he furthermore 
rejects evolution altogether on philosophical and scientific grounds. Whereas McFague 
wants to embrace evolutionary theory, and incorporate its insights into her ecological 
theology, Nasr wants to discredit it.  
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin was the first Christian theologian to advance an experimental 
theology which blended the idea of evolution with traditional Christian theology. It will 
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be useful to sketch a couple of themes of Teilhard’s thought which figure prominently in 
McFague’s work: the compatibility of evolutionary thought and Christian theology, and 
the idea of having faith in and loving God and the World simultaneously.
14
  
Surely the two terms – faith in the world and faith in God – so far from being 
antagonistic, are structurally complementary? On one side, represented by modern 
humanism, we have a sort of neo-paganism, bursting with life, but still 
‘acephalous’ – headless. On the other, in the form of Christianity, we have a head 
in which the blood no longer circulates at the necessary speed. On one, the 
fantastically enlarged stratified surfaces of a cone which are nevertheless capable 
of closing up on themselves: a cone that has no apex. On the other, an apex which 
has lost its base: two detached parts, it is plain, that clamour to be joined 
together.
15
 
 
For Teilhard, Christianity and evolution fit together like pieces in a puzzle. The one 
completes the other, Christianity (corresponding to faith in God) gives a higher meaning 
to evolution, and evolution (corresponding to faith in the world) gives substance and 
energy to Christianity. For Teilhard, the two “faiths” here are not incompatible but 
destined to be synthesized into a new form of Christianity. McFague, in the first period of 
her ecological theology, follows Teilhard in promoting the unification of Christianity and 
evolution. 
It is important to note, however, that for McFague, the coming together of 
Christianity and evolutionary thought, or faith in God and the world, serves a very 
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different purpose than it does for Teilhard. McFague of course believes that this merger 
will help bring about the development of an ecological Christianity that supports a robust 
ecological ethics. For McFague, the crisis that calls for integration of faith in God and 
faith in the world is the ecological crisis. For Teilhard, the crisis is more of an existential 
and institutional religious crisis concerning his own faith and the vitality of the Christian 
religion.  
In other words what we must recognize in this present crisis, in which we can see 
and feel the confrontation between the traditional Christian forces and the modern 
forces of evolution, is simply the permutations of a providential and indispensable 
inter-fertilization. I am sure that this is so; but in that case it is clear that if the 
synthesis is to be effected Christianity must, without modifying the position of its 
peak, open up its axes to include in its totality the new surge of religious energy 
which is rising from below in its effort to be sublimated.
16
 
 
For Teilhard, Christianity’s incorporation of evolutionary theory and faith in the world in 
general will not only resolve his own existential intellectual crisis issuing from his 
allegiance to Christianity and evolutionary biology. This integration will also strengthen 
the Christian faith in its institutional dimension, and lead it to surpass all other religions. 
The two vectors, or components as they are better called, veer and draw together 
until they give a possible resultant. The supernaturalizing Christian Above is 
incorporated (not immersed) in the human Ahead! And at the same time Faith in 
God, in the very degree in which it assimilates and sublimates within its own 
spirit the spirit of Faith in the World, regains all its power to attract and convert! 
I said at the beginning of this paper that the human world of today has not grown 
cold, but that it is ardently searching for a God proportionate to the new 
dimensions of a Universe whose appearance has completely revolutionized the 
scale of our faculty of worship…But let there be revealed to us the possibility of 
believing at the same time and wholly in God and the World, the one through the 
other; let this belief burst forth, as it is ineluctably in process of doing under the 
pressure of these seemingly opposed forces, and then, we may be sure of it, a 
great flame will illumine all things: for a Faith will have been born (or reborn) 
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containing and embracing all others—and, inevitably, it is the strongest Faith 
which sooner or later must possess the Earth.
17
 
 
McFague does not follow Teilhard’s argument insofar as he argues that unifying 
Christianity with evolution will expand the influence and popularity of Christianity. For 
McFague, the goal of integrating Christianity and the common creation story is to create 
a functional cosmology that would allow Christians to view the world and treat the world 
in ways which help to mitigate and reverse the ecological crisis. Consistently, McFague 
presents her ecological theology not as one with irresistible power to convert others but 
as her own belief, her square in the quilt of faith, that may or may not be compelling to 
others.  
For McFague, Teilhard’s work is so valuable because it represents the first 
attempt to Christianize the story of evolution, to integrate theology and science. 
Teilhard’s “acheivements as a scientist and theologian” are not as important as “that 
aspect of his work concerned with internalizing the new scientific story that was just 
emerging in his time.” McFague writes: “While one aspect of his work was a strong 
natural theology to show the convergence of evolutionary and theological purpose, 
another, and I believe more important, contribution was his attempt to remythologize the 
new creation story from a Christian perspective.”18 With this assessment, McFague 
distances herself from the specific conclusions of Teilhard’s natural theology, and adopts 
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instead the general purpose of integrating science and religion into a functional 
cosmology. 
Teilhard’s distinctive contribution was his attempt to internalize the new creation 
story from a Christian perspective in a series of often outrageous metaphors, such 
as, for instance, the bread and wine of the eucharist as embodying in nuce the 
entire universe: “There is but one single mass in the world: the true Host, the total 
Host, is the universe which is continually being more intimately penetrated and 
vivified by Christ.” Christ and matter, Christianity and evolutionary history, are 
reimagined together through the metaphor of the eucharist. My point is not that 
Teilhard’s remythologizing of the new creation story was entirely successful; 
rather, it is that he attempted it at all.
19
 
 
McFague then, draws on the methods of Teilhard, but not his conclusions. Even in the 
space of a half century between Teilhard and McFague much has shifted scientifically, so 
that his specific ideas regarding how Christianity and evolutionary theory might be 
combined need to be reworked. McFague looks more to postmodern science than to 
modern science, rejecting scientific reductionism in favor of a holistic scientific 
perspective that takes better account of the complexity and interconnectedness of nature. 
In the Body of God, McFague describes how her integration of science and religion is 
related to that of Teilhard de Chardin. 
In a way similar to Teilhard’s project, it will try to embody the new creation story 
metaphorically, using the contributions of both contemporary science and 
Christian faith, for the organic model comes from and is enriched by both science 
and Christianity. Unlike some versions of natural theology that operate by reason 
alone (finding their material in the sciences) and unlike some theologies of nature 
that rely on faith alone (finding their material in revelation), our theology of 
nature will be dialectical.
20
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As already noted in chapter 4, the proportion of scientific input to revelatory input in 
McFague’s cosmological construction changes throughout her career. In The Body of 
God, which is her major treatment of this subject, revelation plays a less prominent role. 
After her fourth conversion where God is revealed to McFague as love and reality in 
potent and consistent mystical experiences, the scales tip in favor of revelation as the 
defining factor of McFague’s cosmology. But at this stage in our essay, we are reflecting 
as it were on a snapshot of the conflict between McFague and Nasr in this regard, through 
analyzing Nasr’s explicit critique of McFague in Religion and the Order of Nature.  
Conflicts Between Teilhard and Traditionalism 
 One consistent aspect of Teilhard’s evolutionary theology is a theme of Christian 
triumphalism, conceived of in terms of Christianity’s superior evolutionary fitness: “And 
yet is not Christianity today the only human current in sight in which faith (essential for 
the future of all anthropogenesis) in a personal and personalizing centre of the universe is 
alive and has some chance of surviving?”21 For Teilhard, Christianity is the only religion 
that will be able to combine with evolution and continue to survive through this major 
shift in scientific perspectives on the universe. In one passage, Teilhard compares 
Christianity (among other religions) as the one “species” destined for the next stage of 
humanity’s evolution, just as a certain line of primates at the end of the Tertiary period 
could be seen to be different and more advanced than the rest. 
At that time (that is, about a million years ago) an informed observer might have 
been able to recognize, from countless anatomical and psychical indications, that 
a particular hominoid line or fascicle contained in itself the promises of the future. 
Similarly, I would say, it is indisputable (if we know how to look) that a 
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difference and a radical advance can easily be distinguished, which permanently 
sets the ‘Christian phenomenon’ apart from every single one of the other 
‘religious phenomena’ among which it appeared but which it has continually, ever 
since its origins, been striving to shake off.
22
  
 
For Teilhard Christianity has been evolving in a superior fashion to other religions. In the 
above quotation, he presents Christianity in competition with other “religious 
phenomena.”  He images Christianity as “striving to shake off” these competing religions 
much as a particular line of racially superior hominoids distinguished themselves from 
the rest in the process of competitive evolution. This presents a striking contrast to the 
Perennialist or Traditionalist story about the relationship of world religions and 
philosophies.  
For the Perennialist the variety of religious and cultural forms are complementary 
in reflecting the infinite nature of the Absolute. Teilhard’s evolutionary story has 
dangerous implications in that the religious superiority he argues for can quickly be 
translated into an implied cultural or racial superiority of Western society and Europeans 
in general. Furthermore, it is a perspective that does not encourage interreligious 
dialogue, especially not in the sense of seeking common ground with other faiths. 
Instead, Teilhard’s rhetoric encourages a winner-take-all approach to comparative 
religious thought. It inserts an element of competition by presenting the blending of 
Christianity with evolution as something that would distinguish it from its religious peers 
in the game of evolution and enable it to fulfill its destiny of surpassing and displacing 
other religions. 
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Today every other religion is mercilessly halted in its stride by the obstacle of a 
universe that has become so organic and so demanding that it outruns or 
disheartens most of the great mystical intuitions of the past; Christianity, 
however, rises effortlessly above this situation, carried along by the very 
conditions, so profoundly changed, of thoughts and action to which the most 
eminent of its rivals cannot succeed in accommodating themselves.
23
 
 
While Nasr does not raise an objection to this strand of Teilhard’s thought, it nevertheless 
represents another pronounced difference with Nasr’s traditionalist stance. Surely this 
aspect of Teilhard’s thought, which traditionalist authors have not explicitly engaged, 
would make it quite difficult for a non-Christian reader to digest. In attempting to win 
over a Christian audience with a triumphalist and colonialist mindset, Teilhard advances 
sentiments that could only be seen as toxic to Muslim traditionalists who value all 
religions as essentially equal and who are highly resistant to Western colonialism. 
Teilhard is at odds with the traditionalist school not only because of the way in 
which he proposes to mix religion and science, but also because of his exclusivist, 
triumphalist interpretation of Christianity. For Teilhard the telos of his work is the growth 
of the church in relevancy, numbers, and intellectual activity. Teilhard envisions 
Christianity out-evolving all other religions and becoming the faith that will dominate on 
Earth and displace others. In Christianity and Evolution, Teilhard asserts: “In other 
words, the Christian faith can hope to dominate the earth tomorrow only if, while being 
already alone in a position to amortize the universe, it also proves itself to our reason to 
be alone capable of completely valorizing the stuff of the world and its evolution.”24 In 
the Traditionalist school, on the other hand, the major world religious traditions are 
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equally valued, and Nasr seeks to call Christianity into harmony with other traditional 
religions such as Islam rather than seeking to have Christianity move ahead of the pack 
on its own, so to speak.  
 One does not find this theory of the evolutionary edge Christianity stands to gain 
or solidify over other religions by incorporating the theory of evolution into its theology 
in thinkers such as Thomas Berry or Sallie McFague, at least not stated explicitly. Yet 
there is a kind of residue of this line of thinking that lingers. In the rhetoric of the 
“common creation story,” and the new spirituality that will incorporate this story, one 
often gets the sense that traditional religions that cannot incorporate the new story will be 
left behind as maladaptive. Because Teilhard believed that Christianity alone was 
destined to incorporate evolution into its theology and become the only relevant world 
religion in an increasingly scientific age, his thought developed in isolation from dialogue 
with other faiths. Mary Evelyn Tucker, a follower of Teilhard and Berry, has attempted to 
correct Teilhard’s Christian exclusivism by talking about how the religions of the world 
are entering their “ecological phase.”25 Through her publishing efforts, especially the 
Ecology and World Religions series that has chronicled ecological theology in so many 
major world religions, she has worked to close this gap in Teilhard’s original analysis. 
Tucker understands the importance of interreligious solidarity. However, in her 
articulation of a universal spirituality rooted in the common creation story, inspired by 
Teilhard and Berry, she does not seem to have solved the problem that Teilhard 
intuitively grasped but handled in a regrettable way: that the theory of evolution would be 
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difficult to integrate into world religions, perhaps even more difficult than integrating it 
into Christianity.  
What Teilhard realized was that a Christianity integrated with the evolutionary 
story as a new creation myth would become much less like other religions. Because 
evolution and the common creation story are Western scientific creations there is an 
inescapable element of colonialist domination in the idea that all religions ought to or will 
accept this particular scientific worldview and mythology as a new basis of understanding 
the God-human-world relationships. In Teilhard this colonialist attitude is stated 
explicitly in his vision of Christianity dominating Earth through its superiority in 
incorporating evolutionary theory. As progressive as it may sound to promote the 
acceptance of the new creation story by Christianity or even all religions, the problem of 
colonialism and a European superiority complex pervades the whole project. On the other 
hand, one aspect of Nasr’s theology, and that of traditionalist thought in general, is to 
push back against such a totalizing European scientific worldview.  
In The Body of God McFague affirms Berry’s definition of “functional 
cosmology” as she adopts the common creation story as the cosmological basis for her 
model of the world as God’s body.26 
[Berry] claims, rightly I believe, that most contemporary people do not have a 
story of the cosmos that on a daily basis helps them understand how they and 
other created beings fit into the scheme of things. The Genesis myth used to be 
such a working cosmology but is no longer helpful for most of us. The common 
creation story, says Berry, is a narrative that all people on the earth can know 
about and affirm not only as their own story but the story of all other people and 
all other living creatures. We can once again, he says, have a sense of belonging, 
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not as the lords over creation, but as the ones in whom the universe has become 
conscious.
27
 
 
Throughout The Body of God McFague echoes themes from both Teilhard and Berry, 
especially the concept of spirit emerging from matter, and the higher emerging from the 
lower (ideas Nasr adamantly opposes). For McFague these themes are useful for the 
ecological agenda in terms of emphasizing the value of the material world of bodies, and 
also because they challenge typical anthropocentric notions that human beings are above 
other creatures and the world of matter in general. In the quotation above, where 
McFague describes Berry’s understanding of the “common creation story,” one can see 
that this new, science-based cosmology—one might call it “the Big Bang and evolution 
myth”—is meant to displace the religious-based cosmology of “the Genesis myth.” The 
way McFague speaks of “most contemporary people” not having a “working 
cosmology,” and of the “Genesis myth…no longer [being] helpful for most of us”, shows 
that she and Berry are thinking primarily of what this new myth will mean to a Western, 
post-Christian audience. Nasr writes for a Muslim audience for whom the traditional 
Quranic creation story, which in many ways mirrors the Genesis account, is much more 
alive than in the post-Christian West. In a post-Christian West, the introduction of this 
new myth might be less problematic because the traditional creation myth has already 
waned in influence to the point that it is no longer generally functional. However, in the 
Muslim world, where the traditional religious myth is much more functional (though 
Nasr argues that in many cases it is not functioning, and Western values are dictating 
behavior in the Muslim world), there is less space for this type of new cosmology that 
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directly contradicts the story of God’s creation in the Quran and traditional Muslim 
metaphysics. 
Nasr argues that acceptance of this modern Western perspective threatens 
traditional cultures of Muslim nations and other peoples, including Native Americans. 
His writings offer support to Christianity in resisting Teilhard’s proposed evolutionary 
cosmology by reminding it of its traditional doctrines and its affinity with other 
traditional religions, especially Islam. For Nasr a move away from tradition is not 
progress but regression. Furthermore, from his perspective, the ecological crisis is a 
product of the Western Enlightenment, of so-called Western scientific and technological 
progress, and economic excesses. The Muslim world has failed insofar as it has imitated 
the West by adopting modern architecture and industrial technologies, as well as by 
jettisoning traditional ways of knowing the natural world and understanding the human-
nature relationship, for logical positivism and the scientism of the West. In the midst of 
this narrative, which is highly critical of the West, the common creation story that offers 
a pseudo-scientific mythology and cosmology of the big bang and evolution does not 
appear as an attractive partner for Islam or other world religions, but rather as another 
forced cultural export of the West that promises to destroy and displace the Muslim story 
and perspective. For Nasr, the West, which has produced the ecological crisis, precisely 
because of problems at the world view level and because of its sacrilegious science, is in 
no position to advise the rest of the world on what they should believe in order to reverse 
the crisis. 
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Frithjof Schuon 
To better understand Nasr’s position on this issue of the relationship of religion 
and science, and his critique of Teilhard and McFague, it is important to consider his 
major influence in this regard. Frithjof Schuon, one of the pillars of traditionalism, 
sharply criticized modern, reductionist science for claiming a total knowledge of reality. 
This criticism of modern science—and it is by no means the first ever to be 
made—is made not on the grounds that it studies some fragmentary field within 
the limits of its competence, but on the grounds that it claims to be in a position to 
attain to total knowledge, and that it ventures conclusions in fields accessible only 
to a supra-sensible and truly intellective wisdom, the existence of which it refuses 
on principle to admit. In other words, the foundations of modern science are false 
because, from the “subject” point of view, it replaces Intellect and Revelation by 
reason and experiment, as if it were not contradictory to lay claim to totality on an 
empirical basis; and its foundations are false too because, from the “object” point 
of view, it replaces the universal Substance by matter alone, either denying the 
universal Principle or reducing it to matter or to some kind of pseudo-absolute 
from which all transcendence has been eliminated.
28
 
 
For Schuon, the knowledge afforded by modern science is fragmentary and partial, yet it 
presents itself as absolute and complete. 
By refusing to admit any possibility of serious knowledge outside its own domain, 
modern science, as has already been said, claims exclusive and total knowledge, 
while making itself out to be empirical and non-dogmatic, and this, it must be 
insisted, involves a flagrant contradiction; a rejection of all “dogmatism” and of 
everything that must be accepted a priori or not at all is simply a failure to make 
use of the whole of one’s intelligence.29 
 
All errors concerning the world and God consist either in a "naturalistic" denial of 
the discontinuity and so also of transcendence – whereas it is on the basis of this 
transcendence that the whole edifice of science should have been raised – or else 
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in a failure to understand the metaphysical and “descending” continuity which in 
no way abolishes the discontinuity starting from the relative.
30
  
 
For Schuon, evolution is a case in point for his overall argument against modern science.  
In a note on the quotation above, Frithjof continues his argument, applying it specifically 
to Teilhard de Chardin: 
It is mainly this "scientific" prejudice, going hand in hand with a falsification and 
impoverishment of speculative imagination, which prevents a man like Teilhard 
de Chardin from conceiving the overriding discontinuity between matter and the 
soul, or between the natural and the supernatural orders and so leads to the 
evolutionary outlook, which -- inverting the truth -- makes everything begin with 
matter. A minus always presupposed an initial plus so that a seeming evolution is 
no more than the quite provisional unfolding of a preexisting result; the human 
embryo becomes a man because that is what it already is; no "evolution" will 
produce a man from an animal embryo. In the same way the whole cosmos can 
only spring from an embryonic state which contains the virtuality of all its 
possible deployment and simply makes manifest on the plane of contingencies an 
infinitely higher and transcendent prototype.
31
 
 
For Schuon, Teilhard de Chardin becomes the symbol of the betrayal of religious truth to 
scientific materialism and reductionism. He becomes the ideological other and enemy of 
the Traditionalist School. 
One of the effects of modern science has been to give religion a mortal 
wound…Its doctrine, it is true, is not affected, but the false opinions borrowed 
from its repudiators corrode it cunningly “from within”; witness, for example, 
modernist exegesis, the demagogic levelling down of the liturgy, the Darwinism 
of Teilhard de Chardin, the “worker-priests”, and a “sacred art” obedient to 
surrealist and “abstract” influences. Scientific discoveries prove nothing to 
contradict the traditional positions of religion, of course, but there is no one at 
hand to point this out; too many “believers” consider, on the contrary, that it is 
time that religion “shook off the dust of the centuries”, which amounts to saying, 
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that it should “liberate” itself from its very essence and from everything which 
manifests that essence.
32
 
 
Schuon clearly believes that religious truth is more important than scientific knowledge.  
For Schuon, religious truth is primarily transcendent and beyond the world, so that an 
improved knowledge of science does not help to advance it.  
From the point of view of total truth—let it be said once more—it is a thousand 
times better to believe that God created the world in six days and that the world 
beyond lies beneath the flat surface of the earth or in the spinning heavens, than it 
is to know the distance from one nebula to another without knowing that 
phenomena merely serve to manifest a transcendent Reality which determines us 
in every respect and gives to our human condition its whole meaning and its 
whole content.
33
 
 
In the quotation above, Schuon raises the issue of fundamentalist creationism, without 
fully probing the difficulty. The serious question, which he does not answer, is whether a 
God that creates the world in six days is any longer credible. For Schuon the theological 
task of incorporating our new knowledge of the physical world into our theological 
conceptions, to make them credible, is secondary. Metaphysical truth stands on its own 
and does not need to be buttressed by the latest scientific discovery.   
 Nasr carries forward Frithjof Schuon’s criticism of modern science, Teilhard de 
Chardin, and the theory of evolution. He argues against reductionism, against the 
incorporation of evolutionary thought, built upon a reductionist science, into theology. 
Furthermore, he maintains Schuon’s concern with Teilhard’s compromise of the 
transcendence, permanence, and absoluteness of God. 
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Cosmological Conflict 
 When we see the opposing ways in which Teilhard and Schuon approach the 
relationship of religion and science, and the fact that McFague is heavily influenced by 
Teilhard and Nasr by Schuon, it is clear that there will be a conflict in religions and 
cosmologies represented respectively by McFague and Nasr. For McFague, Teilhard 
represents the possibility of a creative exchange between religion and science, in which 
ideas from science and religious ideas combine to form a functional cosmology that can 
serve to facilitate simultaneous love of God and the world. Furthermore, she is excited by 
Teilhard’s concept of collapsing, as it were, transcendence into immanence, and time into 
eternity, in defining a faith that is transcendent in a worldly sense. For Nasr, in contrast, 
Teilhard is a symbol of the corruption of religious truth. Reductionist science, insofar as 
it denies the existence of God, cannot be seen as a foundation or even a partner in 
meaning-making with religious truth. For Nasr, the truth about God is unalterable, 
transcendent, and untouched by the world. That truth needs to be maintained, not 
compromised, and it should especially not be altered for the sake of evolutionary theory, 
which he sees as deeply flawed. This basic tension animates much of the conflict between 
Nasr and McFague.  
 Interestingly, this conflict is one that appears to fade somewhat after McFague’s 
fourth conversion of revelatory experience of God as love and reality. The creation story 
she begins to tell is one of all things originating in God, being sustained by God in every 
moment, and ultimately returning to God. It is a religious or metaphysical story that is 
“congruous” with the common creation story, which “can ‘accompany’ the contemporary 
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worldview with minimum strain.” However, it is larger than and independent of these 
contemporary scientific stories: “contemporary cosmology and evolution do not give 
special support to this religious tale.”34  Here we find McFague apparently accepting the 
primacy and independence of metaphysical truth from scientific truth, which brings her 
much closer to Nasr’s view in this regard. As both authors get deeper into concern for the 
ecological crisis, not only do their differences shift, but their common ground grows. 
Still, their ideological differences, though they shift here or there, remain. One 
ideological barrier that remains more stable is their disagreement about the use of 
traditional patriarchal language for God.  
God as King Debate 
In Nasr’s traditional Muslim perspective, names of God explicitly stated in the 
Qur’an are not negotiable; they are revealed sacred symbols rather than mere human-
conceived metaphors. This includes the Quranic designation of God as King. For feminist 
Christians, king-language for God and other patriarchal language in the Bible is not seen 
as pure revelation, but as male-biased ways of naming God. For McFague and other 
feminist authors who read the Bible with a critical eye for patriarchal tendencies, “King” 
is not a name that comes down on high from God for God, but rather a name given to 
God by males that upholds the institution of kingship and patriarchy in general. This 
particular difference between McFague and Nasr seems to be irreconcilable. It is not a 
personal difference, but rather reflects how their respective communities value the 
metaphor or, as Nasr sees it, revealed symbol, of God as king. For Nasr, there is no 
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option to simply jettison a concept of God articulated in the Quran and other traditional 
scriptures. Even if he did recognize that a concept of God was harmful, the onus would 
fall on misinterpretation and there would be a need for reinterpretation rather than 
jettisoning. McFague’s hermeneutic is typical of postmodern Christian theology, and 
helps explain why her theological approach to the ecological crisis is so different from 
Nasr’s. 
In rejecting the model of the world as the king’s realm, McFague is displaying 
loyalty to feminist colleagues and the basic tenets of eco-feminism. In steadfastly 
retaining it Nasr is being true to the Muslim faith. For McFague’s audience imaging God 
in gender neutral or feminine terms makes God more attractive as an object of faith, trust, 
and meaning-making. For Nasr’s audience a rejection of a name for God found in the 
Quran would cause all sorts of theological problems by undermining the defining and 
central source for the faith of Muslims. If anything, such a move would undermine rather 
than strengthen the faith of Muslims, and hence be counterproductive to his overall 
project of leveraging that faith into the enactment of an ecological way of life consistent 
with that faith.  
Nasr relies upon the Quran as a source of revelation in nearly all of his theological 
arguments, and views the Quran as an ally in terms of advancing an appropriate sense of 
ecological responsibility for human beings in our contemporary world. It is simply not 
part of his field of action to make such a move as disputing or discrediting any part of the 
Quran; and his protest that several major world religions include this name for God 
should not be taken lightly if we value the idea of interreligious unity. Of course, within 
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much of Christian theology, the metaphor of God as king of the world is not considered 
problematic. Although the Bible is not treated exactly the same as the Qur’an in terms of 
its revelatory status, in that Christians would tend to read the Bible less literally than 
Muslims tend to read the Quran, one would expect to find a similar pushback from 
Christians regarding McFague’s proposal to jettison the model of God as king, citing 
hundreds of scriptures where God is named as such.
35
 For McFague, the shift from God 
as King of the world to the world as God’s body represents a paradigm shift that will 
reshape the way Christians relate to the world. It is interesting to note that although Nasr 
forcefully resists the idea of delegitimizing this name for God, he does not particularly 
emphasize it in his ecological theology or, in fact, in any of his theology. In fact, 
following a common traditionalist convention, Nasr quite frequently employs impersonal 
and gender neutral names for God, such as the Principle, the Absolute, the Infinite, etc. 
Although he does not consider it an option to discredit or dispute traditional Islamic 
concepts of God, he finds a broad range of symbolic language at his disposal through 
mining his own tradition as well as what he sees as other authentic religious traditions. 
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Like McFague, he emphasizes ways of speaking about God that demonstrate God’s 
nearness to the whole creation and connection with the physical environment apart from 
human beings. 
Besides McFague and Nasr’s difference regarding the authority of scripture, this 
debate over whether to name God as “king” reflects their different views on God’s 
transcendence and immanence. Simply put, McFague describes God as more immanent 
than does Nasr. Even when she speaks of transcendence she speaks of “worldly 
transcendence”; she believes that God is experienced in and through the world. Nasr, on 
the other hand, believes that God is experienced in the most vivid way beyond the world, 
and that such an experience of God beyond the world is necessary to understanding the 
symbolic meaning of the world as God’s creation. 
 Although McFague presents her new model as a replacement for God as king, it is 
not necessary that this new model completely displace the old, even if it becomes one’s 
working model. What is more important, and where there is also common ground to be 
found with Nasr, is in the model’s positive implications in terms of the resacralization of 
nature. The major theological move that McFague is making is to introduce a model that 
emphasizes God’s immanence and the sacred value of nature. 
This means we look at the world, all parts and aspects of it, differently: it is the 
body of God, and hence we revere it, find it special and precious, not as God but 
as the way God has chosen to be visible, available, to us…It is not, then, mere 
earth or dead matter; it is “consecrated,” formally dedicated to a divine purpose. 
We do not know in all ways or even in many ways what this purpose is, but the 
world is not ours to manipulate for our purposes. If we see it as God’s body, the 
way God is present to us, we will indeed know we tread on sacred ground.
36
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The primary focus and intent of McFague’s new model for God is the way it focuses our 
attention on the cosmos and its sacredness, rather than how it may or may not displace 
the patriarchal model of God as king of the world. By bringing God closer to the world 
(in our perception and awareness) McFague hopes to instill the world with greater value, 
with spiritual value, by connecting it to the ultimate source of value; that is, God. This is 
her most important theological move. It is a specific response to the problem of the 
desacralization of the world which allows for its destruction and the current crisis. The 
project of resacralization of a desacralized world is one in which McFague and Nasr are 
both engaged, though in different ways based on their unique stories, contexts, and 
traditions.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter we have highlighted two major ideological conflicts between Nasr 
and McFague, regarding religion and science and the concept of God as king. These 
differences, and the disagreements underlying them (regarding interpretation of scripture, 
authority of tradition, patriarchy, etc), effectively blocked dialogue between these two 
thinkers. At the Spirit and Nature conference at Middlebury College in 1991 where they 
had an opportunity to dialogue in person, Nasr rather forcefully criticized McFague’s 
challenges to her own tradition’s sacred scripture. He followed up that criticism with a 
more extended one in Religion and the Order of Nature. McFague did not respond to 
either line of criticism from Nasr. In the chapters to come, this essay ventures into the 
conversation between Nasr and McFague that never happened but very well could have 
happened were the authors more forgiving of their differences and able to get beyond 
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them to see their common ground on the ecological crisis. The ideological differences 
between the authors in fact predate any concern for the ecological crisis, insofar as their 
ideologies themselves (traditionalist and feminist) were quite separate and ideologically 
contrary to each other long before either thinker began addressing the ecological crisis 
from their respective ideological homes. The conversation that continues in the coming 
chapters is focused not so much on the generic differences between a postmodern 
Protestant feminist and a traditionalist Muslim but rather the profound common ground 
they uncover in their common search for a solution to the spiritual crisis underlying the 
ecological crisis. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
COMMON GROUND 
Introduction 
 In this chapter we continue the dialogue between Nasr and McFague beyond the 
ideological identity conflicts that present themselves as obstacles and stumbling blocks to 
dialogue and cooperation. The problematic issues are not resolved, but simply observed 
and understood, and thus to a certain extent neutralized. We now approach the 
comparison of the ecological theology of Sallie McFague and Seyyed Hossein Nasr with 
an eye to their substantial common ground. In dealing with the ecological crisis, both 
McFague and Nasr perceive the problem similarly, as a spiritual crisis involving a loss of 
vision of the sacredness of creation. Both authors describe a “fall” from pre-modern 
(Nasr’s language) or Medieval (McFague’s language) ways of appreciating nature’s 
supernatural significance. With the rise of modernity and the secular scientific worldview 
(via the Renaissance and Enlightenment) this spiritual vision of nature was lost in the 
Western world. Nature became a mere object to be controlled and used to benefit human 
beings. The stage was set for the ecological crisis to develop as new technologies were 
employed to exploit nature in the service of rapid and, at times, irresponsible economic 
development. Even though McFague and Nasr approach this common problem 
differently—with Nasr arguing for the restoration of a traditional or Medieval cosmology 
and McFague arguing for a forward-looking approach based on the cosmology of 
postmodern science—they both seek the same goal of restoring a spiritual vision of the 
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sacredness of nature, and consequently addressing more forcefully Earth’s ecological 
crisis.  
In the context of this recognition of shared mission—the resacralization of 
nature—exciting possibilities emerge for meaningful and productive dialogue between 
McFague and Nasr. What becomes clear is that their approaches to the ecological crisis 
are in many ways complementary and mutually reinforcing. Furthermore, despite all the 
apparently irreconcilable differences these authors have, their reflections on the 
ecological crisis have indeed led them to similar conclusions—not only in regard to how 
to conceive of the God-world relationship and the human-world relationship but also in 
terms of concrete steps that could be taken. For example, they both believe that cities are 
in need of more wild places to encourage their inhabitants’ to develop and maintain a 
sense of wonder for, and appreciation of, nature. For the most part, the ideological 
differences which present themselves as barriers to dialogue are generic; they might 
present themselves between a postmodern Protestant and traditionalist Muslim no matter 
what topic they were attempting to discuss. However, the common ground which they 
share comes first of all from their serious engagements with the problem of the ecological 
crisis itself; secondly, it issues from their common experiences of the mystical depth of 
dimensions of reality. 
Desacralization of Nature as Fall 
 Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Sallie McFague both argue that the contemporary 
ecological crisis is at root a spiritual crisis. It is a consequence of the desacralization of 
nature in human conception and perception which began in the West during the 
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Renaissance and Enlightenment, and became an integral part of the established 
worldview of modernity. In framing this problem of desacralization of nature, both Nasr 
and McFague tell the story of the loss of the spiritual vision of nature using the motif of 
“fall.” As we review their versions of this story, we will pay close attention to how their 
different perspectives and social locations shape the way they tell this story. We will look 
closely at key themes that emerge in their critiques of the modern scientific worldview, 
especially their strikingly similar critiques of Descartes, who for both authors serves 
more or less as the personification of the wrong way to view nature.  
 Nasr’s dramatization of the problem in his first major text on ecological theology, 
Man and Nature (which is consistent with his later publications on this topic), begins 
with a reminder of the quality of the pre-fall state; that is, the meaning of nature to “non-
modern man.” It is important to note Nasr’s terminology of “non-modern man” is 
inclusive not only of pre-modern or medieval Westerners, but also of contemporary 
peoples (mostly from non-Western traditional cultures) who have not adopted the vision 
of nature of secular modernity.  
It must never be forgotten that for non-modern man—whether he be ancient or 
contemporary—the very stuff of the Universe has a sacred aspect. The cosmos 
speaks to man and all of its phenomena contain meaning. They are symbols of a 
higher degree of reality which the cosmic domain at once veils and reveals. The 
very structure of the cosmos contains a spiritual message for man and is thereby a 
revelation coming from the same source as religion itself.
1
  
 
After reminding us of the pre-modern state of spiritual knowledge of nature in the 
West—a state that is alive among contemporary “non-modern” peoples—Nasr tells the 
story of the West’s loss of genuine, sacred knowledge of nature and fall to a desacralized 
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knowledge of nature. Nasr, though having been educated in modern Western educational 
institutions and in many ways being a participant in Western culture, does not identify 
himself as a “modern man”; rather, by virtue of his adherence to Islamic tradition, he is 
“non-modern” or traditional. 
In order for the modern sciences of nature to come into being, the substance of the 
cosmos had first to be emptied of its sacred character and become profane. The 
world view of modern science, especially as propagated through its vulgarization, 
itself contributed to this secularization of nature and of natural substances. The 
symbols in nature became facts, entities in themselves that are totally divorced 
from other orders of reality. The cosmos which had been transparent thus became 
opaque and spiritually meaningless—at least to those who were totally immersed 
in the scientific view of nature—even if individual scientists believed otherwise.2 
 
The symbolic view of things is for the most part forgotten in the West and 
survives only among peoples of far away regions, while the majority of modern 
men live in a de-sacralized world of phenomena whose only meaning is either 
their quantitative relationships expressed in mathematical formulae that satisfy the 
scientific mind, or their material usefulness for man considered as a two legged 
animal with no destiny beyond his earthly existence. But for man as an immortal 
being they bear no direct message. Or rather it can be said that they still bear the 
message but there is no longer the appropriate faculty to decipher it.
3
 
 
For Nasr the desacralization of nature is characterized primarily by the loss of the 
symbolic meaning of nature in regard to “other orders of reality.” Nature as symbol 
points beyond itself: it both veils and reveals higher orders of spiritual reality. For 
modern Western humanity, as Nasr understands it, nature is opaque and meaningless, a 
veil not recognized as a veil but seen as the totality of reality. Modern human beings, 
without a higher spiritual and ethical reference point beyond their earthly existence, 
perceive nature only in terms of its “material usefulness” in terms of fulfilling their 
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present needs and wants. This lack of spiritual vision leads them to plunder and destroy 
nature for their own short-term benefit without regard to any concept of the sacrilegious 
nature of such plundering and its detrimental effects for human spirituality, or its 
significance for them in the life beyond this world.  
In order to capture the weight of this troubling transition from pre-modern to 
modern, Nasr embraces the analogy of “the fall.” 
There seems to be in the movement from the contemplative to the passionate, 
from the symbolist to the factual mentality, a fall in the spiritual sense 
corresponding to the original fall of man. In the same way that Adam’s fall from 
Paradise implies that creation, which had until then been innocent and friendly 
and also inward, thus became hostile and also externalized, so does the change of 
attitude between pre-modern and modern man vis-à-vis nature imply a further 
stage in this alienation. The I-thou relation is destroyed to become the I-it and no 
amount of the pejorative use of such terms as ‘primitive’, ‘animistic’ or 
‘pantheistic’ can make one forget the loss implied in this change of attitude. In 
this new fall man has lost a paradise as a compensation for which he has 
discovered a new earth full of apparent but illusory riches. He has lost the 
paradise of a symbolic world of meaning to discover an earth of facts which he is 
able to observe and manipulate at his will. But in this new role of a ‘deity upon 
earth’ who no longer reflects his transcendent archetype, he is in dire danger of 
being devoured by this very earth over which he seems to wield complete 
dominion unless he is able to regain a vision of that paradise he has lost.
4
 
 
For Nasr the fall of modern man is primarily defined by the loss of “his” spiritual vision 
of nature. Major factors in this fall for Nasr are the loss of a symbolist spiritual vision of 
nature and the transition from an I-thou relationship with nature to an I-it relationship. A 
way of seeing nature is needed that is expansive rather than reductionist and allows 
human beings to perceive the deeper symbolic meaning of nature beyond mere facts 
regarding its quantitative aspects or physical make up. For Nasr this way of seeing nature 
is common to numerous traditional philosophies and religions, including Islam and 
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Christianity. In his message to a Western Christian audience regarding the environmental 
crisis, Nasr repeatedly calls for Christians to recover the metaphysical cosmology of 
traditional Christianity, as seen in the writings of medieval theologians and mystics such 
as Thomas Aquinas, Saint Francis, Hildegard of Bingen, and earlier sources such as 
Augustine and Maximus the Confessor. As Nasr sees it, modern Western humanity must 
try to recover the vision of and relationship with nature that it had in the middle ages and 
before. The key to doing this, he believes, is recovery of a traditional cosmology that 
includes a hierarchic vision of the universe, including higher orders of unseen reality. 
 For Nasr, the crucial point of no return in the story of the fall of modern Western 
man is the acceptance of the dualistic and reductionist natural philosophy of Rene 
Descartes: 
Although there are numerous intellectual and historical causes for the 
desacralization of the cosmos, the reduction of the knowing mind or the subject of 
the Cartesian cogito to the purely rationalistic level was certainly one of the main 
ones. It is not accidental that the mechanization of the cosmos and the emptying 
of the substance of the world of its sacred quality took place at the same time as 
the desacralization of knowledge and the final divorce between the reason which 
“knows” scientifically from the world of faith on the one hand, and the Intellect 
which knows principally and essentially on the other.
5
 
 
For Nasr, the fall of modern Western man is simultaneously cosmological and 
anthropological. A human being that is conceived of as a cogito is a reduced human being 
which corresponds to a reduced universe. If human beings do not have the higher mind or 
intellect to perceive the sacred essence of the world, then this sacred essence must be 
assumed not to exist. 
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Since only the like can know the like, the secularized reason which became the 
sole instrument of knowing in modern times could not but leave its mark and 
effect upon everything that it studied. All subjects studied by a secularized 
instrument of knowledge came out to be depleted and devoid of the quality of the 
sacred. The profane point of view could only observe a profane world in which 
the sacred did not play a role.
6
 
 
Before discussing the implications of Nasr’s version of the fall of modern humanity, it is 
instructive to explore the similar story that McFague tells. 
McFague’s Story of the Fall 
 McFague recognizes how people in medieval Europe saw symbolic meaning in 
nature, and lived in relationship with nature, and then describes the “fall” from this state. 
As in Nasr’s version of the story, Descartes plays a key role and the problem centers 
around the objectification and mechanization of nature and, in short, an inability to see 
nature properly. However, McFague tells the story differently because, unlike Nasr, 
McFague does not believe that recovery of the medieval view of nature is possible or 
desirable for her or her readership.  
McFague argues that “The Great Chain of Being at the heart of the medieval 
picture, with God at the top as the transcendent Determiner of Destiny and all creatures 
arranged in descending order—angels, men, women, children, animals, plants, matter—is 
antithetical to an ecological and feminist perspective.” McFague takes issue with the 
medieval model because of what she sees as an overly transcendent definition of God as 
king of a hierarchically arranged universe that supports an unjust social hierarchy, also 
known as patriarchy. Therefore, McFague is “by no means suggesting it as a picture to 
which we can return…rather, what it suggests is that we must do for our time what that 
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picture did for its time—namely, work out a functional cosmology.”7 On this important 
point McFague and Nasr are at loggerheads. For Nasr, in order to “see the cosmos as 
theophany and not veil, it is necessary to return again and again to the truth that reality is 
hierarchic, that the cosmos is not exhausted by its physical aspect alone.” Nasr asserts 
that the goal of all traditional cosmologies is “to present in an intelligible fashion the 
hierarchy of existence as reflected in the world.”8 At issue theologically is Nasr’s 
insistence that any true cosmology must include a transcendent spiritual dimension of 
reality beyond the physical world. In his understanding and experience of spirituality, one 
must encounter God in this reality beyond the world in order to then recognize the 
symbolic meaning of nature and see God everywhere. McFague is aware that her 
deconstruction of the concept of God as transcendent king of the universe and her 
proposition that the world is God’s body suggests a different spiritual path. Rather than 
knowing the world through knowing God, as in Nasr’s model, McFague presents a 
spirituality of loving God through loving the world. What the ensuing discussion of this 
chapter will show is that despite this and other important differences and tensions, Nasr 
and McFague’s analysis of the spiritual root of the ecological crisis is remarkably similar. 
Furthermore, the solutions they propose, although they may present them in ways that 
make them appear incompatible, are united in a common mission to resacralize nature. 
McFague and Nasr have a very different relationship to the modern Western 
world.  McFague does not, like Nasr, live in the tension of fighting to preserve a 
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traditional Islamic worldview and lifestyle in resistance to pressure to adopt a modern 
secular worldview and lifestyle (a familiar dynamic for many in the Western-occupied or 
post-colonial Muslim world). Although a Christian, McFague does not have an intact, 
living tradition including a sacred vision of nature that she can choose to preserve and 
maintain; the Christianity that she has inherited is fully complicit and tied up in the fall of 
modernity and the desacralization of nature. One interesting product of this circumstantial 
difference is that McFague tends to look forward for her solution, into the postmodern, 
rather than looking back into the medieval. Because the medieval Christian worldview is 
not “alive” for McFague, it is something she can learn from but not something she feels 
she can “revive.” Instead of looking to bring back a medieval cosmology she instead 
looks to combine insights from the Christian tradition with postmodern science in order 
to fashion a functional cosmology. In The Body of God and Super, Natural Christians she 
does not speak about worlds beyond the world described by contemporary science. 
However, she rejects the reductionism and absolutism of modern science and looks to 
biology, other sciences, poetry and alternative cosmologies for ideas that will help to 
resacralize nature and move from the arrogant eye to the loving eye.  
At the same time as McFague values the medieval view of nature and laments its 
loss, she also critiques it insofar as her postmodern subject-subjects model differs from it. 
Her main critique is that in the medieval subject-subjects model, unlike in the postmodern 
subject-subjects model McFague proposes, “nature as a whole as well as particular 
individual creatures certainly do not have intrinsic value: they are not subjects in their 
own right…On the contrary, nature for them had a higher calling—in fact, the highest 
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calling.” In the medieval model, which takes seriously what Nasr refers to as “other 
orders of reality” beyond the physical, nature points beyond itself to heavenly realities, 
ultimately to God. McFague’s concern with this model is that it appears to assign nature 
instrumental rather than intrinsic value. And, yet, she does still appreciate this model, and 
understands it much the way Nasr does. 
Like the Bible, it was a book, the book of nature, which humans were to learn to 
read rightly in order to find their way to God. But the natural world was certainly 
not an object either; it was not a commodity that people could use and destroy at 
will. Rather, it was a way God had chosen to lead humans into the divine 
presence. Thus, its subjectivity, its persona, its particular individuality in whole 
and in its parts, was symbolic: it signified God for humans. While we might see 
this as highly anthropocentric (as well as anthropomorphic), it nonetheless meant 
that nature was a subject of great importance to human beings. If the way to God 
was an extroverted, not an introverted, way, then human beings had to look 
outside themselves to nature in order to find God. If the way to God demanded 
reading these natural signs rightly, then one had to pay attention to nature in order 
to get the meanings right. In other words, one had to live in nature and with 
nature: the relationship was a close one and a very important one.
9
 
 
McFague’s complaint with the medieval view, as much as she values it and prefers it to 
modernism, is that “the emphasis from the beginning appears to be on the vertical, not the 
horizontal, on nature as a way to God and not on the value of individual, different things 
and creatures.”  
In search of a model that places more value on the horizontal dimension of 
humanity’s relationship with nature, McFague points to one outstanding Christian figure 
from the medieval period to help establish her new subject-subjects model, Francis of 
Assisi, who she describes as having “double vision.” 
[T]he interesting thing about Francis for our purposes is that he suggests a step 
beyond emblemism, another way to understand the subjecthood of nature. Like 
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emblemism, Francis’ attention to things as natural symbols was a form of 
extroversion. He looked to the world, not to his own psyche, to find the presence 
of God. But unlike emblemism, which tends to see animals and plants entirely in 
terms of their usefulness for the human journey to God, Francis had double 
vision—horizontal as well as vertical. His earliest biographers indicate that while 
he saw things as symbols of God, he also saw them as valuable in themselves.
10
 
 
McFague, distancing herself from the medieval picture of the world, emphasizes St. 
Francis’ status as an outlier among medieval people. Commenting on Francis’ famous 
canticle of creation, McFague writes: 
The closeness that medieval people had with nature—as a means to closeness 
with God—is redirected by Francis toward seeing nature as intrinsic subject. Its 
subjecthood was not solely a sign for us; its being was for its own sake—and as 
praise to God. Water, wind, sun, and stars, the entire earth and even death, are 
natural symbols, singing the praises of the creator by doing their own thing, not by 
being the symbol of a doctrine or a moral lesson for human beings.
11
 
 
For McFague, the primary goal of her proposed subject-subjects model is to recover a 
view of nature as intrinsically valuable subject, a view that “lets things be what they are”; 
that is, she seeks to recover the horizontal dimension of Francis’ spirituality. Of course, 
the cosmological vision McFague embraces supports this emphasis on the horizontal, 
insofar as it does not include a hierarchically conceived transcendent dimension of reality 
or God. For McFague, the vertical aspect of Francis’ vision is still important, but 
secondary. The first thing is to love nature for its own sake; the second is to see God in it: 
“Perhaps we will glimpse as well how these others are, now and then, images of the 
divine, as we are.” 
                                                        
10
 Ibid., 56. 
 
11
 Ibid., 57. 
  
241 
Interestingly, Nasr also comments extensively on the double-vision or bi-
directional spirituality of St. Francis. He does so in the context of an argument for 
“world-denial” in Religion and the Order of Nature. For Nasr, the vertical dimension of 
St. Francis’ spirituality relates to world-denial, which he argues is complementary to 
world-confirmation, what McFague calls the horizontal dimension of Francis’ 
spirituality.  
How can one forget that the recently anointed patron saint of ecology, St. Francis, 
was an ascetic if there ever was one. That did not prevent him from addressing the 
birds and considering the Sun and the Moon as his kin. The modern world needs 
nothing more than that so-called world-denying mysticism that is nothing other 
than its ascetic aspect that seeks to control the passions and slay the dragons 
within, without which the greed that drives the current destruction of nature 
cannot be controlled.
12
 
 
For Nasr, St. Francis is not an outlier among medieval people (as McFague sees him) but 
a typical non-modern mystic, who both confirms and denies the world simultaneously. In 
Nasr’s perspective, belief in Heaven, the vertical component of reality, enables one to 
rightly conduct oneself in the horizontal, on Earth, without giving up any love for nature. 
Moreover, world-denial is simply one aspect of a single reality whose other 
dimension is “world-confirmation,” but the soul cannot confirm the world as 
sacred without first of all denying the “world” that disperses the soul from within 
and makes it ever more reliant upon the material environment for the satiation of 
an ever-increasing thirst. One wonders how, in the light of the crucial nature of 
the problem at hand, a deeper distinction is not made by often well-intentioned 
eco-theologians between the world as enticement toward passion, greed, and 
aggression and the world as God’s Creation and ultimately theophany.13 
 
This difference between McFague and Nasr, in terms of McFague’s emphasis on the 
horizontal dimensions of spirituality and Nasr’s emphasis on the vertical, correspond to 
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what they both see as missing in a more crucial way from Western spirituality, and also 
directly to what they see as the problem with modern cosmology. For Nasr the cosmic 
hierarchy of heavenly realms needs to be restored, which correlates with and symbolizes 
God’s transcendence. McFague argues for an organic view of cosmology that conceives 
of reality in horizontal and egalitarian terms, drawing on the biological sciences which 
highlight the interconnectedness and mutual interdependence of all things. Rather than 
accept the traditional metaphor or model for God’s transcendence—that is, a 
hierarchically arranged cosmos with God on top, which is opposed to her egalitarian 
value-system—McFague re-images God’s transcendence within a world that is 
egalitarian rather than hierarchical. The transcendence of God as the force that empowers 
all things becomes a symbol of divine support for an egalitarian rather than hierarchical 
social system. As already discussed, Nasr values hierarchy not only theologically but 
socially, intellectually, and politically, while McFague sees it as fundamentally 
oppressive and unjust and rejects it at every level, whether in gender relations, 
intellectual discourse, or political systems. However, even without recourse to the 
concept of another world above this world, symbolizing God’s transcendence, McFague’s 
theology still supports a spirituality of world denial in the sense Nasr describes. 
McFague’s concept of sin speaks to the negative reality of the “world as enticement 
toward passion, greed, and aggression,” and calls the faithful into a practice of world 
denial that includes kenosis or self-emptying. 
In her discussion of double-vision and the integration of the natural and the 
supernatural in her subject-subjects model McFague argues that her model is new. 
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Distinguishing it from the model of the medieval period, McFague points out that there is 
a long line of such double-vision in Christian tradition, including Hildegard de Bingen, 
St. Francis, Thomas Aquinas, and others, even past the Renaissance. Gerard Manly 
Hopkins is the last example she provides, noting that “Hopkins was an anomaly at the 
close of the nineteenth century and even more of one now: few people beyond the 
seventeenth century had this integrated sensibility, the ability to see the natural and the 
supernatural worlds together.”14 It is so important to recognize McFague’s point that 
there is a profound discontinuity between Christianity today and medieval Christianity. 
For Nasr, there is a profound continuity between the traditional Islam of the medieval 
period straight through the Renaissance and Enlightenment, including the great 
traditional teachers he studied with in the gardens of Iran. According to Nasr, spiritual 
double vision was rare in Christianity, even in the medieval period: “The traditional 
perspective sees as the reason behind these limitations of modern science a concept of 
nature which goes back even before the seventeenth century to the traditional schools of 
Christian thought where, despite a Hildegard of Bingen, Saint Francis, or Saint 
Bonaventure, a kind of polemical attitude was entertained toward nature at least in the 
official theology. It was in Christian Hermeticism and alchemy that one had to seek an 
integral vision of nature and its significance. The quantification of nature by the 
seventeenth-century physics was carried out upon a natural order which was already 
depleted of its sacred presence.”15 McFague’s observation that “few people beyond the 
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seventeenth century” had an integrated view of the natural and supernatural is spoken in 
reference to the Western world. She agrees with Nasr that this current in the Christian 
tradition was weak to begin with and faded almost completely with the rise of modern 
science.  
For McFague, as for Nasr, the rise of modern science represents a fall for the 
spiritual vision of nature in the Western world: “The Renaissance and the rise of science 
collapsed those two worlds [the natural and supernatural] into one—into the secular 
world, which would mean nothing beyond itself. The most notable victim of this collapse 
would be nature. Nature became a mere object with no meaning or vocation beyond its 
utilitarian value to human beings.”16Again, of course, McFague is speaking about the 
Western European experience: 
With the seventeenth-century reduction of knowledge about nature to the 
appearance of objects, language followed suit. Whereas the Middle Ages had 
need of a rich symbolic language in order to track the many similarities among 
God, humans, and nature, after the Renaissance a literal, one-dimensional 
language was sufficient. Metaphor, symbol, and image were now seen as mere 
decoration, not as necessary in order to suggest the complex ontological 
connections among all levels of being.
17
  
 
McFague’s analysis explores what Nasr calls the “loss of the symbolist spirit” through 
changes in language. After the Renaissance a kind of narrow, literal interpretation of 
physical reality takes over, which demotes language which was once necessary to 
describe the “ontological connections among all levels of being” to “mere decoration.” 
The spiritual vision of nature was no longer considered essential to truly knowing the 
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world and God, but rather compartmentalized from “serious” pursuits like science, 
business, or government, as though it were a sentimental or merely poetic mode of 
viewing nature. In the words of E.A. Burtt: 
Our world now is literalized. What was once rich in meaning, a subject responsive 
to many deep and sublime interpretations, becomes nothing more than an object 
to be analyzed, dissected, and commodified. Everything interesting, meaningful, 
and living moves into our minds: “I think, therefore I am”—with these fatal 
words, nature loses its subjecthood:
18
 “The gloriously romantic universe of Dante 
and Milton that set no bounds to the imagination…as it played over space and 
time, had now been swept away…The world that people had thought themselves 
living in—a world rich with colour and sound, redolent with fragrance, filled with 
gladness, love, and beauty, speaking everywhere of purposive harmony and 
creative ideals—was crowded now into minute corners in the brains of scattered 
organic beings. The…world outside was a world hard, cold, colourless, silent, and 
dead, a world of quantity, a world of mathematically computable motions of 
mechanical regularity.”19 
 
Not to lose any of the dramatic flair needed to describe this fall, McFague quotes Burtt’s 
description of the loss of Milton’s and Dante’s paradisiacal view of nature with the rise of 
reductionist Renaissance science. Throughout the history of the Christian West, a 
spiritual vision of nature was never as strongly established as it was in the Muslim world, 
or in Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Precisely because of this weakness, it fell flat when 
challenged by the rise of modern scientific reductionism and its technology of 
domination. 
This common critique is at the heart of their common ground in general. Both 
authors in the most fundamental sense are responding to the desacralization of nature, its 
decoupling from religious cosmology and symbolic meaning in the Renaissance and 
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Enlightenment, as a root cause of the ecological crisis. Both authors are trying to 
introduce language that, in McFague’s words above, recovers the “complex ontological 
connections among all levels of being.” Of course McFague and Nasr’s viewpoints are 
not always the same insofar as cosmology is concerned, but they are on the same page 
when it comes to describing the Renaissance and the Enlightenment as a “fall” in the 
sense that nature became desacralized for modern Western humanity. The common 
ground between McFague and Nasr is more a result of their direct engagement with the 
spiritual crisis underlying the ecological crisis. Despite the fact that McFague and Nasr 
belong to schools of religious thought that are opposed on a number of important issues, 
the common ground they share in terms of their understanding of the spiritual crisis 
underlying the ecological crisis brings their theologies closer and closer over their careers 
as they seek to articulate solutions to these same crises. While Nasr and McFague do not 
end up with identical points of view, insofar as neither has an ideological conversion, the 
movement they do make within their ideologies in response to the ecological crisis is 
what brings them first into conversation and might have led them later (though this was 
not recognized, unfortunately), to what I will call a functional level of agreement—not 
total agreement, but sufficient agreement for constructive dialogue and cooperation in 
addressing the ecological crisis on local and global levels. 
Common Problem, Common Solution 
 McFague and Nasr both make the general argument that adopting their ideology 
would be helpful in remedying the ecological crisis. As discussed earlier, this kind of 
general argument begs the question of priorities, whether the authors are primarily 
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concerned with buttressing their ideologies by demonstrating their relevancy to the 
ecological crisis (in the interest of ideological stewardship), or whether they are primarily 
concerned with working to solve the ecological crisis and transform the way human 
beings relate with the natural environment (in the interest of planetary stewardship). This 
is a question of theological ethics. Just as many religious denominations, seminaries, 
colleges, towns, and other ecologically conscious organizations engaged in divestment 
campaigns are calling on their endowment fund managers to prioritize ecological ethical 
responsibility to nature over fiduciary responsibility to investors, so also theologians such 
as McFague and Nasr are now being called to prioritize planetary stewardship over 
ideological stewardship. Insofar as the authors make general arguments for their 
ideologies, that is, eco-feminism and traditionalism, they necessarily come into conflict 
because these ideologies are quite different and, in various particulars and principles, 
mutually exclusive. The profound common ground that McFague and Nasr share in 
responding to the spiritual crisis underlying the ecological crisis comes not through 
viewing the more general differences in the ideological fields in which they operate, but 
rather through analysis of the unique theological proposals that they present from within 
the parameters of their ideological frameworks. This common ground has already been 
cleared, so to speak, by their strikingly similar diagnoses of the problem of 
desacralization of nature. In that semantic and conceptual space created by their criticism 
of the desacralization of nature both McFague and Nasr construct theological solutions to 
the problem of the desacralization of nature whose commonality inheres in that they are 
attempts to solve the same problem. The authors of course use different theological 
  
248 
methods—because both are working within their own ideological, philosophical, and 
religious parameters (and it is worth noting that Nasr would not think of his work in 
terms of “theological construction”)—but the solution or goal of both authors, that is, the 
resacralization of nature, is one and the same; this is the quintessential religious response 
to the ecological crisis, and it is no accident that both McFague and Nasr advance it. 
Their common ground, again, does not issue from a prior ideological agreement, but from 
their work on a common problem with a common solution. Their common ground is 
Earth, their shared experiences of awe and wonder and mystery, their shared existential 
crises caused by the acceleration of the ecological crisis, a common language, and 
concepts drawn from environmental writings of common interest and, significantly, the 
fact that both authors eventually approach the ecological crisis from a mystical theistic 
perspective. This is a common ground which emerges despite ideological disagreement.  
The Body of God & God as Al-Muhit, the Environment 
 At the centerpiece of both McFague and Nasr’s proposed solutions to the spiritual 
crisis underlying the ecological crisis are concepts of the God-world relationship that 
highlight the connection between God and the world and in so doing advance the 
resacralization of nature by connecting nature with the Most Sacred. McFague’s concept 
of the world as God’s body is an intentional theological construction of a new model of 
the God-world relationship. She unfolds this theology most fully in The Body of God, 
where it is presented in a hypothetical mode as a new possibility for conceiving of the 
God-world relationship. The major move of this theological model, which McFague 
proposes as a replacement for the model of God as king of the world (the prevalent model 
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in Christian theology), is to see both God’s immanence and transcendence as connected 
to the world. If God is “the inspirited body of the whole universe” then both God’s 
transcendent dimension—the spirit—and God’s immanent dimension—the body—are 
intimately connected to the natural world in which we live. The problem with the model 
McFague intends to replace is that it pictures God as primarily transcendent and primarily 
above and apart from the world. By reconceptualizing the location of God vis-à-vis the 
world, bringing God closer to the world, so that we identify the world quite fully with 
God and vice-versa (while maintaining God’s transcendence as empowering spirit of the 
universe), McFague hopes to present a picture that will support a more robust ecological 
ethic for those who adopt this model for viewing the relationship of God and the world. 
 As discussed in chapter 5, Nasr rejects McFague’s approach of theological 
deconstruction and reconstruction. His criticism, however, is limited to a passionate 
defense of the traditional concept of God as king of the world which McFague 
deconstructs.
20
 As if willing to proceed no further beyond McFague’s act of theological 
deconstruction, Nasr does not seriously consider McFague’s alternative model, the world 
as God’s body. However, what is interesting to note is that as much as Nasr would defend 
the model of God as king of the world,
21
 still this is not the model of the God-world 
relationship that he himself finds most useful or appropriate to emphasize in response to 
the ecological crisis. In fact, the descriptions of God that Nasr emphasizes as particularly 
relevant to the ecological crisis have much in common with the one McFague proposes. 
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Because Nasr and McFague share a common mission of resacralization of nature, the 
theologies they propose share common ground related to this common mission, despite 
their conflicting theological methods and perspectives.  
 From the beginning of his work on the ecological crisis, in Man and Nature, Nasr 
intentionally addresses a Western Christian audience because he believes that the 
ecological crisis has its genesis in the secularism of Western Europe where the 
desacralization of nature originated and from which it has since spread. In this work Nasr 
proposes that: 
If a day were to come when Christianity, rather than trying to convert the 
followers of Oriental religions, should also try to understand them and enter into 
an intellectual dialogue with them then Oriental metaphysics, which is also in its 
essence the philosophia perennis, as well as the cosmological doctrines of the 
Oriental traditions (which could also be referred to as cosmologia perennis), could 
act as a cause and occasion for the recollection of elements forgotten in the 
Christian tradition. They could aid in restoring a spiritual vision of nature that 
would be able to provide the background for the sciences.
22
 
 
McFague unfortunately does not try to convert people from or try to understand “Oriental 
metaphysics”—she rather ignores this potential dialogue partner completely. Again, 
McFague disappoints Nasr because she is not engaged so much in “recollection and 
restoration” as “deconstruction and reconstruction”—insofar as her theological method is 
postmodern rather than traditional. However, the “spiritual vision of nature” that 
McFague presents is not so far off from the one Nasr calls Christians to embrace in Man 
and Nature.  
In Man and Nature, in Nasr’s review of Christian examples of the now lost 
“spiritual vision of nature” that he seeks to revive, he approvingly quotes Saint Hildegard 
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de Bingen as “an eminent example of the Christian contemplative vision of nature.” This 
contemplative vision of nature, especially in terms of its doctrine of God as Spirit, bears a 
striking resemblance to McFague’s own doctrine of God as the transcendently immanent 
inspirited-body of the Universe, which is God’s own body. States Nasr: 
Saint Hildegard had a vision of the Universe, similar to that of Hugo of Saint 
Victor in which nature is totally in the domain of the Spirit manifesting itself in 
all products of nature. In her vision she is addressed by the Spirit in these 
remarkable words: 
‘I am that supreme and fiery force that sends forth all the sparks of life. Death 
hath no part in me, yet do I allot it, wherefore I am girt about with wisdom as with 
wings. I am that living and fiery essence of the divine substance that flows in the 
beauty of the fields. I shine in the water, I burn in the sun and the moon and the 
stars. Mine is the mysterious force of the invisible wind. I sustain the breath of all 
living. I breathe in the verdure, and in the flowers, and when the waters flow like 
living things, it is I. I found those columns that support the whole earth…I am the 
force that lies hid in the winds, from me they take their source, and as a man may 
move because he breathes, so doth a fire burn but by my blast. All these live 
because I am in them and am of their life. I am wisdom. Mine is the blast of the 
thundered word by which all things were made. I permeate all things that they 
may not die. I am life.’  
 
Directly after quoting this passage, Nasr remarks approvingly: “Here is a vision of nature 
still sacred and spiritual before it became profane.” 23  
Of course, the manner of Hildegard’s presentation of her spiritual vision of nature 
as a direct communication of the Spirit is vastly different from McFague’s presentation of 
her theology of the universe as God’s body, which is speculative, hypothetical, and 
apparently reason-driven (laid out in a formal academic “argument”). McFague does not 
hear from the Spirit and prophetically declare the Word (in a manner congruent with 
traditional notions of the manner of revelation and the source of theological doctrine), but 
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rather “suggest[s]…that we think of God metaphorically as the spirit that is the breath, 
the life, of the universe, a universe that comes from God and could be seen as the body of 
God.”24 And yet Hildegard’s and McFague’s visions themselves are remarkably similar, 
especially in their focus on God’s “transcendent-immanence” in creation. Hildegard’s 
focus on God as the life-force, breath, and life of all things is remarkably similar to 
McFague’s concept of God as the Spirit of the Universe, a concept that she intentionally 
draws from the “deepest traditions of Christian thought.” She writes: 
That tradition is of God as spirit—not Holy Ghost, which suggests the unearthly 
and the disembodied, nor initially the Holy Spirit, which has been focused largely 
on human beings and especially the followers of Christ, but the spirit of God, the 
divine wind that “swept over the face of the waters” prior to creation, the life-
giving breath given to all creatures, and the dynamic movement that creates, 
recreates, and transcreates throughout the universe.
25
 
 
At the heart of McFague’s theology in the Body of God, what she calls “the prime 
analogy of this essay,” is the affirmation that “the dust of the universe [is] enlivened by 
the breath of God.” In language that comes close to the striking prose of Hildegard, 
McFague affirms,  
Each of us, and each and every other part of the body as well, owes our existence, 
breath by breath as we inhale and exhale, to God. We “live and move and have 
our being” in God (Acts 17:28). Indeed we do. That is, perhaps, the most basic 
confession that can be made: I owe my existence at its most fundamental level—
the gift of my next breath—to God. God is my creator and recreator, the One who 
gives and renews my life, moment by moment, at its most basic, physical level. 
And so does everything else in creation also live, moment by moment, by the 
breath of God, says our model.
26
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McFague would be even closer to Hildegard if she ended with, “says the Spirit” instead 
of “says our model,” but the substance of their visions is profoundly and substantively in 
concert, both connecting deeply with a strong current of biblical nature mysticism. 
Hildegard’s vision even more directly confirms McFague’s proposal that God is to the 
world as our spirits are to our bodies when she states: “I am the force that lies hid in the 
winds, from me they take their source, and as a man may move because he breathes, so 
doth a fire burn but by my blast.” In Hildegard’s spiritual vision, God is that breath/spirit 
that brings life to the world just as the breath/spirit of a person gives a person’s body life. 
Apart from the ideological trappings of eco-feminism and postmodern academic form 
which so jangle and clash with Nasr’s own traditionalist ideology and methodology, the 
kind of transcendently-immanent God that McFague proposes would apparently be 
acceptable and even laudable to Nasr as a profound spiritual vision of nature worth 
reviving in Christianity. Notably, Nasr does not cite any exemplars of Christian spiritual 
vision who say that God is apart from the world, or a king above and beyond the world.  
Nasr acknowledges deep issues in the mainstream of Western Christian thought 
regarding nature. In particular, he acknowledges the historic role of Christianity in the 
profanation of nature:  
In the West, however, the early Church as a reaction to paganism gradually 
became withdrawn and totally distinct from the world about it. Even the terms 
paradise and wilderness in their positive sense became connected solely with the 
Church and later with the monastery and the university as distinct institutions. 
Gradually in the Western Church the selective character of salvation became more 
emphasized, and virgin nature and wilderness became interpreted as a domain of 
warfare and combat rather than of peace and contemplation. Even the geographic 
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expansion of the Renaissance and the conquest of the New World were 
accomplished with this motif in mind.
27
 
 
The long tradition of the spiritual vision of nature, with the metaphysical 
doctrines upon which it is based, must again be brought to life within Christianity 
if the encounter of man and nature is not to result in complete disaster. 
Theologians and philosophers have been for the most part responsible, or at least 
have contributed during the past few centuries to making nature profane, thus 
setting the stage for its becoming profaned through the industrial revolution and 
the unending applications of modern sciences. They are responsible also for 
reinstating a more wholesome and integral attitude toward nature. Too many 
modern religious thinkers and theologians have put aside the question of nature 
and considered man’s salvation with a total disregard for the rest of God’s 
creation.
28
  
 
McFague really does respond to Nasr’s call—not his call per se, but the challenges he 
identifies. As much as Nasr opposes her deconstruction of the model of God as king, 
McFague deconstructs it precisely because she believes it has, in Nasr’s words, 
“contributed during the past few centuries to making nature profane.” Furthermore, her 
theological construction of the world as God’s body is in the interest, again in Nasr’s 
words, of “reinstating a more wholesome and integral attitude toward nature.” Her 
theology is also explicitly consistent with what Nasr calls “the long tradition of the 
spiritual vision of nature in Christianity.” Her theology is a movement away from the 
mainstream Christian concern with human salvation while neglecting Earth, which Nasr 
laments. For McFague, the deconstruction of the model of God as king of the world is 
part of this movement towards a spiritual vision of nature. It is an acceptance of the task 
of correcting what theologians have done in the last few centuries to make nature more 
profane. So there is a robust argument to be made that McFague and Nasr share profound 
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common ground in terms of their understanding of the Christian theological task 
regarding the ecological crisis. Again, this agreement or common ground is rooted in the 
problem of the ecological crisis itself. Their major methodological differences do not 
relate to the problem but are artifacts of the differences between postmodernism and 
traditionalism, and Protestantism and Islam. 
 In Man and Nature, Nasr calls attention to the spiritual crisis underlying the 
ecological crisis, but does not advance an Islamic environmental theology per se, except 
to argue in general terms that traditional Islamic theology participates in what he calls the 
symbolist spirit that sees the spiritual quality of nature (not only its physical quantity), 
that it does not divide man from nature or the natural from the supernatural, and that it 
views nature as a sacred source of revelation on par with the Qur’an. Nasr goes beyond 
this general description of how the environment is viewed in traditional Islam in “Islam 
and the Environmental Crisis,” the text of the essay Nasr presented at the Spirit and 
Nature conference at Middlebury College in 1990. Here Nasr presents his own proposal 
for a doctrine of God especially pertinent to the ecological crisis: God as al-Muhit. This 
concept of God bears remarkable similarities to McFague’s. In order to understand how 
the model of the universe as God’s body interacts with the concept of God as al-Muhit, it 
will be useful to quote Nasr’s brief discourse on God as Al-Muhit in its entirety: 
It is of the utmost significance that in the Quran God is said to be the All-
Encompassing (Muhit), as in the verse, “But to God belong all things in the 
heavens and on the earth: And He it is who encompasseth (muhit) all things” (IV: 
126); and that the term muhit also means environment. In reality, humans are 
immersed in the Divine Muhit and are only unaware of it because of their own 
forgetfulness and negligence (ghaflah), which is the underlying sin of the soul to 
be overcome by remembrance (dhikr). To remember God is to see Him 
everywhere and to experience His reality as al-Muhit. The environmental crisis 
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may in fact be said to have been caused by the human refusal to see God as the 
real “environment” which surrounds us and nourishes our life. The destruction of 
the environment is the result of the modern attempt to view the natural 
environment as an ontologically independent order of reality, divorced from the 
Divine Environment without whose liberating grace it becomes stifled and dies. 
To remember God as al-Muhit is to remain aware of the sacred quality of nature, 
the reality of natural phenomena as signs (ayat) of God and the presence of the 
natural environment as an ambience permeated by the Divine Presence of that 
Reality which alone is the ultimate “environment” from which we issue and to 
which we return.
29
 
 
In Nasr’s conception, remembering or knowing God as al-Muhit allows persons to see the 
natural environment as sacred because it is surrounded by the Divine Environment and 
permeated by the Divine Presence. By focusing on the divine name al-Muhit Nasr 
resacralizes the natural environment, in Islamic fashion, through remembrance. The idea 
of God as al-Muhit, as the Divine Environment surrounding and permeating the natural 
environment, is much closer to McFague’s idea of the world or environment as the 
inspirited body of God than it is to the idea she deconstructs—God as a distant king 
ruling the world. Al-Muhit is not anthropomorphic, it does not support a God/world 
dualism, it pictures God both in and around the natural environment, and has the effect of 
sacralizing all things. Like the concept of the world as God’s body, the idea of God as al-
Muhit pictures the God-world relationship in a way that the sacredness of the world 
cannot be missed because of its integral connection with God. God as al-Muhit and the 
world as God’s body both do the work of resacralizing the environment. God as al-Muhit 
permeates and surrounds nature, which is what the transcendent dimension of McFague’s 
Spirit of the World does in her theology. Both models are panentheistic. The difference is 
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that Nasr does not call the environment God’s body. Of course, Nasr does not have the 
incarnation as a theological resource to justify a direct identification of God with matter, 
nor the familiar trope of the church as the body of Christ. Yet the major reason Nasr 
would not and does not identify the natural environment with God’s body is 
cosmological. For Nasr there is a transcendent hierarchy of bodies and it is only at the top 
of this hierarchy that it is proper to speak of the Divine Body.  
Not only are we endowed with a physical body, but also a subtle body, an 
imaginal body, and even “bodies” on higher planes reaching the Divine Order 
itself in which it is possible to speak of the Divine Body. We possess bodies 
situated in a hierarchic fashion and corresponding to the various levels of the 
cosmic and meta-cosmic hierarchy.
 30
   
 
Nasr’s exposition of God as al-Muhit explicitly includes this doctrine of transcendence, 
which is the most substantial area of disagreement between Nasr and McFague’s eco-
theology in The Body of God. For Nasr, God as Spirit permeating nature is immanent, 
whereas for McFague this is the transcendently immanent dimension of God. But for 
Nasr the transcendent nature of God corresponds to higher orders of reality that transcend 
the visible world altogether. 
The traditional Islamic view of the natural environment is based on this 
inextricable and permanent relation between what are today called the human and 
natural environments and the Divine Environment which sustains and permeates 
them. The Quran alludes in many verses to the unmanifested and the manifested 
worlds (‘alam al-ghayb wa’l-shahadah). The visible or manifested world is not an 
independent order of reality but a manifestation of a vastly greater world which 
transcends it and from which it issues. The visible world is like what one can 
observe around a campfire during a dark desert night. The visible gradually 
recedes into the vast invisible which surrounds it and for which the invisible is the 
veritable environment. Not only is the invisible an infinite ocean compared to 
which the visible is like a speck of dust, but the invisible permeates the visible 
itself. It is in this way that the Divine Environment, the Spirit, permeates the 
                                                        
30
 Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature, 260. 
  
258 
world of nature and of normal humanity, nourishing and sustaining them, being at 
once the origin (al-mabda’) and entelechy or end (al-ma‘ad) of the manifested 
order.
31
 
 
Nasr’s concept of God as “the Divine Environment, the Spirit” is close to McFague’s. It 
is a panentheistic vision of God that sacralizes nature.
32
 Yet Nasr’s and McFague’s 
concepts of God diverge because of the basic cosmological differences in terms of how 
they see the world. For McFague “the ‘world’ in question, the world in which to 
understand both God and human beings, is the contemporary scientific picture of the 
earth, its history, and our place in it that is emerging from astrophysics and biology.”33 
For Nasr, McFague’s world is like a campfire flickering on a dark desert night—it is 
miniscule compared with the invisible world. In The Body of God, McFague’s starting 
point of contemporary science limits her “world” or “universe” to the visible, and thus 
limits the way she envisages God, especially in God’s transcendent dimension. Nasr’s 
traditional metaphysics pictures God within a larger framework of visible and invisible 
orders of reality conceived hierarchically. This adherence to a traditional view of the 
invisible orders of reality, the unmanifested transcendent, prevents Nasr from an easy 
acceptance of the world as presented by contemporary science (whether the disciplines 
are physics and chemistry or biology and astrophysics, all lack the transcendent and 
invisible aspects of Nasr’s cosmology). From Nasr’s perspective McFague’s theology is 
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undermined by its adaptation to a modern secular scientific worldview. It does not 
adequately include the dimension of God’s transcendence that corresponds 
cosmologically to “heaven” or other orders of reality beyond the earthly world of sense 
experience. In answer to McFague’s suggestion that religion accept the contemporary 
scientific picture of the world, Nasr writes: “It seems that having surrendered the world 
of nature to modern science, religion is now asked, in the name of the environment, to 
also surrender God to this science and allow a quantitative science of nature to determine 
for us who have created such a science the way to understand God.”34 For Nasr, the 
problem is not only that McFague has denied the hierarchical nature of the cosmos, but 
she has also reversed the proper hierarchy between religion and science. For Nasr science 
should operate within the limits set by metaphysics, which is the ultimate science. In the 
Body of God, McFague appears to want it the other way around, with contemporary 
science determining the limits of the world in which we can conceive of God. Nasr is 
concerned that placing religion under the authority of a secularized science will lead 
inevitably to the desacralization of religion itself, which will destroy its efficacy. As a 
Traditionalist, Nasr believes that religious forms are sacred, being based primarily on 
Revelation rather than humanly constructed, and hence not subject to rational or scientific 
criticism.  
 While these tensions all exist between Nasr’s perspective and McFague’s in The 
Body of God, as McFague’s perspective becomes more mystical and theocentric, 
especially after her fourth conversion, many of these tensions become much less 
                                                        
34
 Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature, 226 note 25. 
  
260 
pronounced and their common ground increases. Unfortunately, since their dialogue had 
gotten off to such a poor start just before and after McFague published The Body of God, 
there was no further dialogue between Nasr and McFague where their growing common 
ground might have been recognized and celebrated; that would only have happened if 
they had recognized what common ground was there to begin with when they first 
encountered one another in the context of interfaith dialogue regarding the ecological 
crisis. In Life Abundant McFague comes to recognize that the natural world is not 
ontologically independent of God. While not using language of hierarchy, McFague 
basically agrees with Nasr’s idea of God as the Divine Environment within which the 
natural environment exists, especially with her metaphor of the world being like a child 
in the womb of God. Even while critiquing McFague in Religion and the Order of 
Nature, Nasr’s theology about the God-world relationship is even closer to McFague’s 
than it was at the Spirit and Nature conference, insofar as he recognizes that the world is, 
in a certain sense, God’s body or God incarnate. Nasr writes, “[O]ne can say that the 
order of nature is nothing but the Divine Reality manifesting itself on the plane of 
phenomenal existence.”35 And, again, “The order of nature is not only created by God 
through His Will, but derives from the Divine Substance.”36 
Nasr and McFague both picture God as the Spirit surrounding and permeating the 
natural world, which is the object of sacralization. At an even deeper level, which they 
perceive mystically, they claim that nature itself is a manifestation or incarnation of God. 
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When one can see this common ground clearly, the cosmological differences and the 
differences in theological method between McFague and Nasr become more meaningful 
and potentially constructive. If both authors can agree on the project of resacralization of 
desacralized nature (which they understand to have been desacralized in much the same 
way), and if both authors can agree that picturing God as the Spirit permeating and giving 
life to the natural world is important to this project, they probably have enough common 
ground to become united in this mission while still continuing to debate the points about 
which they disagree, which will lead them to increased understanding of each other’s 
social and historical contexts. Their common ground for the solution directly relates to 
their common ground on the problem, and that is why it is all so resonant and close.  
Dialogue will be very helpful because such ideas will only be strengthened, clarified, and 
extended in this manner. Despite their many differences, then, the profound common 
ground indicated shows how dialogue will lead to a stronger resacralization movement. 
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CHAPTER 7 
COMMON GROUND EMBODIED 
Introduction 
 In Chapter 6 we began our exploration of the common ground between McFague 
and Nasr by focusing on the similar ways in which these two thinkers understand the root 
causes of the ecological crisis, and how this common understanding of the problem leads 
to profound similarities in the corrective theologies and worldviews they propose. In this 
chapter we continue this exploration, looking for common ground between McFague and 
Nasr’s proposals for the resacralization of nature in urban industrial contexts. As part of 
this discussion, we will also explore the ways both authors interact with and develop the 
theme of the body in their ecological theology. The body is a central theme for both 
McFague and Nasr. They agree that the way that the worldview shift needed for the 
sacred in nature to become apparent is for people to shift from viewing the world as a 
machine to viewing the world as a body. Of course, the ways in which McFague draws 
on the discourse about the body from a postmodern feminist perspective is quite different 
than the way that Nasr draws on this discourse from a traditionalist perspective. 
However, their differences are much more complementary than antagonistic or 
contradictory. In this chapter we will see how the common theme of the body could be 
used to combine and strengthen their different proposals for the resacralization of the 
city. 
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Nasr on Modern Cities 
In an interview with Bill Moyers in the documentary “Spirit and Nature,” Nasr 
describes, as the second of two causes of the desacralization of nature (the first being the 
rise of Enlightenment science), how denatured cities have contributed to the 
disconnection between human beings and the natural environment: 
But there is a second reason also for [the profanation of nature], and that is the 
creation, through modern technology, of an urban setting, in which, first of all, 
God is absent in a certain way—it is not like a medieval city, not like the Chartres 
Cathedral, where all you have to do is be there to have the presence of God; 
secular architecture, secular city planning, and then the banning of nature as much 
as possible from that ambience, so that the child is not brought up with the rhythm 
of nature and its realities.
1
 
 
For Nasr, the built environment of modern cities, being quite devoid of nature, is a 
detriment to the innate sense of wonder and mystery that children feel towards nature. A 
living connection with nature helps make one aware of God as sacred presence 
permeating the world. However, in the modern world the built environment tends to 
alienate people from nature and, in so doing, causes people to forget about God. 
Nasr comments on the problem further in Islam in the Modern World, in a chapter 
devoted to the problem of secularized and desacralized architecture in the Islamic world. 
Nasr’s telling of the change in Islamic cities mirrors his overall fall narrative regarding 
the desacralization of nature. It begins with his description of the traditional Muslim city 
where nature is integrated into the city. 
                                                        
1
 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, interview by Bill Moyers, Spirit and Nature, Bill Moyers and Company, 
June, 1991. http://billmoyers.com/content/spirit-nature/, accessed 5/28/2014. 
  
264 
Traditional Muslims looked at the houses in the city with full awareness of their 
passing, transient quality with respect both to God Himself and to virgin nature, 
the handiwork of God. Moreover, they saw the city as the extension of the natural 
environment, in harmony rather than in discord with it. Islamic architecture 
remained faithful to simple building materials and employed the elemental forces 
of nature such as light and wind for its sources of energy. It brought nature into 
the city by recreating the calmness, harmony, and peace of virgin nature within 
the courtyards of the mosque and the home.
2
 
 
In accordance with the form of a “fall” analogy, he then describes in a tone of lament 
how this traditional Muslim architecture and urban ambience has been displaced by 
modern modes of architecture and city planning which have contributed to the 
desacralization of Muslim cities. This might be seen as a particular manifestation of the 
overall fall of humanity in regard to the alienation from nature issuing in the ecological 
crisis. 
Modernized Muslims, whose spiritual sense has become dulled by the forces of 
secularization, have forgotten the ephemeral quality of human life on earth and 
the peace and harmony pervading nature. Like modern Westerners, whom they 
emulate, they want to build homes as if they were going to live forever and 
construct cities whose very existence is based upon defiance of nature, the 
violation of her rhythms, and the depletion of her resources. One need only look 
at the glittering palaces built in the middle of the Arabian desert or the 
skyscrapers of the Persian Gulf to find clear examples of this assertion. Modern 
people, including secularized Muslims, want to create an ambience in which God 
is forgotten. This means creating an urban environment in total disequilibrium 
with that natural environment, which is created by God and which, being itself a 
reminder of the Divine, gives the lie to the very notion of secularism and 
desacralization.
3
 
 
The above quotation is consistent with Nasr’s conception, discussed earlier, of God as al-
Muhit. For Nasr, because of the intimate connection between the Divine Environment and 
the natural environment, a city which is not integrated with nature is one that, by design, 
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forgets God. For Nasr, the problems of secularism and desacralization of nature go hand 
in hand, insofar as traditional Muslim architecture was integrated into nature in ways that 
honored and complemented the spiritual presence of God in nature.  
 Nasr’s critique of urban industrial cities also ties into his general critique of 
modern reductionist science, insofar as he views such cities as examples of the 
application of this science. 
The very qualities, forms and harmonies which physics leaves aside from its 
quantitative point of view, very far from being accidental or negligible, are the 
aspects most closely tied to the ontological root of things. That is why the 
application of a science which neglects these elements causes disequilibrium and 
brings about disorder and ugliness, especially in a world where other sciences of 
nature do not exist and where there is no wisdom or sapientia which could place 
the quantitative sciences in their proper position in the total scheme of 
knowledge.
4
 
 
For Nasr, the reform of science he suggests, that is, the creation of a sacred science, has 
its corollary in the project of creating a sacred city. In such a city, environmental 
equilibrium and sustainability would be accompanied by order and beauty. Also, just as 
Nasr’s suggestion for the development of a sacred science focuses on how this project 
might move forward in the Muslim world in resistance to an alien Western model, so too 
his ideas about the creation of sacred cities focuses on the Muslim world and the prospect 
of restoring traditional Islamic architecture. 
  In Islam in the Modern World, there is a picture of the Dubai skyline as of 2010. 
Its skyscrapers, including the world’s tallest, represent fully Dubai’s participation in 
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Western-style modern development.
5
 To further illustrate this point, consider Dubai’s 
2014 plan to build the world’s largest mall. The eight million square foot complex would 
feature climate controlled indoor streets, an indoor amusement park, and other design 
features that will require massive amounts of energy to operate. It is an environmental 
monstrosity not only in its design, but in its purpose to attract tourists via air-travel for a 
vacation experience based on extravagant consumption of goods, services, and 
entertainment.
6
  This is just one project that confirms Nasr’s contention that architectural 
projects within the Islamic world are proceeding “as if the energy crisis did not exist and 
as if the environmental crisis were just a fiction to scare the gullible.”7 
 As a first step towards a solution, Nasr suggests training Islamic architects who 
will be able to employ Islamic principles of design and traditional building techniques, 
which he argues are inherently more sustainable than their modern Western counterparts. 
While Nasr mentions a few examples of traditional architects current in the field, the 
prospect of training Islamic architects on a large scale brings up the whole problem of 
Western-dominated education in the Islamic world. Nasr writes, “ultimately, Islamic 
architecture cannot be revived unless the contemporary Muslim is reborn and the 
shackles of Western cultural and philosophical domination overthrown.”8 At the heart of 
this rebirth of the contemporary Muslim would be Nasr’s project of reviving the 
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traditional Islamic sciences as primary sources in Muslim higher education, and 
integrating contemporary Western science within a traditional Muslim metaphysical 
framework. While an academic and cultural official in Iran Nasr did begin to manifest 
this vision in shaping institutions of higher learning in the nation. 
Also, as described in chapters 1 and 3, Nasr made practical efforts to manifest this 
philosophy of architecture in his role as the first president of Aryamehr University in Iran 
before his exile. The original plans for the campus included a thirty story tower in its 
center. Nasr appealed first to the Queen and then to the Shah to change the plan to make 
this structure both more traditional and more environmental. He proposed a “horizontal 
tower” which would not obstruct the view of nearby Isfahan, a city featuring traditional 
Persian architecture, nor disrupt the skyline itself, and which would not require so much 
energy for elevators, air conditioning, and other amenities needed for a tall tower in the 
desert. The Shah allowed Nasr to change the plans, and because of this the buildings were 
able to be constructed of brick which was made by local artisans with their own kilns in 
an effort to revive traditional technologies.
9
 Nasr’s project shows how his values of 
traditionalism and environmentalism are integrated in his architectural philosophy. For 
example, he values both beauty and function. His concerns are environmental and 
aesthetic, and his architectural philosophy presents an alternative to what he sees as the 
ugliness and wastefulness of modern Western-style architecture.  
Besides thinking about architecture in the Islamic majority world, Nasr also 
considers how the principles of Islamic architecture might be applied in the West and 
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other non-Muslim majority parts of the world. He presents an extensive rationale for this 
potential cross-civilizational application of Islamic architectural principles based on (1) 
“universal elements within human beings and in their relation to the natural 
environment”; (2) a sympathy between the Western and Islamic worlds via the West’s 
Christian heritage, which is from the same religious family as Islam; and (3) the 
universality of Islam itself as the “primordial religion of Divine Unity” that relates to the 
primordial nature hidden within all people.
10
 This discussion focuses on the principles of 
unity and integration at the heart of Islamic architecture.  
In architecture and urban design unity implies the integration of the elements of 
architecture, the interrelation of the functions and purposes of space, and the 
ubiquitous presence of the sacred in all forms of architecture in such a way as to 
remove the very notion of the secular as a category in opposite to the sacred. It 
implies realization of the theophanies of the One in the buildings created by 
human hands in the same way that virgin nature reflects its Unique Creator 
through the harmony, equilibrium, and interrelation that characterize its manifold 
forms and phenomena. Since al-tawhid in Arabic means both “oneness” and 
“making one” (or “integration”), the principle of unity in architecture and urban 
design implies at once the state of oneness reflected through the peace, tranquility, 
and harmony of Islamic architecture and the act of making one, or integration, 
that interconnects the functions of human living space, starting from a single 
edifice and extending to a whole village or urban setting, creating ever greater 
degrees of unity leading to Unity as such.
11
 
 
For Nasr, Islamic architecture seeks to embody the theme or principle of unity, and in 
doing so imitates nature. Like nature, Islamic architecture is meant to be revelatory of the 
One. Another aspect of this theme is integration, making things one, which sets Islamic 
architecture apart from secular urban architecture that sacrifices beauty and deeper 
significance for greater utility. 
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In traditional Islam, religious and secular architecture do not exist as two distinct 
and opposing realities; rather, Islamic architecture in a sense grows as a whole out 
of the mosque and is its extension.  Any action or rite performed in the mosque 
can also be accomplished in the home or the bazaar, whose spaces are in this 
sense the extensions of the space of the mosque.
12
 
 
Traditional Islamic architecture links all its forms to the sacred forms of the mosque, 
insofar as sacred acts are welcome in all spaces in Muslim life. In this way, traditional 
Islamic architecture supports an integrated rather than compartmentalized life.  
 In his discussion of the theme of unity in the architecture and overall planning of 
the  traditional Islamic city, Nasr’s description of the city begins to sound like a 
description of the body (reminiscent of Paul’s connection of the theme of unity and body, 
e.g., “We are all one in the body of Christ)”:  
In a traditional Islamic city such as Fez or Isfahan, the mosque is not only itself 
the community center as well as the locus of religious activity, but opens, to the 
area of economic activity, private homes, schools, and palaces in such a way as to 
link them all together. The spaces of all these activities are related to each other 
and form an organic whole. The architecture and city planning thus reflect the 
unity of traditional Islamic life, while themselves facilitating the living of an 
integrated life based on and also resulting in the interconnection between the 
religious, educational, cultural, social, economic, political, and other facets of 
human life.
13
 
 
In modern architecture three different specialists tend to the interior of a building, the 
exterior, and its landscaping, whereas in traditional Islamic architecture the same person 
or cohesive group designs all three aspects. Nasr writes, “[T]his enables them to become 
organically integrated into a single experience embracing the interior spaces, the structure 
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itself, and the landscape surrounding the edifice.”14 Furthermore, Islamic architecture 
manifests the principle of unity in creating spaces that are used for multiple functions. 
Nasr writes, “A room in the traditional Muslim home can serve during a single day as 
bedroom, dining room, guest room, or place of worship, and the lack of fixed furniture in 
the modern sense aids greatly in facilitating such multiple usage.”15 
In Nasr’s conception of the Islamic city as a whole greater than the sum of its 
parts, one picks up almost on a description of the city as itself being a body: “unity 
always predominated over multiplicity and prevented the parts from becoming realities 
independent of the whole.”16 Nasr describes the home as a whole, greater than its parts, 
agriculturally, in which spaces for life grow with flexibility as needed, but always as part 
of the whole. So too, the parts of the city itself grow in harmony with the whole of the 
city. Nasr’s interpretation of the traditional Islamic city is that it is holistic and bodily. 
The home and the city are both bodies (not human bodies) that grow naturally as needed 
while remaining one unified organism with a distinctly Islamic bodily identity. 
Nasr also talks about the importance of wedding beauty and function, which is 
another aspect of Islamic architecture derived from the principle of unity. Nasr quotes the 
hadith, “God has ‘inscribed’ the mark of beauty upon all things.” Islamic architecture, 
according to Nasr, defines beauty as a “human necessity.”  
To have a holistic image of the human person as at once a body, soul, and spirit, 
at once a creature of this earth and yet created for immortality and eternal life, is 
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to realize that no authentic functionality or utility can be divorced from beauty, 
for what is ugly is ultimately “useless”—it is false and finally goes against the 
deepest interests of human beings.
17
 
 
This assertion of the profound utility of beauty in terms of supporting human nature 
speaks to the connection between first nature and second nature. Human buildings are 
part of God’s creation. They therefore should be beautiful, just as nature is beautiful. 
Resacralization of nature implies resacralization of architecture; the two are linked. The 
sacredness of nature is echoed in architecture. The sacredness of both, in human 
perception, stands or falls together. A secular architecture can create discontinuity, with 
its ugliness and non-natural appearance, with the world of nature. Rather than serve as a 
bridge of connection to nature and to al-Muhit, and an affirmation of the cosmic nature of 
human beings as bridge between Earth and Heaven, modern Western-type architecture 
isolates and disconnects humanity from nature and God, and rather supports the distorted, 
self-referential view of humanity as the Absolute. 
 For Nasr, traditional Islamic architecture is not only environmentally friendly, but 
it supports the sensibility and worldview of traditional Islam with respect to God, the 
world, and human beings that he has tried to revive throughout his career. 
In accordance with the primordial character of the Islamic revelation and its 
reestablishment of harmony between human beings and nature, Islamic 
architecture and city planning have always emphasized the integration of 
architecture and the natural setting. Nature in a certain sense permeates and 
penetrates the traditional Islamic city and its buildings. The mosque itself is not a 
holy and supernatural space separated from natural space, but an extension into a 
man-made environment of the space of virgin nature, which, because it was 
created by God, is sacred in itself and still echoes its original paradisal perfection. 
Natural light and air enter easily into the spaces of the mosque and other 
buildings, and birds even fly around within religious edifices during the most 
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solemn moments of a rite or ceremony. The countryside is always nearby, and the 
rhythms of desert and mountain penetrate into the city. The traditional edifices are 
what is called today “environmentally friendly.”18 
 
Interestingly, Nasr’s approach to urban architecture is not superficially concerned only 
with the quantitative aspects of the problem, such as the need to reduce our ecological 
footprints by building more efficient spaces out of more earth-friendly materials. Those 
types of concerns are integral to his perspective. But Nasr’s focus is on the resacralizing 
potential of traditional Islamic architecture more than anything else. The revival of 
traditional Islamic architecture he suggests would be pursued as part and parcel of an 
effort to recover the world view and values implicit within its forms.  
McFague on Architecture 
 Unlike Nasr’s lament of the fall of traditional Islamic architecture and city 
planning to modern Western architecture and city planning, McFague argues that 
American cities have always been fundamentally disintegrated from nature. The 
American sensibility regarding cities and nature is characteristically dualistic, seeing the 
city as “the domain of the machine” and the country as “the place of the garden.” For 
Americans nature is synonymous with wilderness (what Nasr would call pristine or virgin 
nature); this narrow view limits nature’s scope and alienates city-dwellers from it. 
McFague writes:  
One finds nature by escaping the filth, corruption, and mechanization of the city. 
The industrial revolution drove Americans into the city, while confining nature to 
the countryside and wilderness areas. We were to earn our living and raise our 
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children in the denatured cities and then escape to the country for rest and 
recreation. This dualistic ideal served neither nature nor us well.
19
 
 
For McFague, the urgency of the problem of cities without nature is that encounters with 
wildness are essential, she believes, to the development of the loving eye, the spiritual 
vision of nature. With only two percent of Americans currently living in rural settings, 
and the populations of cities projected to grow, this problem is acute for the vast majority 
of Americans. Also, for McFague, suburban communities, with their cookie cutter houses 
and manicured lawns are also lacking in wildness in its true sense. “What we need,” 
McFague argues, “is vibrant, interesting cities of diverse human populations with 
wilderness built or rebuilt into them.”20 
 In Super, Natural Christians (her first extended discussion of the issue of 
denatured cities) McFague does not make specific proposals regarding city planning, but 
she does offer some general principles, and theological and ethical rationale along with 
them. Her main argument is that wild places are needed in cities so that all people, 
including the poor and minorities (not only the wealthy who can afford to vacation in the 
wilderness), have regular access to encounter natural subjects and develop a lived 
experience of loving nature, seeing it in all its mystery, complexity, beauty, and 
aliveness. For McFague, the “ecological model” requires that wilderness be included in 
cities so as “to encourage real encounters between human beings and nature.” She argues 
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forcefully that the poor and minorities “have the right to the joy of being in nature.”21 
Ultimately, her claim is a theological one: 
I am claiming that it is not just “nice” to have parks and wooded areas in cities for 
our leisure hours; rather, it is essential to have them—for everyone—so that we 
can learn who we are in the scheme of things. They are not just casual 
acquaintances to whom we can choose to be related. Rather, they are our relatives, 
our kin, the network of life from which we came and to which we will return. We 
all need to awaken to this reality; in this sense, “bird watching” is not just a hobby 
but part of our vocation…The conversion to the earth, the awakening to who we 
truly are, occurs most often, it seems, through immediate encounters with 
particular wild others. This is why as a theologian I believe that the way cities are 
constructed is critical to the future of our species as well as of other species.
22
 
 
McFague’s theological concern regarding denatured cities has much in common with 
Nasr’s concern about modern urban cities which are desacralized in terms of their lack of 
sacred architecture but also because of “the banning of nature as much as possible from 
that ambience, so that the child is not brought up with the rhythm of nature and its 
realities.”23 Nasr’s concern with the “child” in question here is that insofar as one is 
immersed in a modern urban environment, especially from a young age, one’s view of the 
world would be shaped by that urban setting so that one would tend to view the world as 
a lifeless machine. For McFague, like Nasr, urban architecture intentionally designed can 
help us discover “who we truly are.” It can either affirm or deny our innate and integral 
connection with and dependence on the web of life that fills the natural world.   
 For Nasr, traditional Muslim architecture, like traditional Islamic sciences, 
cosmology, and metaphysics, represents an alternative to modern Western architecture 
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that can be remembered, and recovered and preserved from the onslaught of 
Westernization. Just as traditional Islamic thought avoids Western dualisms and views 
the natural and supernatural as integrated and contiguous, so too Islamic architecture 
avoids the Western duality of city and wilderness, and creates cities that nurture a 
spirituality that is in tune with the rhythms and balances of nature. For McFague, just as 
the mainstream of the Western Christian tradition presents an unhelpful theology of 
nature, so too in the architectural realm (at least in North America): there is apparently no 
American tradition of city-planning worth recovering or preserving. Rather than call her 
audience back to a previous ideal of the city, McFague calls them to a way of viewing 
nature (drawn from the spirituality of St. Francis) that is fundamentally new to American 
urban and suburban consciousness. This predicament presents an opportunity for 
dialogue. McFague and others in North America could look to the traditional Islamic city, 
or other traditional forms of architecture that integrate humanity and nature, for ideas and 
clues to renovating and creating cities that foster deep human-nature relationships on the 
subject-subjects model (or at least create a context of possibility for such relationships to 
be forged). 
McFague headlines her discussion of this issue in A New Climate for Theology 
(2010), “Nature Encompasses the City,” a phrase reminiscent of Nasr’s belief in God as 
al-Muhit. McFague does not deal specifically with the problem of secularization in the 
city, given her postmodern, largely secular Western context; the North American city, it 
seems, has always been more or less secular, so there is no significant story of 
“secularization” to tell for McFague as there is for Nasr. In the Muslim world, cities have 
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been drastically and dramatically Westernized, secularized, and mechanized. However, 
she seems to be on the same page as Nasr regarding the problem of forgetting God by 
forgetting the natural environment. McFague speaks about first nature, or wild nature, 
and second nature, or nature transformed by humans into cities and the like. “The human 
ability to distance ourselves from first nature, both by changing it and by objectifying it, 
is causing a deep forgetfulness to overtake us.”24 McFague talks in depth about this 
forgetfulness as it relates to food consumption in cities, which is so disconnected from 
food sources. “A spacious condo overlooking the harbor, with all of the electronic 
devices desired, is the sign of the successful city dweller. But having transformed first 
nature so thoroughly into the built, utilized environment, we are no longer aware of 
nature as source, as that which feeds us every mouthful we eat and provides us with every 
breath we take.”25 Nasr and McFague both frame the problem in terms of forgetting 
nature. For Nasr, explicitly, this implies forgetting God; and for McFague too, this 
connection is there implicitly, though not addressed as directly.  
McFague’s discussion of the environment of cities in A New Climate for Theology 
further elaborates themes introduced in Super, Natural Christians, in regard to applying 
her organic model of theology, the world as God’s body, to life in cities. In this 
discussion, McFague divides the body-focused theology of incarnational Christianity into 
two dimensions, “the sacramental and the prophetic, or the Catholic and the Protestant”: 
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The sacramental stresses continuity between the world and God—the world is a 
sacrament of God—while the prophetic underscores distance between God and 
the world. The sacramental dimension says that the world is a reflection of God, 
tells us of God, and connects the earthly, bodily joys of life (beauty, love, food, 
music, play) with God. The prophetic dimension insists that since the world is a 
body, it must be fed and cared for: all parts must receive their just supply of 
resources, and the earth must be sustained for the indefinite future.
26
 
 
With this application of the organic model, McFague essentially fulfills Nasr’s call for a 
Christian theology that captures the double valence of what he calls world confirmation 
and world rejection.  
[W]orld-denial is simply one aspect of a single reality whose other dimension is 
“world-confirmation,” but the soul cannot confirm the world as sacred without 
first of all denying the “world” that disperses the soul from within and makes it 
ever more reliant upon the material environment for the satiation of an ever-
increasing thirst. One wonders how, in the light of the crucial nature of the 
problem at hand, a deeper distinction is not made by often well-intentioned eco-
theologians between the world as enticement toward passion, greed, and 
aggression and the world as God’s Creation and ultimately theophany.27 
 
While not employing the same theological framework to achieve this nuanced view, 
McFague identifies, through her lenses of sacramental (Catholic) and prophetic 
(Protestant), the aspect of contemplating and appreciating the world (or nature), as well 
as the dimension of limiting one’s consumption of natural goods and redistributing 
resources.  
McFague’s sacramental theology echoes Nasr’s very closely here, especially in 
her insistence that this perspective “sees the world as a reflection of God” and that it 
“supports the ‘irreducibility’ of nature, its ‘more than us’ quality, its ‘otherness’ as 
belonging to God, not to us.” She affirms that “such a sensibility cannot imagine 
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replacing the world with human interpretations and constructions.” This relates well with 
Nasr’s reflections on architecture. He values traditional Muslim architecture because it 
mimics and integrates into nature, echoing her music and reflecting her forms. At the 
same time he is horrified by modern Western-style architecture which distances itself 
from nature, and even defies nature.  
 The prophetic dimension of the organic model, for McFague, focuses on the needs 
of the world as body, and bodies within that world; it “stresses the limits of all bodies, the 
finitude of the planet, the need for just and sustainable use of resources.” This relates to 
Nasr’s call for limits to human consumption through what he calls the world-denial 
dimension of religion, of which world confirmation is the other side of the coin. This 
correlation becomes especially clear in McFague’s direct application of this dimension of 
the organic model to city life: 
More specifically, within the built environment, the twelve thousand years of 
gradual urbanization, the organic model of the world places severe limits on the 
excess, hoarding, greed, and injustice of some parts of the body—namely, the 
well-off 20 percent of human beings who are contributing to the destruction of the 
planet and the impoverishment of fellow human beings.
28
 
 
McFague argues that the prophetic dimension is essential to the urban crisis of the 21
st
 
century, which is defined by social inequality in cities, with drastically unequal access to 
basic goods and services in rich and poor areas. What is fascinating, in comparison with 
Nasr’s understanding of world denial, which leads to this same ethic of self-limitation 
and disciplined, frugal consumption, is that McFague does not rely at all upon any idea of 
a world beyond this world as a vantage-point from which to engage in world-denial.  
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For McFague, the basis of the prophetic dimension of the incarnational model, in 
terms of its ethic of limitation, is kenosis, God’s self-limitation in the act of creation and 
God’s incarnation in Christ. McFague argues that the ethic of kenosis is about making 
space for other bodies on Earth. Christians are called to limit themselves, and in so doing 
make room for others. As many religions affirm, we are called to limit our ego space, 
which McFague relates to limiting consumption of physical space.
29
 While this analogy 
gets at what Nasr identifies as the material being subordinate to the spiritual, she 
decidedly does not follow Nasr’s more traditional framework of symbolizing this higher 
spiritual interest with an interest in Heaven as the limiting force of our “earthly” desires. 
For Nasr, the mystic limits his or her earthly desires and consumption by transcending 
this world and focusing on the world beyond, his or her final destination. For McFague, 
the spiritual technique is incarnational, kenotic. It does not ask the self to go upward or 
escape up into a higher reality that relativizes the importance of earthly means and ends 
altogether. Instead, it asks one to limit and reduce one’s selfishness through self-
emptying and focusing on other bodies on Earth rather than only (or primarily) one’s 
own.  
McFague’s ethic of kenosis has concrete applications for city life that also 
complement Nasr’s calls for the reintegration of nature into cities. By limiting second 
nature, which is an extension of the human self, we can make room for first nature in our 
cities. This opening of space for nature is important in terms of opening up the possibility 
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for city-dwellers to enjoy the sacramental dimension of appreciation for nature—what 
Nasr calls world confirmation.  
Cities as Concrete Common Ground 
City planning is a concrete example of how both McFague and Nasr agree on how 
to resacralize the natural world for contemporary humanity, by bringing nature back into 
cities so that it can be experienced. This is just one example of how their common ground 
could lead not only to a common speech and concept, but to common action and 
advocacy. Ideological obstacles regarding whether to use male language for God, or 
whether evolution is true or not, need not hinder such dialogue and cooperation that could 
be meaningfully expressed in joint efforts by Christians, Muslims, and others concerned 
with the environmental crisis: to integrate wild places into cities and preserve larger 
wilderness areas for the sake of biodiversity, and to decrease levels of consumption for 
the well-off so that all have enough space, goods, and services for a decent life. For all 
the differences McFague and Nasr have, they would both find value in creating a 
community garden or bird sanctuary in a city-scape otherwise devoid of nature. They 
would both want the children and adults of the city to be able to be in this space to 
experience the wonder and glory of nature. For both, it would be a step in the right 
direction from desacralization and disconnection with nature, to resacralization and 
reconnection with nature. Furthermore, for the sake of preserving first nature or virgin 
nature, both would favor cities that are built sustainably and do not needlessly waste 
energy or encourage overconsumption. 
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But the theme of limiting built nature, for McFague, is more essentially prophetic 
in its implications in terms of redistributing Earth’s resources more fairly among all city 
dwellers in the twenty-first century. Her call for limitation goes out to those who have 
built too much, to the “developed” world, rather than the “underdeveloped” world. 
McFague writes: 
It means that second nature, the built environment, must be minimized rather than 
maximized. It means small condos and apartments, not mansions; living spaces 
that go up, not out; small, hybrid cars, not Hummers; food that is grown locally, 
not halfway around the world. It means saying no, saying, “Enough!” Second 
nature is built upon first nature, and first nature is, increasingly, a vulnerable, 
deteriorating body unable to support the Western high-energy lifestyle. This 
realization should impact us at all levels: the food we eat, our means of 
transportation, the clothes we wear, the places we live, the parks where we play, 
the offices where we work. One of the greatest challenges of the twenty-first 
century is the provision of decent, livable conditions for the billions who will live 
in cities. We well-off city dwellers need to take up less space, use less energy, 
lower our desire for more, attend to needs before wants—become small, in other 
words.
30
  
 
Interestingly, McFague’s critique of the built environment of second nature in modern, 
urbanized cities focuses on the quantitative element of this development. The problem, as 
she conceptualizes it, is primarily a problem of scale, of modern human buildings and 
excessive modes of consumption taking up all the space so that there is insufficient room 
for first nature and few resources for poor human bodies. The prophetic dimension of her 
theology supports the contemplative dimension insofar as the prophetic call to self-
limitation, for example in cities, helps make room for wild places where first nature can 
be enjoyed. To the extent that city-dwellers heed the call to slow down their 
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consumption, they may be able to turn their attention to non-consumptive leisure 
practices such as contemplation of nature.  
However, what her thinking about cities seems to lack, and could perhaps borrow 
from Nasr, is an integration of the prophetic and contemplative aspects of her theology in 
terms of her specific vision for urban architecture. McFague’s prophetic call for kenosis 
clearly would place quantitative limits on urban structures, yet she does not have a vision 
for how these urban structures of the built environment can also be integrated into the 
contemplative dimension of her theology. As Nasr describes it, traditional Muslim 
architecture is, by nature, more sustainable or environmental than modern urban 
architecture. However, in his discussion of this form of architecture, its sustainability is 
not the focus; rather, Nasr focuses on its sacramentality. Unlike modern Western 
architecture, which so often appears to Nasr to be constructed in defiance of nature, 
traditional Muslim architecture is based on the principle of the integration of first nature 
and second nature. Traditional Islamic architecture seeks to reveal the Creator by 
imitating natural forms. By seeking to be in harmony with nature, and therefore with 
God, traditional Muslim architecture achieves sustainability without making its primary 
goal sustainability.  
This is an example of where a Christian-Muslim dialogue, in the mode of Islam 
reminding Christianity of its lost spiritual vision, might be quite helpful. In the Islamic 
world, unlike in the North American urban heritage, there are still living examples of 
sacred cities that are organically integrated into nature and sustainable through simplicity 
(use of natural sunlight and airflow to illuminate and cool buildings) rather than 
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technological advancement (such as solar panels, LED light bulbs, wind power). For 
example, Nasr writes: 
Not only does one observe the absence of any opposition between the forces and 
elements of nature and the traditional Islamic urban ambience; but every attempt 
has been made in Islamic architecture to make maximum use of the forces of 
nature, of light, wind, shade, and so on. In short, [traditional Islamic] architecture 
has never set itself up against the natural order or in defiance of the rhythms and 
harmony of nature. Even most materials used, such as mud walls or soft brick, 
have been treated in such a way as to allow a building to be reabsorbed into the 
bosom of nature once it is abandoned by its human inhabitants.
31
 
 
As Nasr observes, the traditional value of integrating architecture with nature leads to 
sustainability or environmental friendliness without conceiving this as a separate goal of 
architecture. For McFague and most other modern North Americans, there is no 
traditional architecture left in sight that one could hope to recover. Yet by being in 
conversation with Muslim interlocutors who have a lived experience of the contrast 
between sacred and secular architecture, between the traditional and modern city, North 
Americans might be able to catch the vision for a city that is not only sustainable but also 
sacred, which integrates itself with nature rather than just makes room for nature. For 
McFague, because she does not envision a sacred form of architecture integrated with 
nature, the focus is on shrinking the size of urban architecture. Yet, in Nasr’s perspective, 
when the quality of architecture is traditional, its quantity or size is less of an issue. 
Traditional Islamic architecture produced very large cities that, he argues, were 
sustainable: 
Muslims towns and even large cities were built in such a way that, had they 
remained in their traditional form, they could in principle have survived 
indefinitely without bringing about the ecological catastrophes and environmental 
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crises associated so much today with urban life, crises with which the modern 
world is only too familiar. Traditional Muslims, like other traditional peoples, saw 
themselves as the custodians of nature, whose laws and rhythms they respected, 
even if they built some of the largest towns and cities known to humanity before 
modern times.
32
 
 
For Nasr, the principles of integration with and respect for nature, which traditional 
Muslims share with all traditional peoples, naturally lead to architecture and city planning 
which is sustainable. Nasr argues that the traditional Islamic cities were, to borrow an 
agricultural phrase, permacultures. His vision for urban architecture, like his vision for 
science, religion, and knowledge in general, is a vision of return to tradition. 
 For McFague, the mechanistic view of nature is the one currently supported by 
modern city life in the “developed” world: 
Since most of us have a difficult time recognizing first nature as the source of 
buildings, trucks, machines, and highways we construct, thinking of the world in 
terms of exchangeable parts is easy. Cities do not appear to be organic entities 
made from the earth; rather, they have independent parts “made by human 
beings” that can be torn down when needed and new ones constructed.33 
 
This failure to recognize nature as the source of our cities, what she also calls “the 
forgetfulness of first nature,” is a problem that Nasr also is concerned with.34 Such 
forgetfulness of the connection between the natural environment and the human 
environment is also at the root of the problem of modern urban cities’ discontinuity and 
disconnection with nature. One observation Nasr makes in this regard is that the materials 
of modern cities mask their origin in nature. Concrete, exposed metal, glass, plastics and 
other such substances are so processed that they have lost their resemblance to first 
                                                        
32
 Ibid. 
 
33
 McFague, A New Climate for Theology, 130. 
 
34
 Ibid., 122. 
  
285 
nature. For this reason, Nasr calls for the use of simpler, less processed building materials 
that speak directly to their origin in the natural world: “Brick should be used as brick and 
should be experienced as brick, and stone as stone, and so forth.”35 These materials, 
unlike building materials which have been excessively separated from nature, are also 
more easily integrated through decomposition back into the body of the earth when the 
structures they compose reach the end of their life cycle.  
Nasr calls for the revival of a traditional Muslim style of architecture that 
cultivates awareness that human habitats are based in and on the natural environment: 
“Even the physical forces and laws that govern the material with which architecture is 
concerned should be treated and respected in such a way as to bring out their character as 
parts of God’s creation and therefore participants in that structuring of harmony and 
beauty that characterizes creation.”36 For example, Nasr is talking about building in ways 
that fit into the natural environment, such as the horizontal tower whose construction he 
supervised in Iran, rather than building Western style skyscrapers which symbolize 
human domination over, and separation from, nature. Insofar as McFague wants to 
promote the metaphor of “bodies living with the body of the earth” instead of “the 
individual in the machine” she is clearly standing on common ground with Nasr.  
McFague’s reflection on the organic model has many concrete implications for 
cities. In her discussion of cities in A New Climate for Theology, she boils the conflict in 
world images down to world as body vs. world as machine. That move isolates the 
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problem in the modern technological, scientific, capitalistic world—the anomaly period 
of ecological fall. She makes a simple statement that Nasr would affirm wholeheartedly 
because it does not entail deconstructing the old models, the medieval model, etc., but 
seems to speak more inclusively of what Nasr calls the “non-modern”: 
In other words, the individualistic, greedy assumptions of market capitalism are 
false: human beings cannot flourish apart from the flourishing of all the 
constituents that make up the earth. The earth is more like a body than a machine. 
Returning to the wisdom of our forebears and living with the body model rather 
than within the machine appears to be an appropriate move.
37
 
 
In A New Climate for Theology McFague strikes a different tone than in previous texts, 
such as The Body of God, which emphasized theological deconstruction and construction 
of a fundamentally new model of the God-world-human relationships based on 
contemporary science. This later text incorporates the fruits of that deconstruction, but 
perhaps because the dust has settled, so to speak, McFague is able to acknowledge her 
organic model as “[r]eturning to the wisdom of our forebears” rather than as 
deconstructing this wisdom. Having completed this construction, McFague has 
apparently discovered that viewing the world as a body rather than a machine reflects, on 
a deep level, a recovery of traditional insight rather than a fundamentally new idea.  
 McFague’s recognition of a need to return to the wisdom of our forebears is a 
point of connection with Nasr’s call to the Western world to learn from traditional 
Muslim architecture and city planning: 
The modern Western city, whose problems have now become also those of many 
Islamic cities, although often in more intense form, suffers from excessive 
segmentation; disequilibrium vis-à-vis the natural environment; unsound 
economical and ecological practices, particularly in its use of energy resources; 
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and the spread of a blanket of ugliness in the name of economic necessity, with 
the result that beauty appears as luxury and is divorced from utility. The Islamic 
emphasis upon the unity of the facets of life as reflected in different architectural 
spaces, the harmony between human beings and the natural environment, and the 
wedding between beauty and utility as well as many other related principles, far 
from being of significance only for the Islamic world, cannot but be of interest to 
those in the West who are genuinely concerned with the future of urban life 
beyond the immediate desire for personal power and wealth.
38
 
 
Nasr’s simple argument is that because the Islamic world and the Western world are 
suffering from the same dysfunctions in urban life, the Islamic solutions to this particular 
element of the ecological crisis must be relevant beyond the Muslim world: 
Although Islam has over the centuries appeared as the “other” to the Christian and 
even “post-Christian” West, its architectural philosophy, based on its conception 
of humanity in its primordial harmony with the world of creation, can play a role 
in this dark hour of human history in the creation of an ambience, at once cultural 
and architectural, that can reflect human beings’ true earthly journey.39 
 
The Body as Bridge Theme 
One essential theme that could serve as a bridge between McFague and Nasr in 
terms of this potential conversation around cities is the theme of the body, which for both 
authors carries cosmic and mystical import. McFague refers to her model of the city as an 
organic model, and highlights the theme of body as it relates to the many human bodies 
in cities and how much room they should take up. Her view also involves the recognition 
of first nature, upon which cities are built, as a body that is suffering, along with 
marginalized human bodies, from the excessively large ecological footprints of well-off 
Westerners who are trampling the earth and the poor by their overconsumption. For both 
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Nasr and McFague, the world itself is a body and this acknowledgment deeply impacts 
their theologies. 
Nasr and McFague are on the same page when it comes to the organic model, that 
is, viewing the world as a body intimately related to our bodies. For McFague the central 
theological task, in the anthropological dimension of theology, is “to change the 
metaphor by which we think of ourselves in the world” according to modern day 
capitalism: in “the individual in the machine” model we are “subjects in an objectified 
world that is there for our use—our needs, desires, and recreation.”40 Nasr also rejects 
this technologically-focused, individualistic, and reductionist worldview. For McFague 
and Nasr, to use McFague’s words in A New Climate for Theology, such a view is “an 
anomaly in human history” brought on by the unique process of objectification and 
desacralization of “the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century.”41 McFague 
points out that traditions as diverse as Stoicism, medieval Christianity, and Indigenous 
Spiritualties have all assumed that the Earth is living.
42
 Nasr would agree with this 
analysis of seeing the modern period of Western history as anomalous and opposed to the 
perennial wisdom of virtually all traditional religions and philosophies in its 
objectification and desacralization of nature. Furthermore, both Nasr and McFague are in 
essential agreement not only in emphasizing that the world is a body, but identifying God 
as relating to that body as its Spirit.  
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Nasr does not explicitly embrace McFague’s incarnational metaphor of the world 
as God’s body, at least not as she presents it in The Body of God. In Religion and the 
Order of Nature, Nasr is careful to articulate the hierarchical cosmological context in 
which he would use such a phrase. “Not only are we endowed with a physical body, but 
also a subtle body, an imaginal body, and even “bodies” on higher planes reaching the 
Divine Order itself in which it is possible to speak of the Divine Body.” 43 His critique of 
McFague’s initial designation of the world as God’s body is implicit in this suggestion of 
how to use the language of “Divine Body”: McFague’s initial construction of the world 
as God’s body, in his view, denies the transcendence of God above and beyond the world 
as traditionally understood. However, Nasr selects other figures of speech that capture the 
immanent dimension of the Spirit permeating or inbreathing the world.  
While Nasr does not want to forget about higher levels of reality beyond the 
physical world, he is very concerned with the physical body which he affirms as being of 
prime spiritual importance. In Religion and the Order of Nature, the same text where 
Nasr defines the Divine Body as being beyond this world, he also affirms the presence of 
the divine in the physical body, both our fleshly bodies and the body of the physical 
world of nature as a whole. 
[T]he rediscovery of the wisdom of the body and its assertion as authentic 
knowledge is the key to the reestablishment of the correct rapport with the world 
of nature and the rediscovery of its sacred quality. As long as we consider the 
body as a mere machine, it is not possible to take seriously the religious 
understanding of the order of nature nor to live in harmony with it. To rediscover 
the body as the theater of Divine Presence and manifestation of Divine Wisdom 
as well as an aspect of reality that is at once an intimate part of our being and a 
part of the natural order is to reestablish a bridge between ourselves and the world 
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of nature beyond the merely physical and utilitarian. To rediscover the body as the 
abode of the Spirit, worthy of Resurrection before the Lord, and intimate 
companion of the soul’s journey in this world, sacred in itself and in the life 
which permeates it, is to rediscover at the same time the sacredness of nature. It is 
to reestablish our link with the plants and animals, with the streams, mountains, 
and the stars. It is to experience the presence of the Spirit in the physical 
dimension of our existence as well as in the world of nature to which we are 
linked both physically and spiritually, through our bodies as well as our souls and 
the Spirit which is reflected both in our bodies as the temples of God and the 
world of nature as the theater of theophanies and mirror of Divine Creativity.
44
 
 
While not identifying the world as God’s body per se, Nasr does use the theme of 
the body as a primary way of understanding the world, both our relationship to nature and 
God’s relation to nature. For example, he writes: 
The human body also corresponds to the cosmos, not only in the sense of sharing 
with it the same constituent elements, but in containing in miniature form the 
whole cosmos. It is by virtue of this correspondence between us as living bodies, 
soul, and spirit and the cosmos as a whole, which is also alive—having its own 
“soul” and dominated by the Spirit—that we are able to know the cosmos. We 
also occupy a special and central position in it because of our being the cosmic 
totality in miniature form, a replica of the Universe, so that in the deepest sense 
the body of the cosmos is our body.
45
 
 
For Nasr, as for McFague, the world is a body and it is through our bodies that we can 
recognize our unity with the whole natural world. We would be remiss not to observe the 
major difference here between Nasr and McFague, that Nasr maintains the idea that the 
human body is in a special way the “cosmic totality in miniature form,” an idea which 
affirms that human beings occupy a “special and central position” in the cosmos. 
McFague, in The Body of God, specifically argues for a non-anthropocentric view of the 
world as body, which does not identify the world as a body that corresponds specifically 
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to the human body, but that corresponds to the infinite diversity and interconnection of all 
the bodies of life on earth—insects, trees, animals, water bodies, etc. This is an 
intentionally biocentric rather than anthropocentric perspective on body. However, this 
conceptual difference should not be overblown, and should be seen in the context of the 
deeper unity of Nasr and McFague’s understanding of the body and the world. 
 The deepest level of the body cosmology of Nasr and McFague affirms the 
mystical unity of the human being with the body of the world. As Nasr writes, “in the 
deepest sense the body of the cosmos is our body.”46 For Nasr, this unity between the 
human being and nature is spiritually substantive, insofar as the Spirit of God animates 
all bodies. 
Our intimate contact with the forms of nature around us as well as attraction to the 
beauty of the stars issues not from simple sentimentality but from an inner 
sympatheia, which relates us to all things, a union of essences of “inner breath” to 
which Rumi refers as hamdami and which joins us, in our mind and body bi-unity, 
to the world about us and finally to the entire cosmos.
47
 
 
Because the Spirit within the human being is the same Spirit which inbreathes all bodies 
and all of creation, it is distinctly possible for humans to become alive to their 
interconnection and deep unity with all life. The deepest affirmation of this experience is 
the insight that “the world is our body,” an insight that McFague shares with Nasr. 
Universal Self and Universal Man 
 In Blessed Are the Consumers McFague lays out her concept of what she calls 
“the universal self,” a concept which she draws from her readings of the lives of saints 
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such as John Woolman, Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King Jr., Simone Weil, and Gandhi. 
For McFague, such saints achieved a new awareness of self—self not limited to their 
egos but rather universal, embracing all life—through a process of self-emptying or 
kenosis: “relinquishing material and emotional possessions (voluntary poverty) and 
diverting attention from the self to others.”48 Each of the saints McFague looks at 
describes this process differently. “Weil called this process decreation; Woolman 
described it as attaining single vision; and Day experienced it in the sharing of the last 
crust of bread around a table.”49 However, for McFague their essential experience is the 
same. Through loving others intentionally they take their focus off themselves and 
develop a new consciousness, a consciousness like God’s. They all emerged from this 
process of self-emptying with a new sense of self that runs counter to the concept of the 
ego-bound individual: 
This new view could be called the “universal” self. Its signature characteristic is 
that is has no boundaries: the understanding of the self here does not stop with 
one’s own body, or the bodies of one’s loved ones, or the bodies of similar 
people, or the bodies of human beings, or even the bodies of other animals, or 
amazingly even all bodies, for it includes the systems that keep bodies flourishing 
(water, land, climate, air).
50
 
 
The process of becoming or awakening to the universal self is both ethical and mystical. 
It is based first of all on an ethical commitment to love our neighbors, but also involves 
the more mystical element of the death of the ego. John Woolman, for example, has a 
dream in which he hears a voice say, “John Woolman is dead.” This marks his realization 
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of the universal self. Voluntary poverty and self-emptying lead a person away from a 
self-centered view into a “stretching of one’s body (and bodily needs) beyond the limits 
of one’s own skin.” The result of this process is that “the world becomes my body.”51 
McFague declares: “The world is your body; you are a universal self, and hence to love 
others as yourself means the extension of the same feelings of empathy, attention to basic 
needs, and concern for recognition of intrinsic value that one “naturally” has for 
oneself.”52 
 Nasr also argues that the basis of the experience that the “the body of the cosmos 
is our body” issues “not from simple sentimentality but from an inner sympatheia.” 
McFague makes the same argument that it is “through emotion,” through love, that the 
sense of universal self develops in the saints.
53
 Interestingly, as McFague expounds her 
theory of the universal self, she expresses her hunch that the notion of kenosis or self-
emptying that leads to the universal self is central not only to Christianity but “to other 
wisdom traditions,” though she finds that she is “not equipped to substantiate that 
claim.”54 Apparently, the only religion besides Christianity that McFague knows well 
enough to write at length about is Buddhism, a religion which she believes also has an 
understanding of the universal self. Leaving aside the question of the full range of 
traditions that may have corollaries to the universal self, let us consider a parallel concept 
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from the Sufi tradition that plays a central role in Nasr’s ecological anthropology: the 
universal man.  
On its face, Nasr’s concept of the universal man encodes that perennial difference 
between Nasr as a traditionalist who insists on retaining traditional male language for the 
deity and humanity, and McFague as a feminist who would not in any case use a term 
such as “man” to speak of human beings in general or “he” to speak of God. And, yet, on 
the mystical level, there are profound parallels between these two concepts. We need to 
push right through this difference regarding gender, recognizing it but not trying to 
resolve it here. Nasr comments in a relatively recent text that the “Universal Man” 
“includes Woman” and “is inwardly the androgynic being who possesses the perfection 
of both sexes.” Apparently, Nasr does not mean to exclude women from participation in 
the fulfillment of the universal man, the state of human perfection. However, he qualifies 
this statement with the idea that “human beings, male or female, cannot attain that 
perfection save by remaining faithful to the norms and conditions that each gender 
implies.” Thus Nasr makes observance of the gender distinctions of Sharia Law a 
condition to the achievement of the state of the universal man. “To reject the distinct and 
distinguishable features of the two sexes and the Sacred Legislation based on this 
objective cosmic reality is to live below the human level; to be, in fact, only accidentally 
human.”55 One can see how disagreements simply on the nomenclature of universal 
“self” versus universal “man,” with the ideological differences these ways of speaking 
imply, could completely block a meaningful discussion between Nasr and McFague on 
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this subject. What is indeed “universal” in their conceptions could be lost in the conflict 
of “self” vs. “man,” of gender neutral vs. gender distinct visions of humanity.  
 Nasr first describes his concept of the universal man in Science and Civilization in 
Islam (1968), a text which surveys and summarizes the Islamic tradition of science and 
cosmology: “Since the universe is the “body” of the Logos, and since the Logos also 
manifests itself microcosmically in man, the gnostic gains greater intimacy with the 
universe the more he becomes integrated into the luminous source of his own being.”56 
Nasr states that in the Sufi tradition “the Prophet is the Universal Man par excellence” 
who most fully manifests the Logos at the center of human nature. He also asserts that 
other religions’ (or diverse spiritualities’) prophets and great saints also could be said to 
have achieved the status of universal man. Furthermore, he argues, in a certain sense all 
people participate in this aspect of human nature by virtue of our “central position in the 
cosmos…although higher states of being remain latent for the majority of men, and 
become fully realized only in the person of the gnostic, or the perfect Sufi, who has 
reached ‘the end of the path.’”57 In this text Nasr’s focus in his description of the 
universal man is mostly cosmological rather than experiential. He is concerned with 
situating the universal man hierarchically in terms of who participates in this fulfillment 
of human nature. Furthermore, Nasr is concerned with describing what it is that the 
universal man knows in the ontological or cosmological sense:  “The contemplative 
presents himself before God as part of the creation to which he is wed, not only by the 
                                                        
56
 Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 339. 
 
57
 Ibid., 340. 
  
296 
elements of his own body, but also by that Spirit which is the source of his own being, as 
well as of the universe.”58 The universal man is aware of his central role in the universe 
and is alive not only to the material but to the spiritual interconnection of all creation via 
the spirit of life. For Nasr the mystical awareness of the universal man grasps that the 
inner Logos and Spirit of the human being is one and the same as the cosmic Logos and 
Spirit whose body is the world.  
 Nasr also comments on this topic in Man and Nature (1967), arguing that the goal 
of human existence is to become the universal man: “The purpose of man’s appearance in 
this world is, according to Islam, in order to gain total knowledge of things, to become 
the Universal Man (al-insan al-kamil), the mirror reflecting all the Divine Names and 
Qualities.” Human nature has a supremely important role in Islamic mysticism. The goal 
of human beings is one and the same as the goal of God in creating the universe and 
human beings: “The purpose and aim of creation is in fact for God to come ‘to know’ 
Himself through His perfect instrument of knowledge that is the Universal Man.”59 
Human beings’ knowledge of self, world, and God, is God’s way of knowing “Himself.” 
This is a belief at the core of Sufi mystical understanding of the unity of being.  
Nasr does not speak of the process of becoming the universal man primarily in 
ethical terms, but rather in spiritual and ontological terms: “Man sees in nature what he is 
himself and penetrates into the inner meaning of nature only on the condition of being 
able to delve into the depths of his own being and to cease to lie merely on the periphery 
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of his being.”60 For McFague, there is a process of kenosis or self-emptying that begins 
with loving others, but Nasr’s focus is on a process of introspection that begins by turning 
within. McFague focuses on the ethical aspects of the process of becoming the universal 
self through retelling the stories of certain saints; she believes that the journey begins 
with loving other human bodies. When we learn to love beyond ourselves we eventually 
grow into the universal self that loves the body of the whole world and recognizes it as 
our body. Nasr apparently focuses on the spiritual aspects; by getting in touch with the 
center of one’s being one becomes aware of the deep, inner connection between one’s 
true self and the true self of the world, so to speak. This is an important complementary 
difference. However, it is notable that McFague’s concept of the universal self, though it 
is formally based on the lives of the saints she mentions in Life Abundant, represents an 
interpretation of these lives that would not have been possible without the spiritual 
awakening or conversation she experienced through an intentional spiritual practice that 
she describes in the beginning of the book. By the same token, Nasr could also have 
described the ethical dimensions of the lives of Sufi saints who participated in the nature 
of universal man.  
 In Nasr’s thought, the universal man is associated with contemplatives, sages, and 
saints, as well as with his other expressions for the ideal human being such as pontifical 
man or pontifex. In one significant discussion of this ideal man later in his career, Nasr 
describes “his” significance in terms of love for nature (rather than knowledge). After 
briefly surveying some samples of ecstatic Sufi love poetry to nature, he writes: 
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The Muslim contemplatives and mystics have loved nature with such intensity 
because they have been able to hear the prayer of all creatures of the natural world 
to God…Fallen man, who has forgotten God, has become deaf to this ubiquitous 
prayer as a result of this forgetfulness. The sage on the contrary, lives in 
remembrance of God (dhikr Allah) and as a result hears the prayers of flowers as 
they turn toward the sun and streams as they descend from hills toward the sea. 
The sage’s prayer has become one with the prayer of the birds and the trees, of the 
mountains and the stars…They in turn draw an invisible sustenance from the 
human being who is open to the grace emanating from the realm of the Spirit and 
who fulfills his or her role as the pontifex, the bridge between heaven and earth.
61
 
 
Nasr is convinced that human beings, especially the universal man, play an essential role 
in the health of the cosmos: “In fact man is the channel of grace for nature; through his 
active participation in the spiritual world he casts light into the world of nature. He is the 
mouth through which nature breathes and lives…Were there to be no more 
contemplatives and saints, nature would become deprived of the light that illuminates it 
and the air which keeps it alive.”62  McFague, after experiencing her fourth conversion, 
also affirms this view of human beings as channels of grace: “When we become aware of 
God, who is the Alpha and Omega, as the source and goal of everything and of all life, 
love, and power, then we become channels for these realities both in our own lives and 
for others. We become available to be ‘saved’ (restored to health and happiness) and to 
help ‘save’ others.”63 Both McFague’s concept of the universal self and Nasr’s concept of 
the universal man consider the fulfillment of human nature to hinge on the consciousness 
of interconnection with the whole body of the world. They both consider this fulfilled and 
centered human being as playing an essential role in reversing the ecological crisis. In a 
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sense, this universal person would be the concrete fulfillment of their theologies on the 
human level, just as a resacralized city would be the fulfillment of their theologies on the 
level of architecture and city planning. 
 Nasr and McFague’s concepts of the universal self and universal man are not 
identical, but they are complementary. They both represent ideals of human nature as 
fulfilled in the lives of saints, prophets, and sages. Human beings find fulfillment in 
living consciously within the world as a body of which our bodies are a part.  
The logic of both of their arguments is that we need Christians and Muslims to 
become fully human in this sense. I think it would not be remiss to ask at this point, 
rather directly, a set of questions that neither McFague nor Nasr would ask: “To what 
extent is McFague the universal self? To what extent is Nasr the universal man? To what 
extent are these concepts embodied and realized by these authors?” The ability to 
dialogue and find common ground with each other and to recognize each other’s 
“universal” connection to the Spirit that permeates all creation would seem to be 
important criteria of the universal man and universal self. The universality of this state of 
being should enable McFague and Nasr to have empathy and mutual understanding 
although they are rooted in different cultures and opposing ideologies. Saints of every 
religion are needed to resacralize their own bodies, and through them, the body of the 
world. At the very least, we should expect of a Muslim “universal man” or Christian 
“universal self” that they would be able to resacralize each other and each other’s religion 
in their own eyes; hopefully, such examplars would help to resacralize the religious other 
in the perception of the constituencies they represent. The ecological saint of the 21
st
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century must be one who sees the universal Spirit in the biodiversity of creation as well 
as in the spiritual diversity of human cultures, religions, and spiritual understandings.  
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CONCLUSION 
HOPE FOR DIALOGUE 
 In Search of a Christian-Muslim Common Path from Desacralization to 
Resacralization of Nature has modeled a dialogical process that involves carefully 
listening to the story of the other (chapters 1 and 2), and understanding the other’s 
perspectives contextually (chapters 3 and 4), before engaging in dialogue. In the dialogue 
we constructed, we first acknowledged and described Nasr’s and McFague’s differences 
in detail (chapter 5). Their differences are significant. Nasr and McFague disagree about 
the use of male-gendered language for God and humanity, the status of evolutionary 
theory, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s synthesis of theology and evolutionary science, the 
interpretation of scripture, and the value of medieval theology (among other differences). 
Their disagreements indicate the ideological gulf between Nasr as a traditionalist Muslim 
and McFague as a postmodern eco-feminist. However, these differences are not 
particularly related to McFague’s and Nasr’s engagement with the problem of the 
ecological crisis. They are general ideological differences that would be present between 
McFague and Nasr when discussing any theological or ethical issue, rather than 
differences that are related in particular to how they interpret the ecological crisis.  
 In our search for places of agreement between the authors we have discovered 
that Nasr and McFague share profound common ground in their diagnoses of the 
ecological crisis as a spiritual crisis (chapter 6). Both lament the desacralization of nature 
in the modern worldview as a fall. In response, they have been working on the same 
project of resacralizing nature by highlighting the presence of God’s Spirit in the world 
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and shifting our view of the world from a mechanistic view to an organic view. Nasr’s 
and McFague’s common ground also extends, more concretely, to their proposals to 
reintegrate nature into cities, and to their understanding of the body as the primary means 
of connection with nature (chapter 7). This dissertation demonstrates that in their search 
to understand the ecological crisis, and the roles of their respective religions in remedying 
this crisis, McFague and Nasr have come to strikingly similar conclusions. However, 
questions remain: Why did these thinkers fail to recognize their common ground? How 
can current and future generations of scholars and theologians engage in Christian-
Muslim dialogue about the ecological crisis more successfully? 
 In keeping with the dialogical methodology of this dissertation, this chapter will 
reflect upon the dialogue constructed in the preceding chapters through a comparative 
analysis of Nasr and McFague’s own statements regarding interfaith dialogue about the 
ecological crisis. Based on a critique and synthesis of these statements, this chapter will 
suggest a new way to frame interfaith dialogue between postmodern Christians and 
traditional Muslims. Rather than pit postmodernists and traditionalists against each other, 
this model of dialogue situates the project of the resacralization of nature within the more 
inclusive category of “non-modern.” It acknowledges the value of both postmodern and 
traditional religious insights to the resilience of the resacralization movement. This type 
of dialogical diversity is itself ecological, insofar as it values religio-diversity, which is 
akin to bio-diversity; it recognizes each religion in its various paradigms as integral parts 
of the larger body of spiritual and religious life. However, the potentiality for interfaith 
unity and collaboration regarding the ecological crisis cannot be fulfilled by merely 
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outlining a method for dialogue or demonstrating that there is common ground to be 
discovered. Such conceptualizations may be helpful guides, but they need to be fulfilled 
in experience by persons who are committed to carrying out this type of dialogue. The 
unity of the body of the world is fulfilled by the universal person, who consciously 
inhabits this unified body. So too, the unity of world religions requires actualization by 
the universal person, who reveals the interconnection and interdependence of different 
faith-perspectives through dialogue and cooperation with persons of other faiths.   
Relative(ly) Absolute 
 For Nasr, the proper goal of interfaith collaboration and dialogue is unity, rather 
than uniformity. He understands unity as a condition that maintains the distinctness of 
diverse religious forms: “Metaphysically speaking, unity lies at the opposite pole of 
uniformity, and the reduction of religions to a least common denominator in the name of 
the religious unity of mankind is no more than a parody of the ‘transcendent unity of 
religions’ which characterizes the traditional point of view.”1 For Nasr, interfaith 
dialogue must balance the goals of unity and cooperation with the goal of maintaining the 
integrity of each religious tradition. He is wary of subsuming what is distinct in each 
religion into some type of vague, interfaith synthesis of ideas. He seeks a form of 
interfaith dialogue that steadfastly maintains the distinctiveness of traditions and 
preserves interlocutors’ religious convictions. From what Bellah calls the “modern” 
religious perspective, an interfaith dialogue may be pursued as part and parcel of the hope 
of “remaking the world including the very symbolic forms with which he deals with it, 
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even the forms that state the unalterable conditions of his own existence.”2 But for Nasr 
and other traditionalists, transformation of the symbolic forms of one’s religion is not a 
goal of interfaith dialogue: 
Many ecumenists expect people of different faiths to become transformed by the 
very process of carrying out a religious dialogue and that, through the continuity 
of such a process, religions themselves will become transformed. One does not, 
however, usually bother to ask into what they would be transformed, the 
assumption being that better understanding itself is the final goal rather than 
understanding of another world of sacred form and meaning through the 
preservation of one’s own tradition.3 
 
For Nasr, the goal of dialogue is not to transform one’s religion or spirituality but to gain 
“understanding of another world of sacred form and meaning through the preservation of 
one’s own tradition.” This sentiment is consistent with Nasr’s general approach to 
dialogue with Western Christianity. He seeks to highlight intellectual and spiritual 
resources from the Islamic tradition, which correlate with similar resources within the 
Christian tradition. Through dialogue, Christians might recover their lost cosmology and 
metaphysics, and regain access to “another world of sacred form and meaning.”  
 The traditionalist mode of interfaith dialogue, as pioneered by Rene Guenon, 
Frithjof Schuon, and others, is adapted to comparing religions in their traditional forms. 
This mode of comparison assumes that a sense of sacred inviolability of scriptures, 
doctrines and rituals will be held more or less in common across traditions. One common 
feature of traditional religions which is especially important to Nasr is the quality of 
absoluteness regarding the religions’ truth-claims. In the traditional school, the doctrine 
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of the “relative absolute” helps explain how to engage in dialogue between religions that 
apparently have competing claims to absolute truth: 
A key concept in the understanding of the significance of the multiplicity of 
religions is that of the “relatively absolute” which, although it might appear to 
some as being contradictory, is impregnated with meaning of crucial importance 
once it is fully comprehensible…Principial knowledge can defend the absolute 
character which followers of each religion see in their beliefs and tenets, without 
which human beings would not follow a particular religion. Yet principial 
knowledge continues to assert the primordial truth that only the Absolute is 
absolute and hence what appears below the level of the Absolute in a particular 
tradition as absolute is the “relatively absolute.”4 
 
For Nasr, the doctrine of the “relatively absolute” allows for an appreciation of the 
absolute nature of faith convictions which give gravity and coherence to religious life 
within a particular faith. At the same time, it recognizes that the absolutes of various 
faiths are more or less equally relative to the Absolute rather than being mutually 
exclusive of each other. This is the rationale by which thinkers in the traditionalist school 
adhere to their religious traditions with full conviction, as reflections of the Absolute, 
while at the same time being open-minded enough to explore and appreciate other 
religious and philosophical traditions as paths to Truth. 
Interestingly, McFague uses very similar language to situate her own theology in 
relation to the Absolute, speaking of her theology as unified around what she calls a 
“relative absolute.” As for Nasr, for McFague, “the only absolute, the only certainty, the 
only universal, is God.”5 McFague argues that all great theologians, including Augustine 
and Aquinas, “have been conscious that certainty is neither in oneself nor in one’s words, 
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but in God alone.” McFague’s concept of “the relative absolute” is different from Nasr’s 
concept of “the relatively absolute.” Nasr is speaking more about a revealed religious 
tradition in general being relatively absolute; he sees each religion as a sacred form 
representing the Absolute which, in Its essence, is beyond all form.  
For McFague, the relative absolute is something much more personal: it is “a 
central conviction that is neither a foundation nor the ‘essence’ of Christianity, but a 
deeply held, abiding insight into God’s relation to us.” For example, consider McFague’s 
relative absolute, as stated in Life Abundant: “The glory of God is every creature fully 
alive and, therefore, we live to give God glory by loving the world and everything in it.”6 
For McFague, this is an extremely important statement, yet not one she would frame as 
absolutely true: 
This is not an absolute, because I know it is simply my interpretation of the 
relation between God and the world, but it is a relative absolute because it informs 
everything else I say about God and the world (all the doctrines of Christian 
faith), and I hold it with a deep and growing commitment. It has been developing 
in me throughout my entire life, and I could no more deny it than deny myself. 
The value of a relative absolute is that it gives unity and coherence to a theology, 
but in a fluid, open, changing way.
7
  
 
For McFague, her personal theology, rather than her religion as such, is her relative 
absolute. Unlike Nasr—who theologizes on behalf of traditional Islam, the Qur’an, 
principial knowledge, or the philosophia perennis—McFague speaks for herself. She 
does not make the claim that her point of view is the point of view of the Christian 
tradition, for example, or even the most authentic or preferred point of view. Therefore, 
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she repeatedly invites her readers “to ‘pass over’ my theology in order to work on your 
own.”8 Although McFague works out her definition of the relative absolute in a very 
different way than Nasr, she does acknowledge that her insight into her theology’s 
relativity is akin to the insight of Augustine, Aquinas, and every other great theologian. 
Her insight is not, therefore, distinctly postmodern, but rather perennial in nature. Surely, 
then, there is a possibility for interlocutors as different as McFague and Nasr to recognize 
each other’s theologies as relative(ly) absolute, and to engage in dialogue on that basis.  
Again, this correlation between Nasr’s “relatively absolute” and McFague’s 
“relative absolute” does not represent an exact conceptual match. A similar duality 
appears in this comparison as has been encountered throughout this dissertation. 
McFague’s approach represents her egalitarian concept of knowledge; she assumes that 
her own view may be equally valuable to her reader’s view. Nasr’s approach represents 
his hierarchical concept of knowledge; he assumes that he has legitimate authority as a 
distinguished scholar and practitioner of traditional Islam to speak on behalf of Islam and 
the philosophia perennis. Given this difference, it might be difficult for Nasr to accept 
McFague’s theology as partaking of the relatively absolute nature of Christianity. In 
Nasr’s theological perspective, deconstruction of traditional Christian doctrines and 
scriptures would appear to violate the integrity of the Christian tradition as a revealed 
religion, which gives it the quality of absoluteness.  
Meanwhile, Nasr would appear to be implicated by McFague’s definition of 
fundamentalism: “Fundamentalism is the refusal to acknowledge our limitations: it is the 
                                                        
8
 Ibid., 128. 
  
308 
attempt to avoid the risky business that theology intrinsically is by claiming that 
‘revelation,’ usually in the form of an inerrant Scripture, is the literal Word of God.”9 For 
Nasr, the Qur’an is most definitely the Divine Word: “Traditional Islam accepts, of 
course, without any ifs, ands, or buts, the Noble Quran in both content and form as the 
Word of God, as the earthly embodiment of God’s Eternal Word, uncreated in its essence 
and without temporal origin.”10 For Nasr the Qur'an and Islam are ultimately “relatively 
absolute,” allowing for full affirmation of other religious traditions despite formal 
differences or contradictions. Nevertheless, it would be a violation of the sacred form of 
Islam to deny that the Qur’an is a revelation. Yet is it fair to call Nasr, who appreciates 
and accepts the truth of numerous religions and spiritualities, a fundamentalist?  
In fact, Nasr is well aware of the problem of fundamentalism in contemporary 
Islam. One of the major differences between traditional and fundamentalist Islam is their 
different methods of interpreting scripture. Nasr’s mode of interpreting scripture, being 
pre-modern or traditionalist, would be much closer to an Aquinas or Augustine than a 
modern day Protestant fundamentalist. His method of interpretation includes linguistics, 
historical data, metaphysical and mystical insight, numerous written commentaries, oral 
tradition, Hadith, etc., whereas a fundamentalist relies upon the “literal and external 
meaning of the words alone.”11 With such a broad definition of fundamentalist as 
McFague espouses, the majority of living Muslim scholars of Islam could be lumped 
together with Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, John Hagee, etc. Such mislabeling could 
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present a major obstacle to dialogue and understanding between Christians and Muslims. 
It is essential to know of which specific tradition one is speaking, before delimiting the 
acceptable parameters and methods of scriptural interpretation. While McFague’s 
definition of “fundamentalist” may be useful in the context of Christianity, its application 
to Islam is dubious. By the same token, Nasr’s understanding of what it means to be 
faithful to tradition, in an Islamic context, cannot fairly be applied to McFague or 
Western Christians in general. 
However, despite these differences in the meaning of “relative absolute” and 
“relatively absolute,” there is considerable overlap in the way these concepts shape the 
theological missions of McFague and Nasr. For example, although McFague emphasizes 
the personal dimension of her “relative absolute,” her theology also emphasizes 
traditional Christian doctrines such as the incarnation and kenosis. Her theology is 
grounded in her personal experience, but she is also committed to working within the 
framework of the Bible and Christian tradition. As she puts it, “The theologian will say: 
‘I believe it. I believe it is Christian. I believe it is good for the world.’”12 In this light, her 
method is not so different than Nasr’s. Rhetorically, Nasr is typically only concerned 
with the last two out of three criteria in McFague’s process of testing a relative absolute 
conviction. Even his rendition of these last two criteria would be somewhat different: 
instead of saying, “I believe it is Muslim. I believe it is good for the world.” he might say, 
“It is Muslim and good for the world.” For Nasr, “I believe” is implicit, though often 
unexpressed. Clearly Nasr believes in his own interpretation of Islam, and he interprets 
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Islam mindful of what he believes is good for the world in the context of the ecological 
crisis. However, his theology is not self-consciously a personal or subjective view of how 
Islam or other religions speak to the spiritual crisis underlying the ecological crisis. 
Rather, it is conceived as a traditionally accurate or objective point of view.  
 Despite the inevitable differences in the way McFague and Nasr conceptualize 
their theologies relative to the Absolute, their concepts are similar enough that, in theory, 
they should provide a suitable framework for dialogue. Both thinkers invest their 
theologies with approximately the same degree of absoluteness, while acknowledging the 
same absolute, God, to which their theologies are relative. Both theologians are aware of 
the problem of a rigid absoluteness that unnecessarily denies the convictions of other 
persons of faith. In Blessed Are the Consumers, McFague gives elegant voice to the 
virtue of theological humility. This is McFague’s latest book, one in which she is more 
convinced than ever of the relevancy and vitality of her organic model. Yet, 
paradoxically, her increasing conviction is matched by increasing humbleness: 
Thus what we see emerging from these reflections is a modest, relative, 
qualified—indeed, humble—mode of operation in which we are moved by a 
vision for a better world, but not in an absolute way. Utopias are important: 
imagining another way is critical to actually moving toward the new vision, but 
again, it is not up to us, the few privileged ones who can set the stage for what 
should happen and then control others so that our vision will dominate. We have 
seen many instances of totalitarian thinking—people who are certain that their 
vision of the way things should be is the only right way, and if not their way, no 
way! This mind-set is entirely alien to kenosis.
13
 
 
McFague is certain that her vision is a right way, but not the only right way. In Man and 
Nature, when Nasr first attempted to begin a conversation with a Western Christian 
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audience regarding the ecological crisis, he did so in hope that Christians would be 
willing to sincerely listen to the wisdom of his tradition: 
If a day were to come when Christianity, rather than trying to convert the 
followers of Oriental religions, should also try to understand them and enter into 
an intellectual dialogue with them then Oriental metaphysics, which is also in its 
essence the philosophia perennis, as well as the cosmological doctrines of the 
Oriental traditions (which could also be referred to as cosmologia perennis), could 
act as a cause and occasion for recollection of elements forgotten in the Christian 
tradition. They could aid in restoring a spiritual vision of nature that would be 
able to provide the background for the sciences.
14
 
 
Implicit in this call is Nasr’s hope for mutual appreciation between Christianity and 
Oriental traditions, including Islam. He hopes that they can engage in a dialogue that does 
not posit the superiority of one tradition over another, but that is mutually enriching. Yet 
despite their wariness of absolutism, and their openness to other perspectives, both 
thinkers appear to absolutize an element of their theologies—not the Christian or Islamic 
element but the “postmodern” for McFague and the “traditional” for Nasr. If McFague 
and Nasr were religious absolutists, and believed in the superiority of their particular 
religions as such, they probably would not have engaged in interfaith dialogue in the first 
place. However, because of their methodological absolutism or rigidness, they were 
unable to engage in this dialogue with each other successfully. 
Methodological Absolutism 
 Nasr considers “the real battle of the future as not being between Islam and the 
West, but between tradition and modernism/postmodernism in both Islam and the West 
and in fact throughout the world.”15 Beginning in Man and Nature, he uncompromisingly 
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presented traditionalism as the only way for Western Christians to overcome the 
ecological crisis. Only through the recovery of a pre-modern cosmology, including the 
traditional hierarchy of Heaven over Earth, could ecological balance be restored in the 
West. In Religion and the Order of Nature Nasr makes a very similar argument. The 
resacralization of nature in human perception can only be achieved through a revival of 
traditional religion: 
And this remembrance and rediscovery can only be achieved through religion in 
its traditional forms as the repositories of the Sacred and the means of access to it. 
Furthermore, such a transformation can only come about through the revival of 
the religious knowledge of the order of nature, which itself means the undoing of 
the negative effects of all those processes of transformation of man’s image of 
himself, his thought, and the world about him that have characterized the history 
of the West during the past five centuries and to which we have alluded in the 
earlier chapters of this work.
16
 
 
In the above quotation, Nasr’s method itself has been absolutized into an only way that 
invalidates postmodern Christianity and other forms of postmodern spirituality. This is a 
road that is apparently blocked to McFague and other postmodern Christians.  
 McFague’s theological method of deconstruction and reconstruction might sound, 
to Nasr, just as much like a battle cry as his traditional method of recovery might to her: 
We live within the models we create, and when they control our actions in ways 
that are diminishing and destructive, we have the responsibility to suggest 
alternative models. This is, I believe, action of the highest order and the greatest 
importance; to refuse this task is to refuse the role of human beings on the planet. 
We are fast destroying the planet by our actions taken within a false model, and 
we owe it to our earth and to each other to imagine and to embody a different 
vision, a different model.
17
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Who is the “we?” Does McFague’s “we” include Nasr and the Muslim world in general? 
Is this a cry to deconstruct the traditional Muslim conception of God or to invalidate the 
Qur’an? No, not directly. McFague’s audience is a North American Christian one. 
However, McFague’s argument that the model of God as King needs to be deconstructed, 
even if directed to a North American Christian audience, alienates Nasr and other 
traditional Muslims. In a traditional Muslim perspective God as King is not a humanly 
constructed model that one can choose whether to accept or not, but an unchanging truth 
revealed by God in the Qur’an.  
Revisions 
To open a pathway to dialogue between Nasr and McFague and others like them, 
the methodological premises of each author require revision. Nasr claims that it is only 
possible to restore humanity’s spiritual vision of nature via a return to pre-modern 
traditions. In direct contradiction of this claim, McFague argues that it is not possible to 
return to a pre-modern worldview. However, both authors agree that a shift is needed so 
that we see the world as a body rather than a machine. In their review of the possibilities 
for a spiritual vision of nature in Christianity, they both cite the same mystics as 
exemplars. The needed revision is simply to remove the element of exclusivity or 
absoluteness from the methods each author proposes for shifting from a mechanistic to an 
organic world view. Rather than viewing these methodologies as mutually exclusive, they 
could be viewed as complementary; while different, each is contextually appropriate. 
Nasr’s strategy of recovering a pre-modern cosmology need not be seen as the only way 
to restore “our” spiritual vision of nature. If this “our” is meant to be inclusive of all those 
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seeking to restore a spiritual vision of nature, rather than a select audience of 
traditionalists, this strategy must be seen as one of many. Likewise, McFague’s 
postmodern construction of an organic model of the world does not need to be built on 
the premise that Nasr’s type of recovery strategy is impossible. Both authors position 
their theological projects in ways that exclude the other’s methodology as impossible, 
and thus push each other from the category of “we” into the category of “they.” Instead 
of conceptualizing these methodologies as mutually exclusive, Nasr’s and McFague’s 
methodologies could regard their own strategies not as only ways but as ways, and regard 
each other’s strategies as possibilities rather than impossibilities. These suggested 
revisions are meant to widen Nasr’s and McFague’s conceptions of “us” so that they 
include each other.  
Both postmodernists and traditionalists are equally non-modern. If Nasr and 
McFague regarded each other as pursuing different possible responses to the problem of 
the modern reductionist worldview they would be more open to a dialogue that might 
reveal how their insights might be integrated or mutually reinforcing. With a few 
linguistically minor but conceptually major changes, Nasr and McFague could go beyond 
seeing each other as enemies going in opposite directions. Instead, they could see each 
other as collaborators from different cultural, political, and religious contexts. They could 
recognize and appreciate that they share profound common ground in terms of their hope 
for a restoration of our spiritual vision of nature and a corresponding transformation of 
the way contemporary people relate to nature.  
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 Of course, even if McFague and Nasr were to find common ground under the 
banner of the “non-modern,” this still leaves the challenge of finding common ground 
with potential allies in the modern paradigm who may also want to join the 
resacralization movement (or work together on addressing the ecological crisis on some 
other common basis). In A New Climate for Theology, McFague stretches in this direction 
of greater unity during her discussion of the doctrine of kenosis (self-emptying): “Giving 
space is a basic Christian doctrine, but it is also deep at the center of most religions—and 
it is felt in the hearts of all people, whether religious or not, who know that ‘love is the 
discovery of reality,’ the realization that something besides oneself is real.”18 The same 
process of kenosis that is so essential to fashioning a sustainable way of life on Earth is 
also essential to interfaith dialogue. In order for interfaith dialogue or dialogue between 
religion and science to be successful, we need to make space for each other. When we 
make exclusive or absolute claims about our perspectives, we crowd others out and there 
is no room to stand together on common ground. The art of interfaith dialogue is to 
humbly and empathetically make room for others’ perspectives as possibilities alongside 
one’s own, as indeed they are.  
  McFague and Nasr both describe ways of seeing the natural world that correct the 
reduction and objectification of nature in the modern worldview. Their concepts of this 
different way of seeing are strikingly similar. McFague speaks of viewing nature with a 
“loving eye” and Nasr speaks of viewing nature with the “eye of the heart.” This 
empathetic way of seeing is also essential to interfaith dialogue. The arrogant eye, the 
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ego, identifies the differences in another person’s perspective as threats that could 
undermine one’s own perspective. The loving eye or eye of the heart views these 
differences empathetically by appreciating how they make sense from the other’s 
perspective. It has the ability to see the common ground one has with the other.  
Hope for Dialogue and Cooperation 
 When Nasr and McFague started writing about the ecological crisis, in the late 
1960’s and early 1980’s, respectively, it was more of a foreboding threat than a present 
danger. In recent years, extreme weather events have more and more been implicated as 
effects of global climate change. Awareness of the ecological crisis is growing as the 
problem becomes more and more undeniable. International cooperation in addressing this 
crisis is increasingly imperative. Therefore, interfaith dialogue remains a major priority. 
This dissertation reveals the possibility for this dialogue to succeed now, even where it 
has failed in the past. Nasr’s and McFague’s works developed common and 
complementary themes as they plumbed the depths of the causes of, and potential 
solutions to, the ecological crisis. Unfortunately, this commonality went unrecognized; it 
was hid, as it were, beneath obvious ideological differences. My hope is that a growing 
sense of urgency will lead to renewed efforts to dialogue and find common ground.  
As the ecological crisis worsens, it could shift radically in human consciousness 
and become a primary existential concern. Such a shift would make other ideological 
concerns secondary or relative, allowing interlocutors of different ideologies to discern 
their common ground on this issue. Among theologians a generation or two after Nasr 
and McFague, such a willingness to find common ground on the ecological crisis might 
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already be great enough for their secondary ideological concerns to be held more loosely 
in the dialogue process. The pressure of a now currently devastating ecological crisis 
might indeed force theologians out of either/or thinking into both/and thinking that is 
constructive and pragmatic. Necessity may help us see each other through the loving eye 
or the eye of the heart. In such a pressure cooker of circumstances theologians of 
traditionalist and postmodern sensibilities may be more comfortable synthesizing their 
ideas with those of the other, or accepting elements of the other’s ideas despite 
outstanding differences. Indeed, in such a context, differences over gendered language 
and scientific theories, for example, may begin to seem more negotiable. Theologians 
across this ideological spectrum might acknowledge their common ground as “non-
moderns” seeking ecological healing and balance, and work together to nurture a 
spirituality meant to help bring us in that direction.  
As the ecological crisis progresses in unpredictable ways, one cannot easily 
predict how the overall discourse of ecological theology and ethics will shift. In McFague 
and Nasr we see a core of common ground that may abide for quite some time, in terms 
of the common project of moving from a desacralized, scientifically reduced view of 
nature to one that recognizes the sacred dimensions and ontological complexity of the 
natural world as a living body animated by the Spirit of God. As the destruction of nature 
progresses, ecological theologians and ethicists are under increasing pressure to 
understand the causes of the crisis, and to point a way forward. We need to both recover 
and discover spiritual visions and ethical values that will allow human beings to live in 
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harmony with the natural world, rather than in a state of disequilibrium and mutual 
destruction.  
 Interfaith dialogue on the ecological crisis is important and it should continue and 
expand. It will help diverse communities to understand the ecological crisis from their 
particular points of view, to grasp the essential aspects of the problems and propose 
corresponding solutions, and to develop language that will revive the sacredness of nature 
in human perception. A major shift in worldview is needed to support human 
communities and individuals in claiming a sustainable and sustaining place in the web of 
life. As our shared sense of urgency increases, we need to do the groundwork of 
identifying common ground across religious, cultural and intellectual boundaries. This 
will help to demonstrate that interfaith dialogue is worthwhile—that there is an end in 
sight. A lack of knowledge about the parameters and goals of interfaith dialogue may 
lead to dialogical failure if and when more widespread willingness to dialogue exists. 
This, in turn, may frustrate and discourage would-be interlocutors and peacemakers from 
seeking reconciliation and engaging in common projects to effect change.  
In this dissertation we followed a method of dialogue that included several steps: 
introducing the thinkers in their contexts, exploring how their theologies relate to the 
ecological crisis, observing their differences, outlining their common ground, and 
suggesting ways to synthesize their ideas. We discovered that their common ground was 
unrecognized because it was veiled by methodological exclusivism or absolutism. This 
veil can be lifted by empathic dialogue. This dissertation has been successful insofar as it 
has rendered the common ground of McFague and Nasr, as well as present and future 
  
319 
generations of Christian and Muslim eco-theologians, more recognizable. However, this 
unveiling of the common ground of McFague and Nasr is just a starting place. The 
challenge that now stands is for practitioners of Christianity, Islam and other faiths to 
inhabit this common ground by engaging in empathic dialogue and cooperating in efforts 
to resacralize our desacralized world. We are presented with the opportunity to help each 
other cultivate a spiritual vision of nature as a body animated by the Spirit of God that is 
characteristic of what McFague calls the “universal self” and Nasr calls the “universal 
man.” We are called to become universal people who see nature and each other as we 
really are, united in and with the Spirit in whom we live, move, and have our being. 
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Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964.  
 
_________________. Islamic Studies: Essays on Law and Society, the Sciences, and  
Philosophy and Sufism. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1967.  
 
_________________. The Encounter of Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis of  
Modern Man. 1968.  
 
_________________. Science and Civilization in Islam. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard  
University Press, 1968.  
 
_________________. Islam and the Plight of Modern Man. London: Longman, 1975.  
 
_________________, and Roland Michaud. Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study. [S.l.]:  
World of Islam Festival Pub. Co, 1976.  
 
_________________. Knowledge and the Sacred. New York: Crossroad, 1981.  
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Küng, Hans, and Jürgen Moltmann. Islam: A Challenge for Christianity. London: SCM  
Press, 1994. 
 
Race, Alan. Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian theology of  
religions. Maryknoll, Orbis Books: 1982.   
 
Siddiqui, Ataullah.  Christian-Muslim Dialogue in the Twentieth Century.  New York,  
NY: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1997. 
 
Watt, W. Montgomery. Islam and Christianity Today: A Contribution to Dialogue.  
London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1983. 
 
Christianity, Pluralism and Interfaith Dialogue 
 
Cox, Harvey. The Seduction of the Spirit: The Use and Misuse of People’s Religion. New  
York, Simon and Shuster: 1973. 
 
Hick, John. Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion. New Haven,  
Yale University Press: 1993. 
 
Hick, John. God and the Universe of Faiths: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion.  New  
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973.   
 
Knitter, Paul F. Introducing Theologies of Religions; Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2002. 
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À La Conservation De Le̕nvironnement Naturel / by Abou Bakr Ahmed Ba Kader  
... [Et Al.]. Gland, Switzerland: International Union for Conservation of Nature  
and Natural Resources (IUCN), 1983.  
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